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Preface
MISINFORMATION about William Goebel abounds. The
scarcity of published material is surprising concerning a man
represented by historian C. Vann Woodward as the leader of
"the first Southern refDrm movement to make a determined
fight for power." Yet this same man so angered his opposition
that his assassination finally occurred. Volumes have been
written about other American assassinations-Lincoln, Gar-
field, McKinley, the Kennedys, and King. But, compara-
tively, very little scholarly work has been done on this single
instance in our nation's history where a governor died in office
as a result of assassination.
Obviously, this brief work is far from definitive. Nor does it
exhaustively examine the assassination. Rather, it studies the
public career of William Goebel, the atmosphere that resulted
in his death, and his place in politics at a particularly crucial
time for Kentucky and the nation. If this study stimulates
further research, part of the author's objectives will be met.
Newspaperman Urey Woodson once remarked, "Even in our
own State the present generation has but a smattering knowl-
edge of this period. That is what has impelled me to write this
story." What he wrote in 1936 holds true four decades later,
and so this book is an initial attempt to correct that situation.
For such a work, where no large collection of the subject's
papers exists, many institutions must be visited in a search for
material. In particular I wish to acknowledge the aid of Wil-
liam R. Buster, George M. Chinn, Hambleton Tapp, and
many others at the Kentucky Historical Society; Jacqueline
Bull and William J. Marshall of Special Collections at Mar-
garet I. King Library, University of Kentucky; Nelson L.
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Dawson and James R. Bentley of The Filson Club, Louisville;
Edison H. Thomas of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad;
and various members of the Kentucky Library at Western
Kentucky University, the Lexington Public Library, the Li-
brary of Congress, the Cincinnati Law School, and Kenyon
College. .
To critical readers of the manuscript whose suggestions
were what every writer should hope for-although I stub-
bornly did not follow them all-go my sincere thanks. Often
stopping their own work to read the manuscript were John
David Smith, Thomas H. Appleton, Jr., James Larry Hood,
Caye Keller Bland, all of Lexington; Norman L. Snider of
Frankfort; and Charles G. Talbert of the University of Ken-
tucky.
If I were only iconoclastic enough this preface would begin,
rather than close, with acknowledgement of the aid of my
typist, counselor, and wife. Freda is in reality coauthor of all
my work, though her interest in history admittedly lags at
times. To our children, who repeatedly ask "What's history?"
we dedicate this work.
I"LOOK UPON
OPPOSITION
AS OPPORTUNITY"
EARLY ON TUESDAY morning, the sixth of February 1900, a
train carrying the assassinated governor's body slowly moved
from Cincinnati toward the station at Covington. Men,
women, and children, old and young, friend and foe, lined the
tracks to watch the train pass. Stores shut down and workers
left their jobs. Thousands gathered at the station and silently
watched the pallbearers lift out the casket. William Goebel
was returning home.
As the procession moved toward the hall where the body
would lie in state crowds grew so thick that police had to clear
the way. Finally the cortege reached its destination and the
casket was placed in the middle of a large room. A minister
from Saint Paul's German Protestant Church offered a prayer
in German, asking that God have mercy on the soul of the
assassin. When the hall was opened to the public, the mass of
the "common people" passed by; estimates of their numbers
reached 100,000. When the casket was closed late that eve-
ning thousands more stood waiting outside.
In the darkness of an early morning rainstorm the next day
the casket was brought back to the Queen and Crescent line
train, which moved north toward Cincinnati, then south to-
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ward Frankfort. The direct route on the Louisville and Nash-
ville tracks would not be taken-a final, bitter rebuff to the
line which had so opposed the man now dead. As the train
passed through northern Kentucky at every town and hamlet,
every village and station, people stood in the rain for a final
view of the dead leader. The train finally reached Frankfort
and the casket was taken to the Capitol Hotel.
For four hours the next morning some 20,000 central Ken-
tuckians paid their respects, despite the cloudburst which
Hooded the streets. In the afternoon the funeral procession
moved up the hill toward the cemetery. Cold, fierce rain and
wind made umbrellas useless. In the line of mourners that
stretched for a quarter-mile, most were completely drenched.
Yet they came.
After songs and prayers, former Senator J. C. S. Blackburn
delivered the funeral oration. At one time the enemy of the
dead man, he now spoke as a loving ally and ended by saying
that the fallen leader, "lived an honest life and gave his life for
your deliverance. Of him no eulogy, but truth may say, 'Earth
never pillowed upon her bosom a truer son, nor heaven
opened wide her portals to receive a manlier spirit.' " The
people applauded as at a political rally. After a brief address by
the new governor and a benediction, the funeral was con-
cluded.
And so William Goebel became in death a martyr for the
Democracy, a "folk hero" to his party, a man honored and
remembered, a much-loved symbol. He became in death,
then, something he never was in life.
For a man who received such political honors, William
Goebel had not been a particularly appealing figure. Of
medium height, he remained generally trim throughout his
career. But most of his distinctive features that people re-
membered were not pleasant ones. They recalled the con-
temptuous lips; the sharp nose; the small, "ferret-like," glassy,
dark-blue, humorless eyes; the black, slicked-down hair; the
pale face; the heavy jaws. Author Irvin S. Cobb, who had fol-
lowed Goebel as a young reporter, later wrote, "I never saw a
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man who, physically, so closely suggested the reptilian as this
man did." Very little in Goebel's physical makeup added to his
political attractiveness.
In death-and to a lesser degree in life-he symbolized the
common man's friend. Yet the opponent analyzed well who
saw Goebel as an autocrat, "but an autocrat not born to the
purple." Had he been of a haughty, upper-class family of long
social standing, Goebel's aloofuess, his coolness toward "the
people," would be less surprising. His simple life-style, his aid
to the needy, even his sympathies reflect a surface commit-
ment to the masses. Yet on a person-to-person basis, he was
not one of them, nor could he be.
Apparently warm and rather witty in the company of friends,
Goebel gave few observers this impression in public. He ,dis-
liked mixing in crowds and remained cautious and aloof with
those he did not know, "as though he were accustomed to
spies." He belonged to few lodges or clubs. A reporter in one
of Goebel's campaigns found a cold, secluded man who rarely
shook hands "and never appears to seek popularity." He did
not offer voters a ready smile and outstretched hand as he
sought approval. Instead he gave them a taciturn and phleg-
matic politician who appeared as a "synthetic, self-assembled
mechanism."
Nor did Goebel become suddenly charismatic on the speak-
er's platform. Even among his friends few called him an ora-
tor, and he rarely excited great enthusiasm in his audience.
By the standards of his time Goebel was not a good public
speaker. He did not use the flowery images common in ora-
tory, and when compared to usual addresses of the era,
Goebel's speeches seem dry and imageless. This is not to say
that they were ineffective. Goebel's deep, harsh voice carried
well and he stated his points plainly and forcibly. He left his
audience with little doubt about his position on an issue.
When coupled to somewhat demagogic appeals and to an occa-
sional phrase that stirred emotions, this delivery made for an
effective speech, but never more than an average one.
Friend and foe alike agreed that Goebel's ambition re-
lentlessly drove him onward without rest. A bold man in a
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fight, Goebel had strong desires and an inner drive to satisfy
them. Little disturbed or discouraged him. A man of strong
willpower, he would make a careful estimate of a situation and
proceed slowly, methodically, and often successfully toward
his goal. To achieve his aims required the use of power, and
"he loved power," Cobb believed, "as drunkards love their
bottle." Goebel sometimes submerged good motives in his
search for authority, and it became increasingly difficult for
him to perceive sincere opposition in others. Friends who
honestly differed with him evolved-in his view-into
enemies who had sold their souls to the devils he saw himself
opposing. "Hate," an opponent noted, "could burn in him to a
white heat, but he could not conceive that men would sacrifice
a political career to a political principle."
To one friend Goebel had few qualities of a great politician,
"save a great mind." Goebel's "great intellect" impressed
figures on both sides of politics. Cobb, not a supporter, wrote
some forty years after Goebel's death that he had not yet met a
man whose mental ability so impressed him as Goebel's had.
Prominent Kentuckians echoed those thoughts and stated that
Goebel was the best-informed man they knew. Goebel did
read widely, and many of his programs owed more to his
knowledge of what other states had done than to any original
thought. But his real strength lay not in his learning, but
rather in his mental powers. He might make mistakes, even
serious ones; but in a battle of intellects Goebel had the ad-
vantage.
When it came to the gathering of votes, however, Goebel's
ability to organize served him better than his intellect. Many
politicians of his era could operate behind the scenes, and
then give a public appearance that their election had resulted
from the massive, unbridled will of the people. Goebel found
it difficult to project that public image. He had to rely almost
solely on organization, and as a political organizer he had few
peers.
Bold, arrogant, confident, tenacious, often having a political
world to gain and little to lose, he could be absolutely fearless
and extremely forceful in pursuing his goals. "This matter of
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achievement," he told a friend, "is more of the will than of the
brain." As a contemporary noted, Goebel simply had "audac-
ity, ruthlessness, a genius of leadership, an instinct for abso-
lute despotism, a gift for organization, a perfect disregard for
other men's rights. . . where his own wishes were concerned;
the brain to plan and the will to execute."
Here, then, was a new and different type of Kentucky
politician, one who was something of a paradox even to his few
intimates. The private and public images of William Goebel
did not always agree, and the contradictions in his life con-
fused all but a few of those who knew him.
Controversy surrounded Goebel all his life and even
obscured his origins. Opponents would claim that Goebel had
been born in Europe, but they were mistaken. Nevertheless,
his cultural roots and heritage did lie deeply buried in the soil
of Germany. There revolutions had erupted in the 1840s and
their failure had driven many Germans to seek better things in
the New World. Among the mass of immigrants of the 1850s
were the Goebels from Hannover. A young William Goebel
(Sr.) had left the familiar but unstable and uncertain life of the
old country for the unknown promise of the new. With the
same wave of immigrants came a young woman, Augusta,
also from Hannover.
Perhaps following relatives and friends to Pennsylvania,
William and Augusta there started a new life together. They
were married on 19 April 1855, according to a note in the fam-
ily papers. While the new husband sought to make his carpen-
try and cabinetmaking trade a success, the wife worked in the
log cabin they had built. And they prepared for their first
child. According to a biographer who knew Goebel and his
brothers, the child came two months prematurely. On 4
January 1856, in Sullivan County, Pennsylvania, a boy weigh-
ing less than three pounds was born. He was named Wilhelm
Justus Goebel, but as the family adopted American ways he
became simply William Goebel.
If he was premature, and Goebel had to struggle for survival
from the very first, his birth may explain much of his adult life.
For he would never stop fighting-first for his physical, later
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for his political, life. That he accomplished what he did in so
short a time is less a tribute to the dream of the open society
that may have brought his parents to America, than to
Goebel's own strong, determined character, which was per-
haps shaped by birth.
Less conjectural is the influence Goebel's mother had on his
life. With the coming of the Civil War family responsibilities
rested on her. Goebel's father, like many German immigrants
in the East and Midwest, supported the Federal cause; and he
was mustered into the service as a private. During those
periods when her husband was away, Augusta Goebel reared a
growing family virtually alone. A second son, Justus Jacob, had
been born in 1858 and a daughter, Minia Augusta ("Minnie"),
three years following that, on the eve of the war. Two years
later, the third son and final child, Arthur William Goebel,
was born.
As they matured all the children felt the lingering influence
of their German background. William, for example, did not
speak English until he was six years old, and his Old World
heritage was stressed. Coebers background and early life-
something he could not influence or change-would later
create uneasiness among Kentuckians. He was almost a
foreigner, an interloper, only one generation away from
Europe and its perceived evils. Goebel represented too much
of the alien and unknown to many Kentuckians, some of
whom had elected a nativist, Know-Nothing governor before
the Civil War. Goebel's heritage would win him votes in the
German community, but would weaken his appeal elsewhere.
Much of his early learning and the stress on his German
roots came from the mother to whom William grew very de-
voted. One who knew both mother and son wrote later that
Goebel "was singularly like his mother and from her he inher-
ited ... her marked individuality." A gentle, silent woman,
she was the inspiration "that fired the spark of [his] ambition."
Years after the war when she suffered a serious and painful
illness and became an invalid, the one who cared for her with
singular devotion was her firstborn. Augusta Goebel died
on 16 July 1880, when William was twenty-four years old.
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Though never a religious man, William Goebel kept her
memory by paying the pew rent in the church she cherished.
Seven years following her death, just before he entered poli-
tics, Goebel went for solitude to his mother's grave in High-
land Cemetery. For there lay the remains of a force that lived
on within him.
His father's return from war had brought the paternal
influence back into Goebel's life. The destruction had not
touched Sullivan County, and so it was some other motive that
prompted the Goebels' move to Covington, Kentucky. The
father apparently held different jobs there. At one time he
operated a boardinghouse; at other times he owned a small
store, worked in a saloon, and, in one account, labored as a
railroad employee. If he did work for a railroad-the evidence
is fragmentary-and he did experience disillusionment and
harsh treatment, that might help to explain the son's later an-
tipathy toward Kentucky railroads. It would have been easy
for the younger Goebel to have vengeful feelings toward those
who had wronged his father, even if Goebel himself did not
recognize the emotions within. The father certainly did not
rise far into the middle class, if even that far; the immigrant's
son thus came from a plebeian background. When Goebel told
of his common origins in later life, he spoke the truth: "I sold
papers when my feet were almost on the ground. . . . I have
stared poverty in the face and overcome it."
And overcome it he had, for by the time he uttered those
words he had become one of the wealthiest lawyers in his sec-
tion of the state. Obviously the road to the law was difficult for
someone of Goebel's background. His father had wanted him
to become a jeweler, and the young Goebel accordingly had
become an apprentice in Duhme's jewelry store in Cincinnati.
But he shortly was accepted as a student in a prominent law
firm, where his rise began.
No more prominent lawyer practiced in Covington than the
senior member of this firm. John White Stevenson by the
mid-1870s had already served in the Kentucky legislature, in
the 1849 constitutional convention, in Congress for two terms,
as postwar lieutenant governor, and as governor. A distin-
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guished son of a past Speaker of of the House of Repre-
sentatives, Stevenson at the time was a United States senator.
Later, in 1880, he chaired the Democratic National Conven-
tion; and four years following that he became president of the
American Bar Association, just two years before his death.
Goebel gained the old senator's attention and respect.
Eventually he became Stevenson's law partner and the
executor (without bond) of Stevenson's large estate. With the
senator supporting him, Goebel had a powerful ally who in-
troduced him to the inner circles of politics and law. And if
Stevenson's powerful support was not enough, young Goebel
soon gained the goodwill of an equally important Covington
leader. A student of Stevenson's himself, John G. Carlisle in
some ways surpassed his teacher. When Goebel became his
law partner-probably on Stevenson's recommendation-
Carlisle's career was ascendant. Coolly aloof yet hospitable, he
traditionally wore black, which symbolically represented his
somber mind. A man of forceful presence and impressive
physique, Carlisle did not so much generate enthusiasm as
respect.
For several years Goebel remained as his junior partner and
when Carlisle became Speaker of the United States House of
Representatives in 1883, the firm of Carlisle, Goebel, and Car-
lisle, at 11 Boone Block, was a prosperous one. In 1890, legis-
lators selected Goebel's benefactor as senator and three years
later Grover Cleveland chose him to be secretary of the trea-
sury. By that time Goebel and Carlisle had parted; but Car-
lisle's friendship, like Stevenson's, better enabled William
Goebel to achieve what he sought.
Though politics eventually became Goebel's chief love, his
initial devotion went to the law. For he was an excellent attor-
ney. His arguments and speeches showed a thorough knowl-
edge of legal precedent and current interpretations. He knew
his cases, his abilities, and his law. Goebel specialized in cor-
porate and railroad cases, and in later years he proudly
boasted that of his many lawsuits against the Louisville and
Nashville line (the L & N) no jury returned a verdict unfavor-
able to his clients. In one such recorded case, a Kenton County
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woman engaged his services to recover damages from a wreck
in which a relative had died. Since he could not get the entire
amount she sought, Goebel said that it was "but fair that you
should pay me one third of the amount recovered [though] our
contract was for one half." He eventually received $1,511 and
sent her $1,100 of the total. In gratitude she named her baby
for him.
As this and other cases indicate, being a "railroad lawyer"
could prove very rewarding financially. Representing Camp-
bell and Kenton counties against the Central Bridge Com-
pany, for example, Goebel received one-third of the $150,000
the counties gained through his efforts. By 1899 his annual
income approached $25,000. Although Goebel reportedly
took some cases from laborers without a fee, in many others
he obviously did quite well. Opponents would charge later
that his contracts could be among "the keenest, cruelest
known," and that he exploited rather than befriended the
poor. That was a gross exaggeration. Still, Goebel did profit
from his specialty. And a reputation as a poor man's lawyer
would not hurt at election time.
By the time he entered politics, Goebel lived a plain, unex-
citing private life. He seldom visited the theater or indicated
any interest in sports; he drank beer in moderation, and he
quit smoking cigars in later life. "Timid and awkward in ladies'
society," Goebel very seldom, if ever, was romantically linked
to any woman. His life centered on his work. He usually re-
tired to a little room with sparse furnishings-a split reed
chair, a few pictures" a bed and a dresser, two ten-pound
dumbbells and, of course, his books. When not involved in
political rallies and the like, he spent his evenings reading and
preparing for the political career he soon would begin. His
creed, almost his motto for the coming years, lay in the words
he wrote his brother when Arthur complained about the
difficulty of studying the historian Herodotus. He should in-
crease his efforts, advised William. He should-as William
Goebel certainly did-follow the advice he had once heard:
"Look upon opposition as opportunity."
2REBELS,
REACTIONARIES,
AN D REFORMERS
ON 30 DECEMBER 1887, William Goebel took the oath re-
quired of a new state senator. With that he formally entered
the political world he had long observed and had long pre-
pared for, a world whose immediate origins went back to the
Civil War. By the beginning of that war the Democratic party
ruled from an unexpected position of prominence in the com-
monwealth. Kentucky was once a Whig stronghold and a vir-
tual fiefdom of Henry Clay. But Clay's death in 1852 and his
party's decline soon after had left Kentucky politics in dis-
array. A strong but short-lived, nativist, Know-Nothing
movement had gathered enough strength to elect a governor
in 1855, but the violence the party attracted-in addition to
other factors-hastened its decline. As the war approached in
1861 only a loosely organized group called the "Opposition"
contested the Democratic party. Almost by default, the De-
mocracy had triumphed.
The war disrupted that brief ascendancy. By most indica-
tions, such as newspaper sentiment and army enlistments, the
state favored the Union so loved by Clay and his successor in
spirit, John J. Crittenden. By late 1862, the Union held Ken-
tucky firmly. But events moved the state away from the Fed-
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eral cause, and more and more citizens turned sympathetic
eyes southward. After 1862 the Confederates made no serious
threats to retake Kentucky, and so the excesses that accom-
pany military rule were blamed solely on the Union side. In
addition, Confederates who did enter the state after 1862,
chiefly John Hunt Morgan's raiders, presented a dashing,
heroic front to the populace. Though only partly the truth,
such an image contrasted with that of the Union leaders who
had the unfortunate responsibility of dealing with citizens day
by day and facing problems Morgan's men never did. The
southern cavalier became more and more attractive. Military
interference in elections added to the mounting Federal prob-
lems.
Moreover, slaves were leaving the farms. After the first
years Federal forces gave little indication that they would re-
turn them. The Emancipation Proclamation did not directly
affect the state, but news of that event created unrest among
slaves and angry resentment among state leaders. Even de-
voted Unionists openly questioned and criticized administra-
tion policy. Enrolling and then enlisting of slaves in the Union
army-in return for their freedom and their family's-drove
Union slaveholders (and there were many) headlong into the
ranks of the political opposition. In an attempt to stop that
movement, leaders of what would become the Republican
party made more blunders. Whether correctly or not, they
became identified in the popular mind with military rule and
black emancipation. By 1864 the state had turned anti-
administration and probably even prosouthern in sympathy.
Soon after hostilities ended, .a newspaper reported that Ken-
tucky had waited until after the war to secede. In a much
quoted remark, Lincoln had said that to lose Kentucky His
nearly the same as to lose the whole game." Although the
Union did secure the commonwealth, the methods used to
insure that victory shaped Kentucky politics for three decades.
William Goebel came to Covington after the Civil War and
beheld a confused political state. This son of a Union veteran
saw little indication that the victors in war were triumphing in
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peace. Although Republicans sought to build their party on a
Union base, their hopes for dominance faded. Besides war-
time images that had to be overcome, now the national Radical
Republicans' policies alienated Kentuckians further. State Re-
publicans tried to turn attention away from Reconstruction in
the South, but the amalgamated group calling themselves
Democrats capitalized on national affairs-to the consterna-
tion of the Republicans. Both groups sought to lure wandering
ex-Whigs to their banner. Most, however, probably turned to
the Democrats-particularly former slaveholders and south-
ern sympathizers. Excesses that some saw in the Republican
administration drove both ex-Whigs and former Union Demo-
crats to the changing Democracy. A new and even more pow-
erful coalition formed.
Republicans, in turn, sought to capitalize on old Whig
animosities toward Democrats and on Union veterans' opposi-
tion to Confederates. In the main they failed. Kentuckians'
amity for the South made the national Republican party's
seeming excesses there more disagreeable. Kentucky Repub-
licans had to settle for the role of minority party for three dec-
ades following 1865. Nevertheless strong Republican leaders
arose-John Marshall Harlan, later a Supreme Court justice;
Benjamin Helm Bristow, U. S. Grant's able secretary of the
treasury; and, later, William O'Connell Bradley, the state's
first Republican governor. Under these leaders the Republi-
can party in Kentucky over the next thirty years not only gar-
nered a sizable vote (as in other southern states), but also
increased their vote as the years passed (unlike southern Re-
publicans generally). By the time Goebel entered politics, Re-
publican opposition had developed into a very formidable
force, although one still trying to break free of the wartime
memories that shackled it.
It was the Democrats, however, who controlled the state.
And that control, for the most part, was in the hands of ex-
Confederates or Confederate sympathizers. Humorist Petro-
leum V. Nasby (David Ross Locke) exaggerated but pin-
pointed the issue when he wrote in 1867 that "Ef no Confed-
rits wuz allowed to vote in Tennessee, thank the Lord no other
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kind wuz permitted to hist in ballots in Kentucky." He added
that "here Dimocrasy kin flourish, ef nowhere else." The vast
majority of Kentuckians who fought had done so for the
Union, but the majority of Democrats who held major office
after the war had served or supported the Confederacy. As a
letter writer complained sometime later in the century, "It is a
well established custom in Kentucky, that worthy and capable
ex-confederate soldiers (especially if maimed) asking office of
the people, are invariably thus 'pensioned.' " Goebel's Union
ties would make it difficult for him to advance in postwar
Democratic politiCS.
Although Democrats and ex-Confederates controlled the
state, they were not in complete harmony. Factionalism di-
vided .the party. The twentieth-century saying that Kentucky
Democrats would rather defeat each other than the Republi-
cans was already proving accurate in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. For a party whose diverse base rested on groups with
strong feelings-ex-Whigs, ex-Unionists, and some ex-
Know-Nothings-such differences would not be unexpected.
Exacerbated by postwar problems, the differences surfaced
and solidified.
But both factions agreed on several vital issues, and they
usually united at election time. Both the Bourbon and New
Departure Democrats decried the Reconstruction of the
southern states, opposed centralization in government, and
supported states rights. While the New Departure faction did
favor governmental aid to railroads, for example, they-like
the Bourbons-agreed that a general policy of laissez-faire was
best. Thus when the inflammatory issue of blacks' rights faded
with the gradual acceptance of the constitutional amend-
ments, differences lessened. Other issues divided the factions,
but by the early 1870s their most basic disagreements had
ceased. The two terms-Bourbon and New Departure-soon
came to mean about the same thing, and the Kentucky De-
mocracy began to adhere to the overall southern pattern more
closely.
Almost as soon as Bourbon-New Departure differences les-
sened in the early 1870s, the previously ignored voice of the
13
disgruntled agrarian spoke out. Agrarian anger grew out of
concentration in the postwar era on "this new mania of to-
bacco." Increasing cultivation of tobacco instead of varied
crops made farmers more dependent on a single price. In the
year before the Panic of 1873 tobacco prices reached ten cents;
six years later they had fallen to half that figure. Laborers'
wages decreased. A people in growing economic distress
turned to quick answers and sought scapegoats. Railroads
seemed appropriate villains. While the depression hit farmers
hard, railroads prospered; their Kentucky lnileage increased
50.percent between 1870 and 1880. Local communities went
into long-term bonded indebtedness to finance and attract
lines to their locales. Special taxation favored railroads and,
while farmers lost property because they could not pay taxes
on it, railroads often escaped even basic taxation.
The very agrarian ideal seemed under attack. A new ethos
had challenged that ideal-and seemed to be winning. The
age of railroads was coming to America, and to Kentucky. And
while many praised the mobility, the expanded markets, and
other advantages that this age brought, some-especially in
economically difficult situations-saw only dangers. Still
others believed in the railroads as potential forces for good,
but supported stringent regulation of the powerful lines. All
these groups, each with their own spokesmen, operated
throughout Goebel's lifetime. Like agrarians, Goebel saw in
railroad regulation a solution to many of the state's problems.
In the depression years of the 1870s agrarian anger focused
on the railroads, but that problem required a long-range ap-
proach and promised little sudden success. To troubled farm-
ers inflation and cheap money provided quicker answers to
their ills. When the dominant Democrats did not encourage
their demands, a third party rose from their ranks. The
Greenback party, sometimes fusing with the minority Repub-
licans, proved a potent, if uncertain, political force. A Murray
resident wrote to future Senator William Lindsay in 1877 that
his whole area was affected with cCGrangerism, Greenbackism
and Soreheadism."
Although the normally nonpolitical granges supported a
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program similar to the Greenback party's, the two did not
formally join forces. Nevertheless, in economically depressed
western Kentucky the new party found quick acceptance.
Here would be the center of Greenback strength, then later of
the Populists, and then of Night Rider activity in the twen-
tieth century. In the 1870s Democratic supremacy in the area
was challenged, and Greenbackers gained close to a fifth of the
vote in most counties. Statewide, the party's candidate for
governor received over 8 percent of the vote in 1879. The
decrease came in the Democratic margin.
Better times and Democratic acceptance of their rhetoric if
not their programs returned agrarians to the Democracy. But
in the granges, in the Farmers' Alliance later, and in the agrar-
ians as a whole, a strong, silent force lay as if asleep. Economic
conditions had turned voters away from their past partisan-
ship. If new issues arose, if times again grew bad, if Demo-
crats ignored their will, the agrarians were ready to rise up
once more to threaten the party's hegemony. In the process,
the old factional leaders might fall before a new order. Goebel
sought to make certain that he would not be excluded from
that agrarian future, should it come about.
Goebel, however, was not completely an agrarian, nor was
he later, as some historians have suggested, a Populist. He did
support many agrarian-Populist programs, and on many issues
he stood on the same side politically. But the programs Goebel
advocated that did coincide with agrarian ones, such as rail-
road regulation, grew out of a nonagrarian background, his
urban experience. Other common causes were Simply ones
whose attainment had been long overdue in the state, and
which now had gained wide popular appeal. Goebel was far
from being "the First New Dealer" that a biographer called
him, but he was closer in some ways to the urban Progressives
of the twentieth century than to the Populists of the nine-
teenth.
When Kentucky agrarians in the 1870s and 1880s, and later
the Populists, appealed-with only limited success-to the
urban laborer, then Goebel and the agrarians moved nearest
to each other in their programs. For Goebel's real base was the
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urban working class. Out of that class had come his family.
Goebel's entire adult life had been spent in Covington, then
Kentucky's second largest city. He had handled workmen's
cases, and-whether by design or by chance-had won much
support from them. His stands on many issues, such as rail-
road regulation, were based on his dealings in an urban
framework. As Kentucky almost matched the tremendous
pace of industrialization in the nation between 1865 and 1900,
urban groups grew in potential importance. Although labor
unions in the commonwealth, as elsewhere, struggled unsuc-
cessfully to gain large numbers of adherents, they did win
some victories and gain some strength, particularly in Louis-
ville and northern Kentucky. The significance of that force
was not lost on an ambitious politician like Goebel.
In election year 1887, the signs were unmistakable. That
year the union labor movement peaked in nineteenth-century
Kentucky. At first glance such would seem to favor candidate
Goebel, who sought his first political office. With state Senator
James W. Bryan as the Democratic nominee for lieutenant
governor, his seat and the remainder of his term was vacated.
Backed by the powerful Carlisle and former allies of Steven-
son, Goebel was expected to win the election eaSily.
But workers dissatisfied with the Democratic party's con-
tinued conservatism and resistance to change organized a third
party-as the Greenbackers had only eight years before. The
Union Labor party developed no strength outside of cities,
and little overall except in northern Kentucky. While separate
at the state level, the Republicans and Union Labor forces oc-
casionallyunited locally.
In Kenton County the Union Labor party did fuse to oppose
the Democrats and William Goebel. And not surprisingly. For
while Goebel actually could have supported the Union Labor
party and Inost of its programs in some ways better than the
state Democratic ones, he was very much a party man. He had
allies in the Democracy, and if he deserted them or alienated
them by supporting Union Labor stands, his political future
might be ended. A new party, no matter how powerful, was
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too uncertain an entity to gain the support of an ambitious
politician with strong party backing.
There was no question that Goebel faced a difficult foe in
the fused Union Labor forces. Although he might stress his
past actions for laborers and his working-class origins,Goebel
had to recognize that his former mentor Stevenson had been
the chief counsel for the Kentucky Central Railroad and other
large corporations, and thus was an enemy of the Union Labor
party. His past association with Stevenson might help Goebel
in certain circles of the Democratic party, but in others it
would cost him votes. Goebel had other handicaps as well. He
was a political novice, he had no record to support his rhetoric,
and he was not a good stump speaker. Yet most analysts did
not foresee a large Union Labor vote. As usual the
Democrats-and Goebel-should win.
The August election returns indicated Widespread dis-
satisfaction with the Democratic party. On the state level,
popular ex-Confederate General Simon B. Buckner won his
gubernatorial race by the smallest margin since the war's end.
The Republicans had now shown that with a clever cam-
paigner, such as "Billy O. B." Bradley, they could threaten
seriously. Wartime memories still faded slowly, however.
While the Union Labor party received less than 2 percent of
the state vote overall, in northern Kentucky the results were
far different. The party carried neighboring Campbell County
(Newport) over both Democrats and Republicans; among the
three state representatives selected in Kenton County was one
Union Labor man. Only exceptional Democrats survived the
labor onslaught.
In the Twenty-Fourth Senatorial District the race was too
close to call. Initial reports indicated that the Union Labor
fusion candidate (a former Republican) had beaten the Demo-
cratic nominee, William Goebel, by over one hundred votes.
"Quite contrary to Democratic expectations," urban areas of
the district gave a Union Labor majority. When the official
tally was announced, Goebel had won, as expected, but by a
margin of only fifty-six votes.
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In two years, at the expiration of Bryan's original senate
term, Goebel would have to face reelection. Given the unex-
pected closeness of his victory, he had to ensure that dis-
satisfied working-class Democrats would return to the party
and vote for him or his career would end. Clearly even his
faint association with corporations (through Stevenson) would
have to be overcome-the political climate so dictated.
Goebel needed to impress alienated laborers that he opposed
the same things they did. Otherwise reelection might never
come. But if he could become the spokesman for the disgrun-
tled electorate, then his political pOSSibilities were more prom-
ising. Ambition dictated one future course for William
Goebel.
3GOEBEL
AND THE GOVERNORS
THE POLITICAL WORLD William Goebel entered in De-
cember 1887 was rapidly changing, as he had quickly discov-
ered in his campaign. Old alliances faded as quickly as new
ones were made. In this quicksand of transitional politics,
Goebel faced the added burden ofbeing basically a northerner
in a state that thought itself southern. His past political allies
had gotten him to the state senate, but one short session did
not afford much time to rise above the commonplace. Con-
sequently, in the legislature the freshman senator from Ken-
ton sought and commanded notice quickly. ·He did so by fol-
lowing the old dictum that if you want to attract attention,
denounce the largest, easiest target available. The Louisville
and Nashville Railroad would prove a formidable foe, how-
ever. Its wealth had increased phenomenally following the
war. In 1870 the L & N had declared a dividend of 40 percent;
a decade later the dividend was 100 percent. Louisville and
towns along the line gave generously in financial aid and polit-
ical support. As the L & N expanded its influence southward
beyond state lines it made the Falls City a center of southern
trade. In Henry Watterson's words, Louisville's "union of
pork, tobacco and whiskey will make us all wealthy, healthy
and frisky."
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Between 1865 and 1880 total railroad mileage in the state
trebled, and these lines introduced Kentucky's rural areas to a
more exciting, vibrant way of life. But at the same time excess-
es biased people's views of the progress. For with railroads
carne discriminatory rates and other measures that angered
small farmers in particular. The resulting Greenback discon-
tent of the 1870s culminated in the creation in 1880 of a weak
state Railroad Commission. Under the leadership of candid,
self-assured, energetic, ruthless Milton Hannibal Smith, the
L & N struck back at this step in what it saw as an organized
attempt to cripple or destroy the line. Smith later explained
his thoughts on any legislature's actions when he told the
Interstate Commerce Commission that "all legislative bodies
are a menace." To control this "menace" a strong, active, and
well-funded lobby was organized in Frankfort. Largely guided
by John Hunt Morgan's former chief lieutenant and brother-
in-law, talented little Basil Duke, the lobby became so pow-
erful that one writer moaned "a man could not be electedjus-
tice of the peace or school trustee without the sanction of the
Louisville and Nashville politicians."
The L & N contributed sums of money to politicians who
supported it faithfully, and it retained large numbers of
lawyers throughout the state on its payroll. Many became
legislators. Free travel passes were distributed widely to
officeholders and politicians for reasons not difficult to ascer-
tain: a judge should receive a pass, as he was a "very valuable
aid to us"; a black pastor, for he is a "pretty influential man
amongst his people"; another judge, because "we are liable to
have to call on him for help at almost any time." Favored
friends and political allies could travel courtesy of the L & N
on any line within the state or the South. In such ways, sup-
porting the L & N could be made very attractive for a politi-
cian. But not for William Goebel. Up until 1887 few politicans
had dared to oppose the L & N line. Newspapers, such as
Henry Watterson's Courier-Journal, promoted its efforts.
Within five years after creation of the Railroad Commission,
Duke's railroad lobby had done its work well. In 1884 the
legislature granted a five-year tax exemption to any newly con-
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structed lines. The governor-a man Goebel had supported-
let the law go into effect without his signature. By the end of
that decade a quarter of the state's roads would be free of
taxation. The railroad .lobby grew more powerful and, to its
opponents, more dangerous. The Railroad Commission re-
ported that it had become a regular policy now to keep a paid
lobby in Frankfort, "to interfere with the Legislature." A Re-
publican paper commented that support of the lobby was
necessary before any prominent measure could be passed.
This was the situation at the end of 1887, when Governor
Buckner recommended increasing the powers of the Railroad
Commission and discontinuing exemptions to railroad prop-
erty.
Shocked at Buckner's actions, the railroads countered with a
bill that in effect would abolish the commission. The gover-
nor's recommendation for increased powers got nowhere, as
allies had to fight even to keep the commission in existence.
Free passes, meals, drinks, and other luxuries were distrib-
uted lavishly by the lobby. The bill passed the house by a
46-26 vote. In the interim, however, a committee was set up
to investigate the lobby's actions. William Goebel was selected
to represent the senate and by the time he finished his task he
had few, if any, doubts of the correctness of his position re-
garding railroads. After hearing testimony the five-man com-
mittee presented its findings. Goebel personally drafted and
introduced the report, which denounced the lobby, but rec-
ommended only a grand jury investigation. The committee
found a "large and influential" lobby at work, entertaining
members and furnishing "whiskey & c." Although there was a
well-planned "and extraordinarily powerful effort to dominate
the Legislature," the investigators found no evidence that
money or anything of value had been given to influence votes.
The senate rejected the bill to abolish the commission, how-
ever.
Goebel came out of the lobby investigation convinced that
the L & N's powers needed curbing. Condemnation of the
evils of the lobby became frequent in his rhetoric. Goebel had
found an issue that he would never let go of. The response to
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his efforts showed what popularity attacks on monopolies
could have. The age of corporate restriction slowly was coming
to Kentucky, and Goebel moved comfortably in the Inain-
stream, if not the forefront.
Not all of Goebel's attentions focused on the one issue of
railroad regulation, however. Several of the bills the young
legislator introduced showed his concern for laborers---or, as
his detractors would argue, at least a concern for their votes.
Goebel's very first move was to offer a bill to repeal a minor
1886 turnpike law protecting turnpikes in which the state had
an interest. Poorer people found the high tolls and monopolis-
tic controls involved in these improved roads unacceptable
during difficult financial times. There was a growing effort to
make these roads "free," and by 1888 lawless force was being
used when persuasion failed. In the 1890s this lawlessness
grew-and eventually it achieved its object. Goebel early
proclaimed his sympathies, and when violence later erupted
his stand placed him-to conservatives' eyes-on the side of
the lawless who sought to take property (toll roads) without
compensation. Goebel introduced a few other bills that con-
cerned railroads and corporations, but in the main the session
was a learning experience, as is usually the case for newcomers
to the General Assembly. Events were more instructive than
usual, however, and they strengthened Goebel's growing in-
clination to view Bourbon-New Departure Democracy with
disdain.
The most unsettling revelation came about unexpectedly.
Republicans and a small number of Democrats pushed for an
examination of the treasurer's office. Finally the legislature
reluctantly agreed. James W. Tate, the incumbent treasurer,
had served since 1868, and his popularity was surpassed by
few state politicians. Opponents found it difficult to convince
his many friends in the legislature that there could even be a
hint of scandal associated with "Honest Dick" Tate. Then, on
20 March 1888, Governor Buckner's message announced to a
startled General Assembly that the treasurer had been missing
for several days. A shortage of public funds had been discov-
ered. Wild rumors spread, and politicians came under sudden
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and close public scrutiny. The auditor of the state, another
perennial officeholder, was blamed for not examining state ac-
counts more closely. Other politicians, including former Gov-
ernor Preston Leslie, had accepted loans from Tate-loans
that now seemed certain to have come from treasury funds.
These men-like others-had trusted the friendly, kind, and
accommodating Tate. Now their political careers were
threatened by that association.
Tate's defalcations were eventually shown to have totalled
some $247,000. The whereabouts of "Honest Dick" himself
remained a mystery. Dick Tate and the state's money both had
disappeared, never to be heard from again. In Frankfort the
public outcry threatened to disrupt Bourbon-New Departure
ascendancy. Tate's case was not exceptional in the Democratic
South at the time, as some Republicans gleefully noted. To
calm their critics, the legislature created the office of State
Examiner to prevent any repetition of the Tate affair. Im-
peachmentproceedings began in the senate on 30 March
1888. Goebel, along with almost the entire senate, voted Tate
guilty of each article. Removal of Tate and tardy remedial
legislation did not end the suspicion and clamor. Public dis-
trust of elected officials continued. When the Court of Ap-
peals declared that Tate's wealthy bondsmen-prominent
party leaders-would not be held liable for his defalcations,
anger increased. Eventually the whole episode influenced the
1890-91 constitutional convention's decision to limit office-
holders to one term, to ensure that no future Dick Tate could
rule his domain unchecked.
Goebel, a newcomer, had remained untouched by the scan-
dal, and in many ways he profited from it. One of a new and
younger breed of politicians who sought to challenge estab-
lished party leaders, the Kenton County senator had fresh
ammunition for his onslaught, and also new allies. Rising dis-
content with the old order, and Goebel's successful efforts to
disengage himself from that group, made his future much
more promising than when the session had begun.
Reelection now faced the incumbent. Goebel did not have
the oratorical powers and personal charisma so useful in cam-
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paigns, but he did have the ability-however imperfect-to
articulate the long-suppressed but now surfacing discontent
felt by agrarians and urban laborers. His ideas were generally
not original, and were based on his knowledge of develop-
ments in other states. But to voters the source meant little.
Goebel spoke and, more importantly, acted for them. They
saw in him a voice for reform. He had accomplished what he
sought and he had projected, in modern terminology, a favor-
able image.
Goebel returned to Covington with a reputation that gave
him significant mass popularity. The ex-Union Labor support-
ers posed no threat now, and Goebel usually could count on
Covington's large and influential German vote. In the 1889
senatorial race Goebel, running without opposition, won a
new term, despite a still unsettled situation. Four years later
Goebel outpolled his Republican opponent by a three-to-one
margin, the largest majority in the county. By that time
Goebel had secured a strong base from which to operate.
If there has been a single crucial decade in Kentucky's.polit-
ical history, it was the 1890s. Goebel's dominant Democratic
party entered the decade totally supreme, having averaged 61
percent of the gubernatorial vote over the past quarter-
century. Divided by factionalism but united for the most part
at election time, the Democracy wielded great national
influence and· almost total control in a majority of Kentucky
counties. But as the 1890s came to an end, Republicans con-
stantly, and often successfully, challenged Democrats. In the
three decades following 1900 a near division of the office of
governor would result, with four Democrats winning that
office, versus three Republicans. The factionalism present at
the start of the 1890s developed into full-blown rebellion, and
political alliances of major import were transformed. Not until
the upheavals brought about by the New Deal would another
such division occur.
What had happened? For one thing, familar economic
stresses again operated. Falling farm prices-tobacco declined
to 3.7 cents in 1896-coupled with laborers' problems follow-
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ing the 1893 depression, brought agrarian and urban discon-
tent to the surface. Angry workers in farm and factory struck
out at the enemies they thought they saw in financial and cor-
porate monopolies. Once again, men and women desperate for
answers to their despair turned to panaceas. In Kentucky they
vented their anger on toll roads and railroads, and in the state,
as elsewhere, they began to cry out for the inflationary scheme
represented in free silver. Two decades of basically static rule
in the commonwealth, and memories of the Tate affair, made
current leadership unacceptable.
To compound the problems, prevalent political theory could
not meet the challenges without major modifications. When
none came, more stress resulted-and more discontent.
Forces opposing change threatened to bring about their own
defeat by resisting needed reforms. President Grover Cleve-
land's earlier veto message on a bill to provide farmers needed
grass seed-government's functions "do not include the sup-
port of the people"-would not satisfy the temper of the
1890s. Above all and for whatever reason the world was chang-
ing rapidly, and the political philosophy of Grover Cleveland
contrasted sharply, as if it belonged to another time, with that
of Theodore Roosevelt. The beginning of the new century
symbolized more than entry into another hundred year
period: twentieth-century Kentuckians would live in an era far
different from that of only a decade before. Events and chang-
ing currents of opinion brought about this transformation, but
so did individuals. There were giants on the national, regional,
and state scenes-some of noble cast, others of lesser quality.
One of these men-and observers bitterly disagreed over
which group he belonged to-greatly influenced the decade of
the 1890s. But William Goebel did not long survive it.
The decade began with a gubernatorial campaign that
showed the diversity of sectional, economic, and class feelings
operating in Kentucky. And a new third party once more
threatened Democratic control. While the generally non-
political Farmers' Alliance had preferred to work for their de-
mands through major parties, they did indicate willingness to
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enter the political arena should circumstances warrant. Some
members became convinced that some formal, organized ef-
fort should be made. And so on 20 May 1891 a group of sev-
enty men who were attending the Cincinnati national conven-
tion of the Populists crossed the Ohio and organized the
People's party of Kentucky. Former Greenbackers took the
initial leadership posts.
Democrats recognized the threat posed, especially in the
troubled flatlands of western Kentucky. "Warnings" there
admitted that "there is an unrest in the minds and feelings of
many" who are usually Democrats. "This element," a writer
continued, "chiefly farmers, are honestly impatient as to exist-
ing grievances." Although handicapped by mediocre leader-
ship and the stigma of Republican collaboration, the Populists
gained a respectable vote that August. The totals matched the
averages of earlier third parties and indicated the resentment
felt toward both major parties. The 25,000 votes represented
less than 9 percent of the vote, but given the Republicans'
rising strength, this percentage became more crucial than in
earlier races.
More so than in the formal People's party vote, however,
the agrarian influence was felt in the Democratic party. Al-
liance men endorsed as Democrats made up half of the legis-
lators elected to the house. And while party man Goebel had
no use for people who took votes from his Democracy, he did
recognize agrarian strength in his party and he appealed to it.
Alliance and Populist strength permeated th·e constitutional
convention of 1890-91 as well. Kentucky's fourth-and pres-
ent-constitution was framed by politicians aware of and
influenced by agrarians. Goebel felt these pressures, but an
analysis of his role indicates that-once again-his interest
was in urban, not rural, matters. He and the Populist spokes-
men often found themselves on opposite sides of issues. Ex-
cept when it came to railroads and corporations. Goebel's
reputation and past actions had resulted in a strong attempt by
the railroads to prevent his selection for the convention. They
had failed. On 8 September 1890 Goebel and other delegates
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assembled; final adjournment did not come until twelve
months later.
During that time Goebel sat in distinguished company.
Former Governor Proctor Knott and present Governor Buck-
ner represented the old Bourbon-New Departure Democrats;
Populist leader Thomas Pettit-"Little War Cloud"-ably
served his party; and future gubernatorial hopeful Dr. J. D.
Clardy watched Alliance interests. An independent reformer
such as Winchester's W. M. Beckner influenced many con-
vention matters. Very slender, quite bald-like "a skinned
onion on a bean pole"-so sour-looking that newspapermen
called him "Rain-in-the-face," he served on more committees
than anyone and helped shape many reform measures. The
thirty-six-year-old Goebel had able and experienced allies and
enemies.
Somewhat surprisingly, Goebel played only a minor role in
the debates, although he would exaggerate that role as the
years passed. Part of his lack of influence simply resulted from
frequent absences: of the 250 days of the sessions he was pres-
ent for only 100, according to one study. A random sample of
nonadjoumment roll-call votes gives the same figure: Goebel
voted on only two of every five roll calls on the average. This
record resulted partly from his duties in the senate, which at
times was in session while the convention met; but it also
probably came from sheer boredom, for convention debates
grew tedious and repetitious. Still, for such an important
document, Goebel gave little of his time.
The Kenton County delegate had called for a flexible docu-
ment that would allow legislatures to pass laws as future needs
arose. The resultant document was just the opposite; agrarians
did not trust the future. Even Goebel's own actions tended to
produce effects contrary to his stated desires. One issue did
bring Goebel to the debates and elicited his strongest efforts.
Railroad regulation continued to be his consuming theme, and
his rhetoric on that issue read well to voters. Goebel explained
that he sought to prevent anything in the constitution from
"being used by the railroad corporations to evade their just
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proportion of the burden of taxation." In defense of a clause
that dealt with recovering railroad damages from employees,
Goebel insisted that "paid lobbyists" had kept legislative bills
on this subject from coming to a vote. This "existing evil"
should be corrected by the constitution. The section was in-
corporated.
In practice then, Goebel used the constitution as a vehicle
to enact laws which he had not been able to pass in the more
conservative legislature. Although he spoke for flexibility,
when it came to certain issues he voted for specificity. This
was particularly true of his chief aim-incorporation of the
Railroad Commission into the new document, which would
make it a constitutional office above the powers of the lobby.
On that issue he prevailed. The unwieldy constitution eventu-
ally included specific sections controlling rebates, drawbacks,
discriminatory freight rates, and preferential contracts. While
the railroad issue dominated Goebel's debates when he ap-
peared at sessions, he occasionally supported other measures.
He spoke out-unsuccessfully-against poll taxes; and he at-
tempted to win a board of labor arbitration with compulsory
powers, which the constitution did make a future possibility.
Two sections he strongly advocated were successfully incorpo-
rated: power to set a minimum age for working children, and
worker payment in currency rather than company store
checks.
Despite strong opposition from the L & N and from the
Courier-journal ("It is an Alliance Constitution," Henry Wat-
terson sneered), the document won widespread voter ap-
proval. More a legislative enactment than a flexible con-
stitution, it became quickly outdated, though not in Goebel's
lifetime. He had reason to be proud, for he had helped to
secure the .Railroad Commission's permanency; and he had
worked-if not hard-for several other needed reforms. His
political standing rose.
But actions by the governor elected in 1891 temporarily
slowed Goebel's ascendancy. John Young Brown, a member of
a prominent family, was in his fifties. He had been in political
life since his 1859 election to the United States Congress even
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before he had reached the required age. Representing west-
ern Kentucky in the preconvention period, Brown capitalized
on feelings in that area that it was their turn to have a guber-
natorial nominee, as the Bluegrass had dominated the field
since the war. Goebel worked hard for the nomination of his
strong ally Cassius M. Clay. Nephew of his old eman-
cipationist namesake, the wealthy Bourbon County farmer and
president of the constitutional convention-like all candi-
dates-desperately sought Alliance support. But that went
elsewhere. Brown won the nomination and defeated a weak
Republican candidate in the fall.
Goebel's differences with Brown did not heal easily. The
new governor's course did not please either his Alliance sup-
porters or Goebel. "I have fought him as hard as I could," the
Kenton County senator wrote Clay. Brown responded by veto-
ing Goebel's local bills and by having the Courier-Journal
attack the stands of the senator. In September 1892 Goebel
accused Brown of relentlessly using "every means at his com-
mand to increase his power and patronage."
Goebel's alienation from Brown helped him win over dis-
enchanted Alliance legislators, and his dealings in the con-
stitutional convention had gained him new support. He still
had the backing of prominent established party leaders, such
as Clay and Carlisle. His 1894 selection as president pro tern
of the senate, by a strict 25-11 party vote, thus came as no
surprise. Goebel was developing into a formidable politician,
and he did not let the governor's opposition slow his efforts.
At the same time depression deepened in Kentucky, and
voter unrest grew with economic distress. In Louisville over
forty businesses failed in 1893, and an estimated 10,000 un-
employed workers sought simple livelihood. When the L & N
reacted to falling business by cutting wages some 10 percent,
over 1,400 workers united in protest. Other urban centers,
especially along the Ohio River, joined the Pullman and other
strikers. Goebel presented to the senate petitions of unem-
ployed laborers and of unions; and, according to some reports,
he defended without charge workers involved in strikes.
These acts aided his reputation as the laborers' friend.
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What the economic situation meant for the Democrats
would be discovered in 1895. Clay again sought the guber-
natorial nomination, over P. "Waf' Hardin. The money issue,
unimportant four years earlier, now became crucial. A cheap
money expedient, free silver, allowed debtors to pay debts
more easily, but entrapped them later in inflationary prices for
the goods they had to buy. Nevertheless, the immediate ap-
peal outweighed the potential results. Many prominent Bour-
bon-New Departure leaders refused to support any free silver
idea in 1895. Watterson, W. C. P. Breckinridge, Clay, Car-
lisle-now secretary of the treasury~allunited in opposition
and got a gold plank at the 1895 convention. Hardin's reputed
alliance with railroad interests gained him some support from
them. Goebel's choice, Clay, stood for gold and railroad regu-
lation, and the senator supported him on both. But again Clay
failed to receive the necessary votes, and Hardin won.
Sensing victory at last, the Republicans nominated their
best campaigner, veteran W. o. Bradley. Stressing his "sound-
money" stands, Bradley badgered Hardin to state his own
views. Finally, in a disastrous joint debate in Louisville, Har-
din came out for free silver. The gold plank he stood on fell
apart. Many c;c;Gold Bugs" deserted the party for Bradley, or
simply did not vote. Although Hardin may have retained some
silverites by his stand, others still went to the Populist candi-
date, Tom Pettit.
An already disunited Democracy divided on another issue,
one that potentially threatened Goebel's future as well. The
American Protective Association (A.P.A.) sought to defend
"Americanism" against c;c;foreign" social, religious, and political
influences. c;c;The rejuvenated ghost of Know-Nothingism," the
A.P.A. directed its opposition toward Catholics and immi-
grants; in 1894 it had influenced the vote that defeated an Irish
Catholic for Congress. Although members of both parties
made up A.P.A. membership, in 1895 the organization
worked for Bradley's election. The Republican candidate him-
self did not voice A. P.A. sentiments, but he accepted their
votes. The next year the A.P.A. state president was rewarded
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by President William McKinley with the post of collector of
internal revenue for Louisville. After 1896 the organization
would not play an important role in elections, but the events
of 1895 showed Goebel the strength of nativist sentiment-
sentiment which would not favor an immigrant's son. Weak-
ened by Populist, A. P.A., and gold Democrat defections, the
party that had ruled for three decades now lost. Bradley be-
came the state's first Republican governor. Democratic
hegemony was shattered.. And Goebel had even more prob-
lems of his own.
4"DIVISION AND
DISCORD"
WITH HIS SELECTION as leader in the senate in 1894
Goebel seemed to be rising toward his ambition of higher
political office. But events over the next two years made such
an occurrence seem an utter impossibility. Adversity began
innocently enough. In 1894, Goebel sought and expected to
receive his party's nomination for a vacant Court of Appeals
seat. Factionalism within Goebel's own Democratic party,
however, denied him the nomination.
The factionalism, which went back many years, had grown
out of severe personal animosities as well as political rivalries.
Theodore Hallam and Harvey Myers, Jr. were longtime foes
of Goebel's rising power in Kenton County. An ex-
Confederate officer, Hallam, if nothing else, brought forth
colorful descriptions. To Irvin Cobb he was "a battered-
looking, hard-hitting, hard-drinking little Irish lawyer"; and to
an angry, anonymous writer, Hallam had a "moral character
[that] would stagger a stone fence-His virtues would be lone-
some in a capsule." Hallam's letters reveal a witty, likable
man, and his actions show a strong one. Although his high,
strident voice did not seem suitable, he was an excellent
orator-to Cobb perhaps "the greatest natural orator in a state
of natural orators." In addition, he had political power and the
ambition-like Goebel-for more. His ties to the L & Nand
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his services as an attorney for the C & 0 meant that his course
and Goebel's pointed toward a collision. Harvey Myers, Jr.,
the younger member of the firm of Hallam and Myers, had
received his legal training under Hallam's guidance. Son of a
Republican who had been shot in 1874, Myers had turned to
the Democracy and found it receptive. He became speaker of
the Kentucky house in 1889-90.
In 1890 powerful divisions, which had long existed in the
county, finally surfaced. The occasion came when the Demo-
crats met in convention to select a nominee for Congress, after
Carlisle's selection for the Senate. According to later recollec-
tions, after over 200 exhausting ballots Hallam lacked only
one-fourth vote to receive the nomination. Selection meant
virtual election. A reporter went to Goebel and suggested
that, as the two men represented the same county, he should
give Hallam the needed support. Goebel said no. Exasper-
ated, the reporter said, "Oh, Give it to him." He remembered
how Goebel turned, "half-smiling, half-snarling, looking more
hate than he could have felt" and sneered, "I'd rather cut his
throat." Hallam did not receive the nomination, but he threw
his votes to a candidate in opposition to Goebel's choice. Both
men had in effect lost that confrontation, but their animosities
continued.
In 1891 when Goebel worked for Clay's gubernatorial
nomination, Hallam and Myers opposed him. Louisville and
Nashville trains carried their supporters to the local conven-
tion. Goebel had told his candidate, "I have things well in
hand. I do not see how we can be beaten." When the voting
began his analysis was verified, and finally Hallam and Myers,
defeated and embittered, withdrew from the convention.
It was a third member of the faction, however, who eventu-
ally turned the feud from angry words to bloody action. A
longtime friend of Hallam's, John L. Sanford (also spelled
Sandford) was an ex-Confederate who had served under the
Kentucky idols of the Confederacy-generals John Hunt
Morgan, William Preston, Humphrey Marshall, and John C.
Breckinridge. Related both to the Breckinridge clan and to the
Marshalls, Sanford turned from a formal political career to be-
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come cashier and chief officer of Covington's Farmers' and
Traders' National Bank. He still kept his interest and influence
in the political sphere, however. Goebel and Sanford clashed
on various issues, including ones involving Kenton County toll
roads. It was Sanford who received credit for blocking
Goebel's attempt to secure the appellate judgeship. An angry
William Goebel secretly purchased a Covington newspaper,
the Ledger, to voice his opposition to Sanford. An article soon
appeared about the attempt by "GoILlLea" Sanford to get a
pardon for a kinsman in an earlier fraud case.
Later, on 11 April 1895, Goebel and Attorney General
W. J. "Jack" Hendricks were walking toward Sanford's bank to
cash Hendricks's check. They met Frank P. Helm, president
of the rival First National Bank, and on Goebel's suggestion
they started for Helm's bank. As they approached the build-
ing, Helm saw Sanford on the steps and noted that fact to
Goebel. "Yes," the senator said, "there the --- ." Hen-
dricks was introduced to Sanford, whom he had never met.
The banker shook hands with his left hand and kept the right
one in his pocket. Goebel had his right hand in his pants poc-
ket as well. Both men remained aloof and cool.
Turning to Goebel, Sanford said, "I understand that you as-
sume the authorship of that article."
"I do," acknowledged Goebel.
Quickly two shots rang out. Helm, so close that he suffered
powder burns, looked at both men, who for an instant re-
mained perfectly still. Then he saw blood trickle from San-
ford's forehead, and the banker fell forward. Shot through the
head, Sanford lived only a few hours. Goebel looked at the
mortally wounded man, placed the pistol back in his pocket,
and calmly walked off. He went directly to police head-
quarters, phoned his brother Justus, turned to the law of-
ficials, and declared, "Well, I suppose you have heard of it."
Surrendering, he turned over a .38 Smith & Wesson revolver
with one empty chamber. Then Goebel went into the chief of
police's private office, where he was soon joined by the mayor
and by Justus. For two and a half hours the group remained
secluded. After posting the required bond, Goebel went
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home. At the preliminary hearing Goebel casually opened his
mail and did not indicate any uncertainty over his guilt or in-
nocence. After hearing the testimony, the judge dismissed the
charges, since "reasonable doubt" existed.
Only two witnesses saw the shooting. Neither Hendricks
nor Helm could say who drew first. Hendricks suggested that
Sanford did; Helm surmised that this was "possibly" the case,
since Sanford had fallen first. Both did agree that the two shots
were fired almost simultaneously, as quickly as two snaps of a
finger. Based on the testimony, there is no real evidence on
who fired the first shot. Both men obviously expected trouble.
As Sanford's friends noted later, he was an excellent shot; yet
at close range his bullet missed Goebel completely, passing
through his coat and trousers. Sanford could have drawn first,
yet have made a fatal error, and Goebel could have reacted
quickly. There simply is no way of knowing who should be
held responsible.
It is certain, however, that Goebel received highly favorable
treatment from the courts, both then and later. After the ini-
tial reversal by a factional ally of Goebel's, Hallam and com-
pany would not let the matter go without one last attempt to
ruin Goebel. Three years later, in 1898, Hallam represented
the widow in an attempt to sue Goebel for $100,000. Judge
James P. Tarvin's rulings openly favored the defense and
Goebel escaped unscathed. But the whole affair left Goebel's
political world in chaos. Powerful United States Senator
J. C. S. Blackburn, whom Goebel had not supported and who
was a close friend of the dead man, vowed eternal and earthly
revenge. In his eulogy of Sanford he concluded, "I shall make
it my life's mission to avenge him by burying his slayer in the
depths of merited public execration." As the copper-lined cas-
ket was lowered into the ground, with it went many of
Goebel's hopes for statewide support.
To his opposition, Goebel had become a murderer. The
man who had once said that "the age of dueling is as dead as
the age of chivalry" had, in effect, fought a duel; but one with-
out either honor or chivalry-which made it even more un-
palatable to aristocratic Kentuckians. The article that had
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triggered the entire incident was a scurrilous political attack
that offended even Goebel's friends. To add to the Kenton
County senator's woes, Sanford had been a devoted ex-
Confederate. His murder by the son of a Union veteran would
not soon be forgotten, or forgiven, by his fellow ex-
Confederates. Sanford's widow, General Marshall's niece, had
to be placed in an insane asylum; and newspapers noted that
she had gradually lost her reason "ever since the awful shock
occasioned by the bringing home of her husband's bloody
dead body." Confederate censure solidified in opposition to
Goebel.
Reporters suddenly noticed that after the last legislative ses-
sion, Goebel had lost his following: "Recognizing this and
smarting under it, he was becoming all the fiercer in his oppo-
sition to measures he did not approve and more curt toward
persons whom he suspected of being unfriendly to his views."
Once dictator of the senate, Goebel could no longer control
that body, they declared. Whether theirs was a correct
assessment or not, Goebel had certainly lost much support. In
the next few months his candidate for governor failed to re-
ceive the nomination. Goebel's ambitions and reforms now
seemed unattainable.
For a long time, even before first running for senator,
Goebel had been building a strong organization. By the early
1890s he could challenge and overcome Hallam and Myers
through the machine he had assembled. Acknowledging his
personal shortcomings as a stump politician, Goebel had been
forced to rely on organization to ensure election. His pro-
ficiency in the political arena stamped him as a first-class pro-
fessional, with little time for idealism. He combined the
"gut-fighting tactics of a political boss" with the issue-oriented
politics of the people's advocate. Goebel built a machine and
functioned as a classic political boss. But he always recognized
that to win he needed the vote of the masses, which required
such an issue as the regulation of railroads. Goebel began to
collect old political debts, he strengthened his machine, and
he effected an intricate series of political maneuvers that
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showed his consummate political skill. "Boss Bill" began to
make his way back from predicted political oblivion.
After a caucus vote of 15-6 Goebel again won the Demo-
cratic nomination for president pro tem of the senate and he
easily defeated his Republican opponent. He thus survived his
first test following the 1895 defeats. The question of extreme
interest in January 1896, however, was the election of a
United States senator. The gold issue dominated discussion.
Giants in the Democratic party stood firmly opposed to the
popular free silver movement and their opposition threatened
to make them party outcasts. New Departure Democrats
Watterson and Breckinridge bitterly attacked all inflationary
schemes, while Carlisle became, to Ben Tillman of South
Carolina, the "Judas from Kentucky" because of his Treasury
Department efforts for the gold standard. Clay, Senator Wil-
liam Lindsay, former Governor Buckner, and other prominent
leaders refused to .yield to agrarian demands. Election of a
senator would be a test of strength for the two sides. Goebel
gave no real indication that he favored either side. He proba-
bly saw the whole issue-with some correctness-as a diver-
sion that could only hurt any chances his reform measures
might have. Yet he recognized that the issue could destroy
political influence, or even a career.
As the Democratic legislative caucus prepared to meet to
choose their nominee for senator, newspapers speculated on
the Kenton County senator's course. James B. McCreary,
former governor and an ex-Confederate colonel under Mor-
gan, was one hopeful; Goebel attended one of his conferences,
leaving the impression of support. But "Bothsides" McCreary
had a deserved reputation of not taking stands on issues and of
following rather than leading. Such indecisiveness did not ap-
peal to Goebel. Still, he left McCreary feeling that he had
Goebel's support.
Former Governor Brown and Goebel had somehow
mended their relations. Newspapers now reported that
Goebel supported Brown for the senate. In the first caucus
vote that was Goebel's position. Again he had backed a loser,
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for Brown received only 6 votes and McCreary but 13. The
third contender received 37 votes and the nomination. "Jo"
Blackburn, the man who had pledged to avenge Sanford's
death not a year earlier, was the party's choice. Or at least he
was the free silver choice, for gold Democrats refused to par-
ticipate in the caucus, and their votes would be necessary for
election.
Goebel's dilemma was obvious. If he did not go for Black-
burn in a race expected to be very close, his vote might cost
the Democrats a senate seat. Blackburn, ever ambitious, saw
as much. The two men met, discussed earlier problems and
current issues, and pledged support for each other. Such a
move was political strategy at its best, for each man desper-
ately needed the other. Goebel's sole vote, plus his senate
influence, could bring Blackburn back to the United States
Senate. And as "Old Jo" now led the majority agrarians in the
state Democratic party, his support would heal party divisions
and prove of future usefulness. The two men ignored the past
as if it had never happened. Blackburn ended by praising-
not burying-Goebel.
On the first ballot for senator, on 22 January 1896, Black-
burn received 58 votes, including Goebel's, but he did not
win. No one did. Republican candidate Dr. W. Godfrey
"Gumshoe" Hunter received all but one of his party's votes.
Though the Republicans controlled the house, on joint ballot
the two parties were almost evenly divided. Nine gold Demo-
crats, however, refused to support the free silver views of
Blackburn; they cast their ballots for McCreary, Carlisle, and
Buckner. When the final results were announced, Hunter
lacked one vote to win nomination.
And so began a long and bitter selection process that would
continue for 112 ballots and would not be decided for fifteen
more months. Hunter remained only one or two votes from
victory, but he could never get a majority; while the gold
Democrats continued to support their principles over their
party, scattering votes among different "sound money" men.
Blackburn could not win without their votes, which they
would not surrender. Through it all Goebel went with "Old
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Jo." Every vote was sought, almost every appeal was made.
Talk of bribery spread and partisanship grew even stronger.
Silverites challenged Dr. Hunter's citizenship, for he had
been born in England; but that issue got nowhere. Then came
a partisan grand jury indictment of Hunter for bribery. He
was quickly acquitted. Several elections had been contested,
and in March the reports were issued. In the Republican-
controlled house one Democrat lost his seat; in the Demo-
cratic senate two Republicans lost on weak grounds. When the
two ousted Republicans sought to vote in the senatorial con-
test, armed Blackburn partisans guarded the doors to refuse
them entry. Bloodshed almost resulted. Outside, supporters
of both sides roamed the streets, angry and ready to give sup-
port to their parties. To Henry Watterson's avowedly preju-
diced eyes, "turbulence, ruffianism, madness, anarchy,
reigned." Such actions by civilized leaders of a state were an
outrage, "a mockery of civilization, a prostitution of political
methods to the ends of insane partisanship and brutish barba-
rism."
In this explosive.atmosphere Governor Bradley ordered out
nearly 400 militia, to guard and to occupy the Capitol. Al-
though calm was quickly restored, Democrats attacked the de-
cision. Republican actions in the South during Reconstruction
had given the party a reputation in the state for quick use of
military force. To Democrats Bradley's order confirmed that
reputation, and so on 16 March 1896 a senate committee in-
vestigated the governor's call for militia. Goebel chaired the
committee and took a leading role in the questioning. While
the investigation continued, Goebel introduced a resolution
which set guilt on the Republicans for not consulting civil au-
thorities and for acting only "to bring about the election of the
Republican candidate for United States senator." It declared
that the use of force was "unnecessary" and "solely for partisan
political purposes." The resolution passed 19-14.
The committee then heard Bradley testify. The governor
scoffed at the whole affair, noting that "guilt" had been.estab-
lished before the evidence was heard. He said that the com-
mittee's work smacked of a star-chamber investigation for
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which there was no defense. He noted that his order to the
adjutant general read, "The General Assembly . . . must be
allowed to control the legislation without interference, dicta-
tion, or intimidation from any source." State officials con-
tinued to be admitted to the chambers, he pointed out. After a
heated questi.on and answer session, Goebel shouted to Brad-
ley: "We will not be intimidated by either the Governor or the
militia."
"Neither is the Governor being intimidated by you," Brad-
ley firmly declared.
The quieter times that followed did not change the voting,
and regular adjournment came without a decision on the sen-
ate seat. Since the Democrats had refused to appropriate
sufficient funds, and since no election for senator had resulted,
Bradley called a special session in March 1897. Virtually the
same count resulted, with Hunter still lacking those few votes
and the "sound money" Democrats backing anyone except
Blackburn. A compromise candidate could have given the vic-
tory to the Democracy, but neither Blackburn nor Goebel
would yield. The balloting continued for two more months.
Hunter finally stepped aside, and Republicans selected a
relatively unknown state legislator. On 28 April 1897, W. J.
Deboe became Kentucky's first Republican senator. Goebel
had gambled in supporting Blackburn. But he had done so
with the expectation that "Old Jo" would win and that, in vic-
tory, he would aid Goebel's ambitions. Though Goebel now
would not have the patronage that a senator could give him, he
still had gained a valuable and popular ally for the future.
After the disasters of 1895 Goebel had made peace with his
powerful opponents Brown and Blackburn, and he had gained
additional statewide support by these associations. But in his
home county of Kenton the power struggle continued, and
Goebel needed a victory over Hallam and Myers there to indi-
cate his strength to any doubters. Winning would require a
careful and calculated maneuver that few Kentucky politicians
besides Goebel could execute. His friendship with "sound
money" men such as Clay and Carlisle had stamped Goebel as
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a gold man. His dalliance with McCreary had reinforced that
belief, for the former governor was reputed to support "sound
money," though, as usual, he was careful not to commit him-
self. Then had come Goebel's strange alliance with the free
silver hero "Jo" Blackburn. He had seemingly gone to the
silverites. Not so, Goebel told Carlisle as he asked for support.
Walter B. Haldeman, manager of the Courier-journal and the
Louisville Times, had urged the two men to meet and discuss
their views. Carlisle later revealed that Goebel pledged his
devotion to "sound money," and said that his support for
Blackburn came from personal and party motives, not from
philosophical ones.
Writing to an important politician, Goebel explained that if
he was to be reelected in 1897 control of the state delegation
"is essential." Nothing should obscure the fact, he em-
phasized, that it was solely a question of "whether I or Myers
should control the party machinery of this county." What
Goebel wanted-and got-was for Carlisle to support
Goebel's delegation to the state convention against Myers's
contesting delegation. Assured that his former law partner
would.oppose free silver, Carlisle used his influence for him,
and Goebel won. In doing so he secured his strength among
northern Kentuckians. At the convention Goebel then voted
for the free silver chairman.
That fall Goebel's course could be clearly discerned by all
involved. William Jennings Bryan's nomination by the
national Democratic party at Chicago threw the "sound
money" forces into total opposition. Tainted by the "anarchist"
Populists, embracing free silver completely, Bryan could not
be supported by the upper echelons of a fading Bourbon-New
Departure leadership. The list of Bryan's opponents in Ken-
tucky read like the master roll of powerful politicians-
Buckner, Watterson, Breckinridge, Lindsay, Carlisle, Clay.
Active in support of a third party, the so-called gold Demo-
crats, this group proclaimed theirs the "true" party, and
Bryan's but a bastard undeserving of recognition. A free silver
advocate suggested in return that the gold Democrats, like the
mule, were "without pride of ancestry or hope of posterity."
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"Sound money" advocates had leaders, but few followers.
Watterson's Courier-Journal proclaimed "No compromise
with dishonor," but found its circulation falling dangerously
low. The free silver panacea attracted mass support-and
votes. With agrarians in control, it was now the old leadership
who turned to third parties. Goebel supported Bryan's cam-
paign and, in doing so, at last completely repudiated his ties to
the old order and to Carlisle. As the old leaders passed, Goebel
had enough influence and power to move ahead on his own,
and he made the necessary alliances-chiefly with Black-
burn-to gain further strength.
Election results did not yield the expected and usual Demo-
cratic victory. Bryan lost the state to McKinley by 281 votes.
The gold Democratic vote, though small (5,108 votes), may
have decided the contest for the Republicans. Conservative
Democrats in old Whig centers, especially in the Bluegrass,
refused to support the party. In the poorer, mountain sections
of the state Bryan's small-farmer appeal found little sympathy,
as these normally Republican areas increased their usual
majorities. Four counties, in fact, cast more than 100 percent
of their eligible votes. In the rural areas of western Kentucky,
stronghold of Democratic and Populist strength, Bryan found
his greatest support. But it was not enough.
More upsetting for Goebel was growing Republican
strength in urban areas-a national trend-since here lay
Goebel's political base and chief hope for gaining strength.
The party·of McKinley reversed Louisville's usual Democratic
majority to a 60 percent Republican vote. Republicans carried
the city for the first time in thirty years. They also reduced the
Democratic majority in Kenton County to a very narrow mar-
gin. The Republican threat became even more evident in
Goebel's own reelection campaign the next year. Goebel won
in 1897, but the three-to-one margin of four years before had
disappeared. The final tally of 5,795 to 5,095 votes was surpris-
ingly close.
Yet the fact that he won reelection itself indicates that
Goebel had recovered from his temporary setbacks. All that
had occurred over the past two years-Sanford's death and the
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resulting ex-Confederate disenchantment, Goebel's defeat for
the Court of Appeals seat, Republican victories in 1895 and
1896, Blackburn's defeat for the senate, Goebel's reputation
as a machine politician, Carlisle's break with his former
partner-made it seem almost impossible that William Goebel
could advance politically. But Goebel would not abandon his
search for power. The old leaders had been seriously crippled
by the free silver issue and by their support for railroads. Into
that leadership void Goebel entered, as he sought to become
the spokesman for the still-leaderless masses.
Goebel wanted the governorship that would be decided in
1899. The process that culminated in nomination usually
began at least a year before the convention, as hopefuls wrote
letters asking for each county's support. Goebel started much
earlier, since to create any opportunity for the nomination he
had not only to control the legislature for enactment of his
reform measures, but also to attract significant mass attention
and support.
Throughout the difficult years of 1895 to 1897, Goebel had
continued to push for needed reforms. One of his proposals
sought to make women eligible for the office of school trustee,
for membership on the Board of Education, and for voting for
these offices. On 2 April 1897, Goebel's bill passed the senate,
but it failed later in the house. As in earlier sessions, Goebel
also spoke and acted against lotteries and poolrooms. On such
issues he appealed more to middle- and upper-class reformers
than to Populists and rural farmers, who had little sympathy
for the women's rights movement. But Goebel's growing
image as a machine politician alienated Progressives and thus
negated some possible support.
During this same period Goebel grew more concerned
about the "evils" of Republicanism. Bradley's conduct in the
senatorial race stamped him, to Goebel's view, as the leader of
a party that would do anything to win. Republican victory in
the 1896 presidential race, Goebel suggested, had resulted
from fraud, and-whether he was correct or not-this belief
strengthened his determination to oppose their every move.
The L & N's growing inclination to support the now majority
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party convinced him of the Republican evils. And the findings
of a partisan legislative committee investigating state prisons
in 1897 cemented that outlook.
The penitentiary system in Kentucky had long been a dis-
grace. In the late 1870s nearly 1,000 prisoners had been
crowded into cells designed to hold 780. Each of these cells
measured less than four feet wide and seven feet long. The
annual mortality rate sometimes approached 10 percent. A
governor who had sought to reform the system cried out that
the "Black Hole of Calcutta . . . was not much worse than
this." Since then the system had been marked with fraud, cal-
lousness, and little substantive reform. Investigations under
Democratic governors had taken place much earlier, but
Goebel had had no part in those. Now sitting in judgment on
the Republicans, Goebel blamed them for everything; and-as
in past Democratic administrations-he found justified
grounds for complaint. Testimony, often of conflicting nature,
told of women prisoners going to men's barracks at night,
punishment with thumbscrews, whippings with a two-inch
strap, sodomy, food filled with maggots. The affair confirmed
his belief that corporational power had touched the Republi-
cans and corrupted them.
The reform measures, the investigation, and related events
still had not brought Goebel's name before the people to any
degree. Although he functioned as senate party leader, out in
. the state others filled the leadership vacuum created by the
defection of gold Democrats and the absence of a Democratic
governor. If Goebel hoped to achieve enough recognition to
overcome his handicaps in time for the gubernatorial canvass,
he would have to realize that hope in the 1898 legislative ses-
sion. The Democracy had swept to victory in the fall elections
and controlled both houses. Bradley's programs had no chance
of enactment; "Boss Bill" Goebel's programs would. In the
senate the lieutenant governor was virtually stripped of his
appointive powers by a party vote. Reelected senate president
pro tem by a 26-8 vote, Goebel, "The Kenton King," ruled
supreme.
Goebel was more active in the senate than ever before, and
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his strongest efforts were devoted to party measures. Although
he did push for restriction of convict labor, tighter regulation
of doctors, and "free" toll roads, Goebel focused his attention
on other measures, one of which was the so-called fellow-
servant bill. Long interested in such a measure, the senator
sought to change existing laws that made individual em-
ployees-not the railroad company-liable if an injury was
suffered by one worker through another's negligence. As
Goebel envisioned it, the owners ("masters") should be
financially responsible for the negligence of their "servants
and fellow servants." A similar measure assigned joint respon-
sibility for all actions against and liabilities of "master and
servant, employer and employee." Both measures passed, but
Bradley vetoed the fellow-servant bill after the session had
ended.
A second pet project did not even get to the governor.
Goebel's close friend J. Morton Chinn introduced a bill that
sought to end a textbook company's monopoly by setting a uni-
form price, with penalties for variances. Conservatives saw in
the measure an attempt to restrict free enterprise and perhaps
even to set up another monopoly as well. Many Democrats
shared the Republicans' reservations about the wisdom of
state interference in such matters. The Chinn bill failed, and a
milder substitute could not get out of a joint committee.
If conservative elements feared the "interference" of the
Chinn bill, then the McChord bill terrified them. Drafted by a
former railroad commissioner and member of the constitu-
tional convention, the proposal gave the railroad commission
power to hear evidence and to "determine a just and reason-
able rate." If the commission found the railroads guilty of "un-
just discrimination" they could be fined. Influential Demo-
cratic newspapers either joined the Republican press's opposi-
tion or ignored the issue editorially. Goebel spoke and worked
behind the scene to insure passage of the measure. He noted
how other states had similar laws and he stressed the need for
tighter railroad control. Finally in a Democratic caucus he got
the bill endorsed as a party measure. Although not all Demo-
crats fell in line, enough did so to pass the McChord bill.
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On 28 February 1898, Bradley vetoed the bill, citing the
"arbitrary, absolute and final" decision it granted to the com-
missioners. With such "unbridled power" in their hands, they
were taking property without any redress. Yes, corporate
power should be held in check, Bradley admitted, but not in
this manner. Allow review and further appeal, he urged. Re-
peating Bradley's arguments, many "New South" Democratic
editors agreed that the powers granted were too vast, that the
object of government was protection of property, not seizure
of it. Goebel Democrats reminded them of the influence
wielded by the L & N in the friendly courts and of the need
for tighter control of what they saw as a dangerous monopoly.
But apparently the opposition found receptive listeners, for
the senate failed to override the veto, as ten Democrats de-
serted their party. On all three measures the Goebel Demo-
crats had failed to enact their goals, and their efforts had alien-
ated many others in their party. The fourth measure would
increase tensions almost to the breaking point.
On 1 February 1898 Goebel himself had introduced "an act
to further regulate elections." Since his days at the constitu-
tional convention the senator had been interested in changing
election laws. The system in use when he acted gave county
officials the power to select their area's election officers. In this
way local party realities were recognized. Where Democrats
made up the county court they dominated; where Republicans
did, they had control. Final decisions were left to a state can-
vassing board composed of high elected officials.
The Goebel election bill sought radical change in the entire
system. A central state election board would be set up with
three members, selected by legislative vote, as the final judge
of all contests. More important, perhaps, these commissioners
would select the county election boards, who in turn would
choose the precinct officials. No provision was made for equal
party representation except at the precinct level. The legisla-
ture, then Democratic, replaced the executive, then Republi-
can, as the source of ultimate decision. Goebel defended the
bill, saying that Republican fraud in the 1896 presidential elec-
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tion justified such a move. He stressed that this was a reform
measure.
One explanation for Goebel's bill is that his motives were
entirely noble. Seeing fraud, and innocently oblivious to any
similar occurrences in his own party, Goebel sought simply to
clean up state elections, according to this view; and the bill fit
well with his reform orientation. Such a view is, at best,
charitable. It probably is incorrect. Both sides had used
methods in previous elections that had violated the code of
honest political conduct. Irregularities in 1896 were probably
little or no worse than in earlier years. Democrats had been as
guilty as Republicans; no conspiracy existed. As one Democrat
wrote a few years later, "It [the Goebel bill] assumed that the
standard of integrity in the Democratic party was a very high
one, and that the interests of good and honest government
could safely be intrusted to its custody and control. It also as-
sumed, on the other hand, that the standard of integrity in the
Republican party was doubtful. . . . These were very arbitrary
assumptions." Goebel's real motivation may have been the fact
that the Republicans had successfully challenged his party)s
dominance. For whatever the rhetoric, the bill)s chief aim was
to keep the Democracy supreme. Many reformers found the
bill distasteful and saw little evidence of its reform spirit. On
the contrary, to many in both parties the law was the antithesis
of reform. To them it would set up dictatorial boss rule and
one-man politics. Reaction to the bill came quickly.
New Departure leader W. C. P. Breckinridge and his son
Desha, who would be one of the leaders of the Progressive
movement in twentieth-century Kentucky, found the bill
anathenla. As editors of the Lexington Morning Herald they
equated "Goebelism" with "Bryanism," which they believed
had encouraged lawless destruction of toll roads, socialism,
and "assault upon the rights of property.))
A silver-bearded, stocky, sharp-tongued ex-Confederate,
"Willie" Breckenridge could be a formidable opponent. Col-
onel Breckinridge used his wit and his melodious voice well,
and he became one of the most sought-after speakers in the
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nation. He earned the title "Silver-Tongued Orator from Ken-
turcky." Breckinridge had used his talents to gain election to
Congress, like his grandfather and cousins before him. He had
served for a decade, until a scandal cut short his career. He
then turned to journalism and proclaimed the "New South"
vision for Kentucky through the columns of his paper. A party
outcast for his "sound money" views, he used his consider-
able talents to oppose this upstart, Goebel, whose background
so varied with his own. He and Goebel represented two dif-
ferent political worlds.
The Herald had cautioned its readers earlier to beware of
these new leaders, men "who would fain be considered gen-
tlemen." Now it warned of the dangers involved in this "Force
Bill" which centralized power and ended home rule. Demo-
crats would not accept it, even if it was forced through the
legislature by the "Kenton Czar." If reforms were needed,
t4is bill provided no solution, but rather "a simple, efficient
and powerful machine to declare the desired persons elected."
Breckinridge predicted-accurately-that soon "we may have
two distinct Legislatures, two rival Governors. . . each claim-
ingrecognition of the Federal Administration." This problem
could be avoided by strong leaders, but he saw before him
only "poor weaklings in the Legislature whose backbone is
mush and whose liver is white; who know what is right, but are
too cowardly to stand up for their convictions and cower be-
hind the hypocritical pretenses of caucus and regularity, poor,
poor fellows!':>
In Louisville "Marse Henry:>:> Watterson viewed matters
Similarly. Vain, talented, cantankerous, blind in one eye, prid-
ing himself on his cultural tastes, the editor of the Courier-
Journal yielded nothing to Breckinridgewhen it came to in-
tense opposition to Goebel. Although his paper:>s sagging
circulation had dictated that he in fact compromise with "dis-
honor:>:> and support the free silver Democrats, Watterson still
had no use for their new leader. He branded Goebers bill "of
imminent and deadly peril to the state.:>:> The ex-Confederate
son of a Tennessee congressman asked legislators to repudiate
this measure "of sweeping viciousness and far-reaching evil.:>:>
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The author of the measure wants to be governor, said Watter-
son, and sees in this "a ready chariot to bear him thither." Men
should not follow this "slayer of civil liberty. " But Watterson's
faith in the party indicated to him that the election law would
not pass: "The Democrats of Kentucky have not sunk so low as
that."
Other party leaders spoke out against the proposal, includ-
ing P. P. John-ston, the chairman of the state central commit-
tee. In the senate a former ally and friend of Goebel's turned
to bitter opposition. Charles J. Bronston had served in the
constitutional convention and on various senate committees
with the Kenton legislator. Like Goebel, a onetime law part-
ner of a governor-in this case McCreary-Bronston was able,
bold, resourceful, and aggressive. Disliking the centralizing
tendencies of the bill, he attacked it on the floor as a measure
"not only subversive of our republican system of local gov-
ernment, but [also] ... a confession of cowardice."
Despite opposition, the Goebel election bill passed the sen-
ate 20-15, with four Democrats, including Bronston, and two
Populists joining the minority Republicans. After a caucus en-
dorsement, on 26 February 1898 the bill passed the house by
a 57-42 vote, with more than a dozen Democrats in opposition.
The Republican Lexington Daily Leader saw this action as
"the enthronement of Goebel as boss and absolute dictator of
Kentucky politics." Only a "virtuous veto" by Bradley could
"save the honor" of Kentuckians. Watterson's Courier-
Journal proclaimed "All Hail, King Goebel!" Watterson also
stressed the strength Goebel and his supporters had: "With
party law of their own making drawn taut and trim, with war-
rants of political death to all who refuse submission . . . a
Triumvirate, controlled by a Dictator, is ordained and estab-
lished."
Republican Bradley echoed Democrat Watterson in a long
veto message filled with legal opinions. "Billy O. B." declared
the bill unconstitutional and he saw power centralized in "a
triumvirate that has more power than any court." His veto was
overridden, and the Goebel election bill became law. Un-
friendly legislators hailed "William the Conqueror."
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But in this bill Goebel had made his gravest political error.
Although it certainly attracted the attention he needed from
both the press and the people, the bill had won him few new
allies and would cost him many supporters. Conservatives
feared its centralization of powers, while reformers considered
it dictatorial boss politics of the foulest sort. Goebel could
have pursued the gubernatorial nomination without the bill.
But he wanted final victory too much. His tendency to over-
estimate the evil in those who opposed him caused Goebel to
expect the worst from them. To his thinking, the bill was
needed to insure his expected election-and that was motive
enough.
Ironically, after Goebel's death, Bronston suggested that
the Goebel bill in fact had not originated with its sponsor. Ac-
cording to Bronston, Goebel acknowledged his desire to be-
come governor, so that he could control corporate excesses
and unify and standardize internal affairs. To gain allies
Goebel had made many commitments, one of which was to
support an election bill. Bronston argued that the Kenton
County senator had reluctantly introduced the proposal for an
ally. Coming when it did, close to Goebel's death, Bronston's
story is suspect. Goebel spoke of "my bill" in debates, and he
argued very forcibly for it. He did nothing to discourage iden-
tification of himself with the bill. And he expected to use it to
his benefit. Still, the basic theme does not change: Goebel
sought the office of governor and would use the Goebel bill as
a vehicle to accomplish that goal.
After passage of the bill, the legislature met to appoint the
three electoral commissioners. The Republicans walked out,
refusing to take part in the selection of men for such an odious
board. Goebel surprised his critics, and strengthened his
claim that this was a reform measure, by choosing three able
men. The legislature unanimously confirmed the appoint-
ments of William S. Pryor, Charles B. Poyntz, and William T.
Ellis. Pryor, the most distinguished of the three, had served
on the Court of Appeals for two and a half decades before his
recent election defeat by a Republican. The seventy-three
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year old Confederate sympathizer was well respected. Poyntz,
a much younger man, had entered politics only recently, after
operating a wholesale whiskey business. A term in the state
senate had been followed by appointment to the Railroad
Commission, where he sat until the Republicans came in. El-
lis, on the other hand, had entered politics shortly after his
return from the Civil War. Following a Harvard education, his
career included stints in Congress. Although men of high
character, the appointees were nevertheless devoted Goebel
supporters who had experienced recent defeats by Republi-
cans. They appointed two Democrats and one Republican to
each county commission. Local party strength would be re-
placed by Democratic control.
Angry Republicans had already determined that in Goebel
they had a bitter enemy; the board's action confirmed that
analysis. Democrats who had split over the virtues of the elec-
tion bill before its passage still debated its wisdom. As the
head of the Democratic State Central Committee wrote,
"What a strong commanding position we held until this legisla-
ture met. Now division and discord."
5"THERE IS GOING TO BE
A HOT FIGHT"
IN NOVEMBER 1898, William Goebel wrote to his brother Jus-
tus about the political situation as he began formal campaign-
ing for governor. Living an almost puritanical life himself, the
older brother moralistically attacked two Covington politicians
as drunkards who spent all their time in pool halls and at race-
tracks. The next mayor must be an enemy of these men, he
wrote, for "I shall not permit any man to be elected Mayor on
the Democratic ticket unless he is entirely satisfactory to me. I
shall beat any man that I do not like with the Election Com-
mission. I turned over to [J. W.?] Pugh the entire matter of
appointing election officers this year. Next year I shall attend
to the matter myself, whether I am nominated for governor, or
not.
"There is going to be a hot fight between me and Hardin for
the nomination."
And there was. Goebel's chief rival, "Waf' Hardin, had
been running for governor for almost a decade. He had lost the
nomination in 1891; won it in 1895, and then lost the election.
Now he was making his final effort. The tall, handsome, for-
mer state attorney general had served the Bourbon-New De-
parture Democrats well, until his turn to free silver left some
feeling betrayed. He still controlled the regular party organi-
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zations, however, and of all three serious candidates he came
closest to what the L & N wanted. Hardin thus gained their
important support and many benefits.
Hardin's opposition to Goebel was stated best by the paper
his allies purchased to proclaim his cause. The Louisville Dis-
patch asked why not Goebel, and answered, "because he is
not a man of the people; because he has none of the chivalrous
spirit of a Kentuckian; because he is selfish and a demagogue;
. . . because he holds that it is legitimate politics to plunder
the public; because he will sacrifice friend or party to self-
interest; because he has no ability beyond trickery." They pic-
tured William Goebel as an undemocratic, unchivalrous, am-
bitious, dangerous demagogue. More quietly they ,attacked his
origins and background.
While Hardin's strength lay in the party organization, in
central Kentucky, and among businessmen, a third contender
spoke for the powerful agrarians, chiefly centered in western
Kentucky. William J. Stone had most of the prerequisites for
victory. He had lost a leg in the war while serving the Confed-
eracy; on his return he had entered politics, had risen to be-
come speaker of the Kentucky house, and was elected to
Congress. The bewhiskered farmer and former Granger had
tremendous appeal in the west, and his opposition to the L &
N was well known. Captain Stone's candidacy took from
Goebel much of his expected antirailroad support.
And Goebel was worried. Writing again to Justus in late
February 1899, the despondent candidate found enemies all
around. Persons "pretending to be friends" had destroyed all
his chances to be governor. He spoke of withdrawing, for "I
know I can not be nominated." The "blood-suckers" had done
their work well. A few days later he wrote of his expectation
that he would soon retire from the race as he cared nothing for
the governorship. "I am better off without it." A postscript to
this letter suggested, however, that his protests might not be
what they appeared. He added, "The Louisville crowd is no
good to me, and I want to smash them anyhow." These letters
came at a low point in Goebel's canvass and represented more
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a rationalization than a correct indication of his mood. For
Goebel's strong will would not allow him to surrender so eas-
ily. He fought back.
Goebel still had powerful allies. He had toured the state in
August of the previous year and gathered support. Blackburn
had conferred with him and apparently agreed on at least a
temporary alliance. Walter B. Haldeman, publisher of the
Courier-Journal and the Louisville Times, although publicly
neutral, supported Goebel; while his perplexed editor, Henry
Watterson, pondered what possible course he could take. Al-
though Stone's candidacy had destroyed Goebel's expectation
of carrying the western part of the state, the man from Kenton
felt reasonably certain that he could still do well elsewhere,
especially in northern Kentucky. And although Hardin had
much of the organizational support, Goebel sat on both the
state central and state executive committees and he had
friends there as well.
Goebel's strength was urban. Stone's lay in rural areas,
while Hardin's was more diverse. The northern Kentucky
candidate had to get some signincant support from rural areas,
which predominated in Kentucky. A Hardin newspaper, the
Woodford Sun, taunted Goebel on this very fact: "Mr.
Goebel's machine politics do very well in the city, but they
can't be worked on country folks." In an effort to overcome
this drawback Goebel spoke in rural areas to appeal for sup-
port. At Bedford on 30 May 1899, he replied to Hardin's at-
tacks. "I have not had a powerful family connection nor wealth
to aid me," he told a predominately small-farmer crowd. "I am
not the chance bearer of a great name made famous by some-
body else." Instead, he stressed, he was of humble origin. He
attacked the "Frankfort dynasty," to which Hardin belonged,
as a producer of "Tateism."
Goebel had also declared his support for the Chinn and
McChord bills and for the election law, but the talk was clearly
defensive. In that he succeeded well, and several of his
speeches were distributed in quantities of 40-50,000
throughout the state. Friendly newspapers like the Glasgow
Times called for bold measures, as advocated by Goebel. "The
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Democratic party in Kentucky is in the supremest peril in its
existence," asserted the editor. ':':The battle of its life is just
before it." The candidacy of Goebel represented the forces of
good against corporational influence and must be supported.
There. was, of course, danger in this approach. Portraying
opponents as evil significantly lessened chances that the three
hopefuls could unite later in a harmonious battle against the
Republicans. Breckinridge cautioned against this very danger
in April, warning that ':':the personal assaults are ... sowing
noxious seeds from which divisions, heart-burnings and feuds
will spring.» Hardin, Goebel, and Stone would reap the re-
sults.
In Louisville the bitterness of a local primary had made sus-
pect that city>s devotion to the Democracy. Two local factions,
as in Covington, had long fought for power. One side, includ-
ing Watterson, Haldeman, and the incumbent mayor, op-
posed a group headed by Louisville>s own boss, ex-Con-
federate John Whallen. Owner of the famous Buckingham
burlesque theater, Whallen used ':':the Buck" as a center of
operations. From there he supervised various legal and illegal
enterprises, aided the needy-in exchange for their vote-and
in 1899 joined forces with the L & N and the Louisville Dis-
patch to oppose his young rival, William Goebel.
On the day of the primary, before noon, the Whallen-
backed Democratic committee declared the election Hnull and
void." They cited Hfraudulent interference>' by the police and
other supporters of the mayor-who aided Goebel. Halde-
man's Courier-Journal blamed the disruptions on Whallen's
forces, who, it argued, saw that they were losing and pulled
out. Other men took their places at the polls and voting con-
tinued. Soon after, the Louisville Dispatch declared that such
actions by ':':Goebel's gamblers" and the mayor's henchmen
would not work in future elections. Calling the mayor ':':a venal
character . . . , a cowardly inciter of riot, a disturber of the
peace, a highwayman . . . , a man sunk to the lowest depths of
political if not moral depravity," the paper suggested that citi-
zens Harmed with Winchesters and well supplied with am-
munition" be at the polls next time-in the governor's race-
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in order to preserve order. If this "gang of political cutthroats"
sought to seize power through force they would be disap-
pointed. Goebel, or whoever won the nomination, could not
afford to see Louisville go strongly Republican again, but ac-
rimony among its leaders made that an increasing possibility.
And such appeals to force meant that both sides, in the long
run, would be the losers.
Results of all the various county mass conventions left
Goebel trailing both opponents. Hardin needed less than 200
of the large number of uncommitted delegates to secure the
547 necessary for a majority. While the Lexington Morning
Herald proudly proclaimed that it was "impossible" now for
the "Kenton King" to win, other editors were less certain.
"That trickery will be resorted to in the coming convention,"
suggested the Hazel Green Herald, "... is as plain as the
handwriting on the wall. "
What initially occurred was less "trickery" than simple,
legitimate political strategy and power politics. Both Stone
and Goebel opposed the L & N; each expected to receive the
votes of western Kentucky should he be nominated; both
knew that, if left alone, Hardin would eventually win the con-
test. Newspapers reported the possibility of an agreement be-
fore the delegates even assembled. Then on 21 June 1899,
headlines proclaimed: "Stone-Goebel Deal Made."
What had occurred seriously crippled Hardin's chances.
One of Stone's managers, the tall, talented, youthful, heavyset
orator Ollie James, had called on Goebel's friends and ar-
ranged a conference. James and the ambitious leader of Logan
County Democrats, John S. Rhea, met with Goebel's repre-
sentatives, including Owensboro newspaper editor and former
railroad commissioner Urey Woodson. After preliminary dis-
cussions they broke up and Woodson asked his candidate to
meet Stone personally. Goebel left the Galt House in Louis-
ville after midnight and returned three hours later. The ex-
cited candidate told a sleepy Woodson (as he later remem-
bered it), "He has agreed to do anything we want, allowing us
to name the temporary chairman and promising us his full
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support." After another meeting a formal agreement was
reached. The two men signed a document in Woodson's pres-
ence. Goebel pledged to give Stone half of his expected
Louisville delegates and to support Stone should Goebel
withdraw or be defeated. Stone would reciprocate should he
suffer that fate. They agreed to elect the temporary chairman,
thus leaVing Hardin powerless.
On 21 June, the convention assembled in the Music Hall on
Louisville's Market Street. In oppressive heat, the band
played "Dixie" over and over again as cheers continued. Fi-
nally preliminary business began. P. P. Johnston, a Hardin
man, chaired the convention and called for nominations for
temporary chairman. The Hardin forces put forth young
lawyer William "Roaring Bill" Sweeney. When Stone manager
Ollie James rose and presented the name of a Goebelite,
David B. Redwine, the convention knew that the rumors of a
"deal" were true.
As balloting began, Chairman Johnston ruled on contested
delegations, often even hearing evidence. This highly unusual
procedure was followed by recognizing delegations certified
by established local party officials-the usual procedure. But
Johnston at times ruled against these delegations-a very im-
portant circumstance for those who had to defend Goebel la-
ter. For eight long, hot hours the process went on. The chair
had not made an organized effort to throw out Stone or Goebel
votes and probably had ruled as it thought just. Johnston had
erred, however, by assuming arbitrary powers.
The final results gave the temporary chairmanship, by a
very few votes, to the virtually unknown Redwine. The
combination had worked. A youthful circuit judge from feud-
ridden "Bloody Breathitt," Redwine had served in the legisla-
ture concurrently with Goebel and was, wrote the guber-
natorial hopeful, "an old friend of mine." Opponents of "Boss
Bill" correctly stressed Goebel's complete dominance of Red-
wine. The chairman did· his bidding. In his opening speech
Redwine declared that he would see "that every man is ac-
corded a fair hearing," and he added a keynote for the coming
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campaign: HThis is a fight with the people on one side and
trusts and corporations on the other." Goebel would not have
said it very differently.
Redwine then turned to the most crucial decision of the
entire convention: deciding contested delegations. Hardin
forces had expected no serious challenges, since they had be-
lieved they would elect the chairman and since so many of the
contests were from blatantly Hrump" conventions. The Com-
mittee on Credentials, however, was now composed of a
Stone-Goebel majority expected to throw out many opposition
votes. The convention adjourned to await their report.
The next day, 23 June, exploded into utter confusion. Head-
lines screamed: "UNDER CONTROL OF OUTLAWS. Music Hall
the Scene of Wild Disorders and Terror, and for a Time on the
Verge ofBloodshed." And in this instance reporters were guilty
of little exaggeration. Hundreds of nondelegates crowded the
floor and arguments broke out. Pistols were drawn and almost
used. Who these people were depended on which newspaper
you read. To the anti-Hardin Courier-Journal most were
HBoss" Whallen's "thugs" sent to intimidate, but failing in
their mission, because Redwine had gathered plainclothes
police to oppose them. The anti-Goebel Louisville Dispatch
described these men as city police, firemen, and gamblers
brought by Goebel to threaten timid, undecided delegates.
Whatever their source, the nondelegates confused a badly be-
fuddled situation.
Redwine, as Goebel's ally, postponed any votes until the re-
port of the Committee on Credentials. The convention ad-
journed that morning, but some 800 people demonstrated
their opposition to the tactics that afternoon. Later, when del-
egates reassembled, Redwine quickly declared .the conven-
tion adjourned again, since the contested votes had not yet
been decided. Charles J. Bronston rose and called for a dele-
gate vote on the adjournment decision. Redwine refused. As
some delegates left, Bronston no longer could control his
anger at what he saw as the chairman's~and thus Goebel's-
utter disregard for parliamentary procedure. To what was de-
scribed as "a howling mob" of both supporters and opponents,
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he spoke of this group of "cutthroats and assassins" who
thought themselves above the law. He defied the anger of hiss-
ing delegates in saying, "I will not be silenced by the outcry
of hired thugs who come to this convention armed with brass
knuckles and bowie knives.... I defy them to silence me."
"Roaring Bill" Sweeney told the convention that these men
were present "for the purpose of assassination if the opportu-
nity presents." A Republican paper, if anything, underplayed
the situation when it said that "utter chaos reignsin the state
democratic convention."
And then that night the credentials committee's report was
finally submitted. Of the twenty-eight disputed cases,
twenty-six were decided in favor of either Goebel or Stone. As
a result, Hardin lost almost 160 votes. His forces grew out-
raged at the decision, shouted for recognition, refused to heed
the chair's rulings, and spoke of "czars without conscience," of
"traitors without principles."
The next morning the vote came on the Hardin supporters'
minority report. Redwine ruled that accredited delegates from
contested counties could not vote-thus removing almost
one-third of the votes, nearly all for Hardin. The defeat of the
minority report by over 100 votes left the Goebel-Stone com-
bination in complete control. Fights broke out on the floor,
shouts of anger again filled the hall; but finally Hardin's forces
acquiesced, if only grudgingly.
Then, on 24 June, nominations for governor began. Hardin,
his face ashen, his hands trembling, walked to the podium,
reviewed the contest; and despite shouts of "No! No!" he then
withdrew. He recognized the disadvantage the committee re-
port had placed on him. Rhea nominated Stone. Judge Tarvin,
who had only recently sat on the Sanford case, put forth
Goebel's name.
Stone's managers thought they had an understanding with
Goebel that, once Hardin was defeated, he would step down
in favor of their candidate. In return, Goebel would be al-
lowed to name other officers and to control party organization.
James sent a messenger to Goebel, asking him to withdraw.
Goebel refused. "Go tell him, God damn him, to come at once
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and withdraw," James roared. He then went to tell Goebel
himself. The man from northern Kentucky would not step
down. James threatened to bolt to Hardin, but Goebel
realized how much Stone supporters disliked the L & N's can-
didate. As his allies warned him of the possible bolt, he
answered, "Let them nominate Wat Hardin. If they can stand
it, I can." Stone and his delegates could not do that of course;
they wanted the governorship too much.
The balloting proceeded quietly enough, until Jefferson
County was reached. Louisville's vote, by the prior agreement
of the two contenders, was to be divided; but on the roll call
all votes went to Goebel. Woodson, who knew of the prom-
ised arrangement, pleaded for fulfillment of it. He was
laughed at. Every vote was needed by the "Kenton King."
Angry Stone managers, feeling betrayed, began to turn to
Hardin, who had received a few loyal votes. It appeared they
might select him in order to repay the treachery they thought
they saw. Woodson quickly shifted Daviess County's vote, and
the votes of five other western Kentucky counties, from
Goebel to Stone to try to balance the Louisville turnaround
and to appease Stone delegates. Before this move Goebel had
lacked less than three dozen votes to win the nomination. De-
prived of them, he grew "enraged," according to reporters.
Pandemonium overcame calm discussion, as delegates
shouted for attention in the huge hall. County after county
changed its vote in the three-hour session. Future governor
Augustus Owsley Stanley stood on a box, held on to a chan-
delier, and announced his county's turn to Hardin. But Wood-
son had done enough to keep Hardin from gaining a majority.
Whereas the first count had been Goebel 520, Stone 428lh,
and Hardin 126112, the recapitulation gave Stone the lead,
Hardin second place, and Goebel third position in a close con-
test. For eleven more ballots, spread without a break over six
hours, this trend continued, _with each man holding between
300 and 400 votes. Near midnight the deadlocked convention
adjourned for a needed Sunday break.
On Monday delegates reassembled to find the Music Hall
filled with over 200 policemen, all there at Redwine's request.
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On orders not to allow anybody but delegates and other cer-
tified observers on the floor, they refused entrance to some
newspaper reporters and, according to anti-Goebel papers,
even to some accredited alternates, who had to replace the
many tired and disgusted delegates who had returned home.
Rhea asked the chair to remove the police, so that the con-
vention would not be under their control. Redwine declared
the motion out of order. An ex-congressman appealed the rul-
ing with the same result. At that, Bronston, Rhea, Sweeney,
James, and others exploded. Bronston asked whether any par-
liamentarian in the hall could support the ruling that no appeal
can be made of the chair's decision. All the Hardin and Stone
leaders' controlled anger over Redwine's earlier rulings now
came into the open.
As Redwine moved to order the balloting to begin, Hardin
and Stone delegates hooted and jeered, so that the secretary's
voice could not even be heard. Tin horns reinforced voices,
and few could hear the chair or the county votes. "The whole
floor," one reporter noted, "was a howling, excited pan-
demonium." Men stood on chairs and shouted at Redwine,
and fights started, while Redwine tried to begin the voting.
He asked to have those rules read which allowed him to clear
the area. James, "his face white with rage," thundered that no
rule gave Redwine power to eject delegates. Cries of "Put us
out if you can" reinforced him.
"Give us a vote on appeal," the anti-Redwine forces yelled.
The chair refused. Another ex-congressman read the rules of
order followed in Congress by "Czar" Thomas B. Reed; even
the "Czar" allowed an appeal, he pointed out. Redwine or-
dered the roll called. Songs .became popular fare among Har-
din and Stone supporters, as they first sang the "Doxology."
Sacred music had no soothing influence. Then came "There'll
Be a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight," "My Old Kentucky
Home," "Hang Judge Redwine to a Sour Apple Tree" (to the
tune of "John Brown's Body") and more. The judge kept time
with his gavel.
Voting began, though the results were almost impossible to
hear. Many delegations refused to cast their votes. Someone
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looked at the disorder and sarcastically remarked that Red-
wine's decision to call in police to keep the peace should bring
the convention to thank him "for the good order he is main-
taining." For almost an hour the roll was called. Goebel re-
ceived a majority of those that voted, but two hundred less
than an absolute majority.
James asked Redwine if Goebel had received the nomina-
tion. The chair answered that he had, and James laughed that
such a nomination "would not be worth a baubee [sic]!"
Goebel realized this too as he observed the proceedings. He
passed word to Redwine that a true majority would be re-
quired. Meanwhile the convention floor began to resemble a
mob scene. For hour after hour the noise and confusion con-
tinued, as forces opposed to Goebel and Redwine refused to
allow a peaceful vote to take place until the chair gave them a
decision on the appeal. Finally, after ten hours and two fruit-
less ballots, the convention adjourned. To a national press at-
tracted to Goebel since his election law outcry of the year be-
fore, this was all good copy. The New York Times reported
that this "continuous performance of howling farce" called a
convention was without doubt "the most uproarious and dis-
orderly body of men ever gathered together for the transac-
tion of political or other business."
The. next day the convention seemed composed of a group
of men different from those of the day before. Stone and Har-
din, still unable to unite their forces, both called later in the
day for adjournment to another city. Sweeney asked for a vote
on the matter. Redwine, at least consistent, declared the re-
quest out of order and refused an appeal. He correctly admit-
ted, "I lay no claim to being a good parliamentarian." This
time the forces opposed to Goebel decided to allow the ballot-
ing to go on. Each ballot continued close, with less than fifty
votes separating the three men. Goebel watched, with Black-
burn sometimes at his side, as he trailed Stone and Hardin on
both the twentieth and twenty-first ballots. By the twenty-
fourth he led by a scant three votes, but the time now was
ready for the move that would decide the contest.
A resolution was introduced that called for dropping the
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lowest man. Some of the Hardin and Stone leaders were op-
posed, and one pointed out to Redwine that if this motion
could be voted on, then so too should the earlier call for ad-
journment. Redwine allowed the vote on the resolution. Tired
delegates, anxious to return to the homes they had left a week
before, narrowly adopted the motion.
The next ballot decided who would be the final contestants
and, surprisingly, Stone trailed. He was dropped. At one time
Stone's entire vote would have gone to Goebel, but their
agreement, in Stone's view, had been broken. His supporters
would divide almost equally now; and since Hardin and
Goebel stood at almost the same count, the contest would be
very close yet.
On the final, twenty-sixth ballot, crucial areas began to go
for Hardin. Of the first six Stone counties, five went against
Goebel. James gave Crittenden County's vote to Hardin, as
Rhea did for Logan. Bardstown went for Hardin. But in other
towns and urban areas Goebel picked up support-in
Lexington, Louisville, Owensboro, Richmond, Hopkinsville.
Finally the ballot came to Union County, previously for Stone.
With its sixteen votes, Goebel won the nomination. Without
Union he would have lost, for only thirty votes separated the
two contenders at the end.
The nominee appeared before the delegates and in a very
brief speech told them, "1 never got anything in my life that
was worth having without a hard fight. . . . I believe the gov-
ernorship is worth fighting for." Following the talk, Rhea,
Sweeney, James, McCreary, Blackburn, and even Bronston
voiced their support for the party and its choice. As the New
York Times noted, the melodrama had ended in a love feast.
Goebel went to the Galt House, ate, and left, as if it were just
another day. He was calm and confident.
All that remained to be done was selection of the other
nominees. The expected choice for lieutenant governor was
J. C. W. Beckham, the young, handsome speaker of the Ken-
tucky house and a proud grandson of a former governor. But
Goebel hesitated to support Beckham, for, as in Louisville and
Covington, two factions struggled in Beckham's hometown of
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Bardstown. Ben Johnson, himself a former speaker of the
house, had controlled the area's convention vote for Hardin,
showing Beckham's political impotence. Finally, however,
Goebel went to Beckham.
The nominee for attorney general aided the ticket, for
Robert J. Breckinridge, Jr. added the most politically presti-
gious family name in the commonwealth to the Democratic
ranks. As an ex-Confederate he was expected to overcome that
group's dissatisfaction with the nominee. (He was, one paper
said, "a small bait for the confederate soldier.") A brother of
Willie Breckinridge of the Morning Herald, Bob Breckinridge
had briefly served in the Confederate Congress, and with
Goebel in the Kentucky senate. Other candidates included fu-
ture gubernatorial hopefuls S. W. Hager for treasurer and
Harry V. McChesney for superintendent of public instruction.
The convention finally was ended.
The goodwill proclaimed was illusory, however. "Mutter-
ings of mutiny or sullen silence" better typified real feelings.
The day after the convention closed, Stone placed a "card" in
the Cincinnati Post in which he told of his agreement with
Goebel, arguing that Goebel had pledged to support him in
return for a position of power in naming the other candidates
and in selection of party leaders. Ex-Congressman W. C.
Owens, a Stone manager, indicated to the press that "Goebel
betrayed Stone if ever a man was betrayed. He broke his word
to him." The statements confirmed the suspicions of disap-
pointed Stone supporters.
Hardin's spokesman, the Louisville Dispatch, had ruled out
any compromise with Goebel even while the convention met.
An editorial proclaimed that "this is no schoolboy game that is
now being played in Kentucky. It is genuine political war of
the most desperate character." It concluded that Goebel's
"revolutionary" methods justified vigorous and "far-reaching"
plans ofopposition. Hallam, Myers, and Clay opposed the tick-
et. Breckinridge's Morning Herald saw the whole Music Hall
affair as a "mob farce," and the platform and candidate but
fruits of "a corrupt bargain and political cowardice." And this
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despite his brother's presence on the ticket. Like the Civil
War, Goebelism split families.
Even Watterson's endorsement of Goebel-which required
a great deal of political leapfrogging and shuffling of past
words-was not strong, as he said the paper was "compelled"
to support the ticket. Perhaps he remembered the thousands
of dollars lost in 1896 when it had not done so.
The conduct and the proceedings at the Music Hall turned
more voters against Goebel than anything had since passage of
the Goebel Election Law. But had Goebel not followed the
course he did at the convention it is doubtful that he would
have received the nomination. Whereas the Election Law had
been a tactical error-unless, as enemies charged, it would
declare him elected-his conduct at the Music Hall was not.
Both would drive voters away from him, but it was vital to win
the nomination. Now he could appeal to the people, to the
masses that he believed would elect him, and perhaps regain
their trust-and votes. To defeat the corporations required his
victory at the Music Hall, at almost whatever cost. And he had
paid the price of victory.
Goebel told a brother that "the nomination has given me a
power that nothing else could have given me; and if I am
elected my power will be still further increased. I do not doubt
my election. n The question was still whether the L & N con-
trolled Kentucy or not. He added, "I have made up my mind
not to be beaten, no matter what is done by the L & N. . . .
And I shall not take any chances. So far as I can do so, I shall
make my election certain."
The Republicans met in relative quiet but not complete
harmony. The leading contender for their nomination seemed
a weak figure when compared to such talented former candi-
dates as John Marshall Harlan and W. o. Bradley. Yet Wil-
liam Sylvester Taylor did lead. His background contrasted
with Goebel's urban origins. Born in 1853 in a Kentucky log
cabin near Morgantown, Taylor grew up on a farm in the same
general area. Not wealthy, not well educated, he was ambi-
tious, and so he entered politics. Taylor won election in a pre-
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dominately Democratic county, and he had enough influence
by 1888 to be chosen as a delegate to the national convention.
He ran with Bradley in 1895 and won the office of attorney
general.
In some .ways, however, Taylor was not unlike Goebel. He
lacked the personal appeal that many political leaders have,
and the graces and physique that attract support. An adequate
but not graceful speaker, he was warm and probably well
meaning; but he was not a man of strong intellect. The ill-
fitting clothes, long, shaggy black hair, and bony fingers of
"Tom-Tit" Taylor made him an easy figure for ridicule.
Even Taylor's friends saw much truth in the picture the op-
position painted. "Hogjaw" Taylor, said one paper, was indus-
trious and ambitious; but beyond that he was "a slouch in his
gait, a boor in his manner, and the butt of the entire bar of
Kentucky." The editor portrayed a man who knew few social
amenities, crowded his way through parties, and kept a Frank-
fort boardinghouse to earn money for his large family. Taylor,
said the Democrats, "is the personification of all the low and
degrading in human tendency."
Taylor came to the convention leading, not because of per-
sonality, but because of persistence. Since Republicans had
expected to lose in 1899, strong candidates abandoned the
canvass. Bradley's handling of Spanish-American War prob-
lems and general voter reaction to his administration kept
them away. Taylor stayed in, built up his own "machine,"
worked hard at the "grass roots," and gained delegate
strength. When the Music Hall proceeding split the Demo-
crats, Republicans suddenly saw excellent opportunities for
victory. Hopefuls now worked harder, but it was too late.
Governor Bradley represented the old wing of his party, the
group which went back to the postwar days and which had
built its base on black voters. Bradley himself had voiced his
support for social equality among races. Taylor, from western
Kentucky, spoke for the younger, "lily-white" branch of the
party, however. He and Senator Deboe sought to widen Re-
publican appeal by disassociating the party from the "stigma"
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of "black Republicanism." A spirit of Negro proscription had
risen in the 1890s throughout the South, and in Kentucky it
had resulted in a Separate Coach Act that segregated railroad
cars. Beyond that the movement slowed in the common-
wealth, and blacks continued to vote. Taylor wanted their
votes, but he promised little in return. Bradley opposed
Taylor, as did a third group led by Lexington Leader editor
Sam J. Roberts and powerful Danville lawyer John W. Yerkes.
But none could overcome Taylor's early delegate lead.
At the convention at Woodland Auditorium in Lexington,
Taylor was made the unanimous selection. Black leaders who
had threatened to set up a third party were promised future
office and one of their number was made permanent secre-
tary. With that threat seemingly settled, Taylor sought to pla-
cate the governor, who refused to attend the convention.
Taylor spokesmen offered to make Bradley's nephew Edwin P.
Morrow the candidate for secretary of state, if "Billy O. B."
would campaign for them. He refused. And so a thirty-year-
old superintendent of schools from Knox County in the moun-
tains received that office. A farmer's son and former school-
teacher, Caleb Powers was a rising politician. Educated at
Union College, then A&M in Lexington, then West Point
(which he had to leave because of poor eyesight), at Northern
Indiana Normal School's law department, and finally ina post-
graduate course at Centre College, Powers was an intelligent,
dignified, shrewd, and sensitive young man. After his wife's
death within six months of their marriage, Powers threw him-
self into politics more vigorously. He grew colder, more re-
served, and more determined. By 1899 politics was almost his
sole interest.
The Republican ticket, like the Democratic one, was filled
for the most part with young men like Powers who repre-
sented the new wave of untried leaders swept in by the chaos
of the 1890s. As new factions replaced old, politics became
almost a question of who could best keep the most elements of
the old party while attracting new faces to a coalition.
The race would not be just a two-man affair, however.
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Democrats defeated at the Music Hall had corresponded,
argued, and then finally agreed to form a third party. At a pre-
liminary meeting some 500 people assembled in Lexington.
Among the Democratic ex-congressmen were Willie Breckin-
ridge, W. C. Owens, Phil Thompson, and G. W. Adams. Re-
former William Beckner came, as .did "Boss" John Whallen.
Myers represented his faction, while "Roaring Bill" Sweeney
and other defeated candidates for office at the Democratic
convention spoke for their causes.
Leadership for this bolters' meeting came from former Gov-
ernor John Young Brown. His temporary reconciliation with
Goebel was no more. Spoken of as a candidate back in 1898
before the Democrats had started their canvass, he had drop-
ped out. According to Goebel, in a letter he wrote to Justus,
Brown had then pledged to support him. Now Goebel saw him
as another betrayer, another enemy.- A good speaker, though
somewhat haughty and reticent in private, Brown turned his
full fury on the Democratic nominee. After florid references to
home, daughters, flowers, the American Revolution, Henry
Clay, and Robert E. Lee, he asked, "Has manhood fled to
brutish beasts and are we to be called up and voted like dumb
driven cattle?" He argued that Goebelism must be defeated by
this group, by "real" Democrats. They would "save" the party
from the clutches of those who would remove fundamental
rights. Anarchists led by Goebel should be destroyed, said
Brown. He, for one, would not "bow my neck to the usurpa-
tion of the Louisville convention."
Two weeks later a convention of these "bolters" assembled
in Lexington. With a one-legged, ex-Confederate soldier sit-
ting as chairman, the delegates chose at least four more ex-
Confederates, including P. P. Johnston, among the seven men
they nominated for the minor offices. Brown was an easy
choice for governor. The earlier leaders were now joined by
allies Hallam and Richard Knott-the latter the independent
editor of the Louisville Evening Post, and a man whose
brother served the· L & N as vice president. The forces oppos-
ing Goebel were growing.
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Even expected allies turned against him. Although a rela-
tively insignificant party since the Democrats had taken over
their free silver plank, a small group of Populists held their
convention, promptly rejected Goebel, and condemned his
election law. Goebel observed these damaging developments
as he prepared for formal campaigning and the most important
speech of his short life.
6"I ASK NO QUARTER
AND
I FEAR NO FOE"
~E CAMPAIGN OPENED at the Democratic stronghold of
Mayfield on 12 August. Initial speeches traditionally set the
tone for the entire race and were widely reprinted. In the
period before his speech, when candidates usually mingled
with the crowd to shake hands and tell jokes, Goebel was ill at
ease, restless, nervous, almost aloof. The irony became evi-
dent: whereas Goebel appealed to the masses with his stands
on issues, his personality belied that appeal. The contradiction
would haunt him as he spoke warmly and with strong feeling
about matters that affected and interested the masses; but on a
person-to-person basis he moved with a cold, emotionless
aura, and he failed to articulate his feelings effectively.
Standing before the crowd as he prepared to give his
speech, Goebel personified a type of Kentucky leader seldom
seen on the political stage before. For almost from the advent
of statehood, politicians of the commonwealth had depended
heavily on strong oratory to win votes; they had stressed family
ties and common ancestries; and postwar Democrats had em-
phaSized their Confederate ties to prestigious leaders. The
northerner Goebel could not make such appeals. Partly
Populist, partly Progressive, a strong reformer, yet a powerful
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machine politician, Goebel was a transitional southern leader.
His appeal would be different in that it would be more issue-
oriented. This is not to say that Goebel ignored oratory, for he
carefully prepared speeches with a good grasp of audience
psychology. By repeating phrases and concepts and by using
very little figurative language, he could give an effective talk.
Perhaps not the demagogue some analysts have presented,
Goebel did use some demagogic techniques. But in Kentucky
politics that did not make him very different.
The audience he faced had tired of four years of Republican
control and they saw Goebel seeking to redeem for the
Democracy the office that was rightfully theirs. Uncertain
Democrats wanted to be convinced that he was their man.
Thus Goebel could have stressed common goals, healed
wounds, and skirted divisive issues. But little in Goebel's per-
sonality slowed his chosen course of attack. Attacking and
fighting made the campaign easier for him. Goebel simply said
the things he had been saying since entering politics a dozen
years earlier. Only now the audience was not a few senators or
a small Covington gathering, but a statewide one, and the
stakes were much greater.
Goebel addressed voters who had experienced the greatest
railroad rate discrimination, who had suffered most from falling
prices. These people knew what Goebel was saying. As
Thomas D. Clark noted: "They needed a political Joshua to
lead them from the wilderness of Republicanism and railroad
abuse into a Jericho of Democracy." Their Joshua was William
Goebel. Many Democratic voters, particularly small farmers,
followed the path of free silver, railroad regulation, cheaper
textbooks, and a return to Democratic control. Goebel aimed
at these men when he gave unqualified support to the McChord
railroad bill, the Chinn textbook bill, his own Election ·Law,
and Blackburn's return to the senate.
In his speech at Mayfield that hot August day, he began
with an almost xenophobic, Populist attack on the L & N,
which was owned, he said, by the Belmonts of New York and
by English investors. Controlled, concentrated wealth-the
L & N monopoly-had sought to select the Democratic
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nominee, but the people had won out and chosen him. The
gold standard, high tariffs, oppressive trusts-these were Re-
publican stands; while Democrats protected the "common
man." Goebel demanded decreased state government ex-
penses, lower taxes, and increased school aid. But the issue
that transcended others was "whether the trusts or the people
shall rule ... whether the Louisville and Nashville Railroad-
Company is the servant or the master of the people of this
Commonwealth." Unfortunately for Goebel, reaction to his
speech was mixed, due in part no doubt to the fact that he had
collapsed from heat exhaustion in the middle of it. Blackburn
quickly had filled in until Goebel recovered and returned to
conclude. But, as campaigns go, this was not an auspicious
debut.
Throughout the canvass, Goebel continued the themes
stressed in his opening speech. The brunt of his attack fell on
railroads. As he once told an acquaintance, "I believe I have a
mission to perform," and part of that "mission" was to humble
what he saw as a dangerous and greedy force influencing Ken-
tucky politics. Long before Goebel entered politics it had been
customary for railroads to contribute to political campaigns,
but 1899 brought a difference in scale. August Belmont sup-
posedly said that the line eventually spent a half million dol-
lars to defeat the Democrat. Such moves strengthened
Goebel's resolution and determination.
In speeches across the state, Goebel traced his long-
standing opposition to the L & N that had begun in his first
legislative term: "From that day to this the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad Company has regularly camped on my
political trail. . . . I have done a little camping myself." He
would then tell of his various efforts against the line, including
support for moves to limit laborers' working hours and to out-
law "yellow dog" contracts. Privately he told a friend that
when elected he would get an indictment against Milton
Smith, Basil Duke, and their colleagues, and put them all in
jail.
Clearly the L & N could expect no sympathy; they believed
they would not even get a fair hearing. Reaction-at times
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extreme reaction-followed. In the view of men like Smith,
Goebel was leading a frontal attack on their business, their
system, their whole philosophy. If successful, this leader
might tear down all that they had spent years building. They
could not accept regulation if it promised their future destruc-
tion, and they feared "the Kenton King" would use any means
to destroy them. Smith, hardly one to retreat, struck back. He
asked former allies who had stayed with the Democrats to re-
turn the free passes given earlier in the year. Funds went to
subsidize newspapers which opposed "Boss Bill." In Louisville
especially pressures increased on the railroad workers.
Watterson, writing as "your personal friend," had warned
Belmont that the Democrats would be elected, for "under the
operation of the Goebel [election] law the result is not left to
chance." Belmont should, for expediency, go with the ticket
(as Watterson did). But the L & N refused, and Belmont wrote
Goebel a letter which the candidate disclosed later to show
L & N opposition to him-if that needed to be stressed. "If in
order to gain adherents to your political ambition in the
State," Belmont wrote, "you endeavor to create a prejudice of
the people against the L. and N. railroad, and try to excite
animosity and legislation destructive to its interests, the L.
and N. railroad is driven to take the best means within the law
and its right to meet such attacks, and this it is now doing by
bringing before the public the arguments which are at its
command to counteract the evil influences of your unjusti-
fiable hostility." The lines were clearly defined. No position of
compromise existed.
If the L & N and its supposed excesses concerned Goebel
above all, he also made appeals to groups who cared little
about that particular issue. Since the 1890s, he had seldom
used familiar Democratic routes to victory. Although some
party leaders, such as Willie Breckinridge, stressed sectional
reconciliation, many others continued to wave their own
"bloody shirt" and to cry of "black domination." Goebel never
used that ploy. Unlike rising southern demagogues, such as
"Pitchfork Ben" Tillman in South Carolina or James K. Var-
daman in Mississippi, who wooed agrarian votes with white
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supremacy appeals, the man from northern Kentucky in fact
appealed for black support. In Kentucky, as elsewhere, this
appeal was not revolutionary for Democrats, as New Depar-
ture leaders had at least voiced such sentiments. And
Populists in the state had made a strong but largely unsuccess-
ful effort to win black support. But Goebel did so now on an
unprecedented scale. Discerning black dissatisfaction with
Taylor, he saw a real possibility that he could woo a sizable
black vote.
Goebel's record was acceptable to blacks, for he had not
voted on the Separate Coach Act in the senate. Black speakers
toured the state for the Democrats, and Negroes in several
cities organized Goebel Clubs. Danger existed in this appeal,
however. Too close an identification with blacks would an-
tagonize some white voters. Republicans continually pressed
Goebel to state his position about the Separate Coach Act.
Finally, torn between keeping Democrats in the ranks and
only possibly attracting new Negro allies, Goebel declared
that he did not favor repeal of the act and would enforce it, if
accommodations were in fact equal. This stand, coupled with
Taylor's reluctant statement later that he opposed the bill,
weakened Goebel's appeal to blacks. Nevertheless, that he
had made such a strong appeal underscores Goebel's depar-
ture from traditional approaches.
Much as Huey Long would do later, Goebel avoided using
the common "Lost Cause" issue with Democratic voters. But
then Goebel ventured into a dangerous situation when he
even alluded to Confederates. The president of the state Con-
federate Veterans Association opposed Goebel. Brown Demo-
crats hit hard at Goebel's Unionist background and his "mur-
der" ofex-Confederate Sanford. The Louisville Dispatch asked
readers, "What husband, if he has the manhood, the chivalry
of a gentleman, can look into the innocent and trusting face of
his wife and tell her that he voted to elevate to the guber-
natorial chair the man whose vile obscenity in the public press
sent Sandford [sic] to his grave and Sandford's wife to an
asylum for the insane?" When Blackburn and other speakers
denied that Goebel had written the article, the Dispatch glee-
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fully printed a facsimile, in Goebel's·handwriting, of the arti-
cle about "Gonorrhea" John. In this race at least, ex-
Confederates, especially among the officer class, might not be
safely tucked in the Democratic column. Goebel, of course,
had a defense. He pointed to Robert Breckinridge's position
on the ticket as an indication of his support for the men of the
gray. But overall he could only hope that his other appeals
would override this deficit with the party faithful.
He had to have the same hopes on another issue as well.
Both Goebel and Brown proclaimed their free silver views in
opposition to the Republicans' "sound money" ones. Carlisle
then presented his version of Goebel's actions in 1896, when
Goebel had pledged to support the gold standard in exchange
for Carlisle's support against Hallam. Now the former secre-
tary of the treasury received his revenge for Goebel's turn to
free silver at the convention that had followed. He exposed
Goebel as a gold man in 1896, and free silver enthusiasts de-
manded an answer. In reply, Goebel told audiences that he
was "proud" to incur Carlisle's wrath and pointed to his own
actions later in 1896 as an indication of his stands. He wisely
skirted earlier events.
All these matters-the blacks, the Confederates, the gold
issue-troubled undecided voters already bothered by
Goebel's negative associations with "bossism," the Election
Law, and the Music Hall Convention. Goebel's chances for vic-
tory had not greatly increased during the campaign. Besides
that, any hopes of compromise with the Brown Democrats de-
creased as their leaders took to the campaign trail. Personal
attacks replaced questions of philosophy; and calm, reasonable
discussion deserted the canvass almost completely. Former
Congressman W. C. Owens told of the betrayal of Stone and
the emergence of the Courier-journal as the "avowed cham-
pion of fraud, force and duplicity." Carlisle asked "honorable
gentlemen everywhere" to form their own opinion "as to the
propriety and good faith" of Goebel in the past, as he cited
Goebel's "betrayal" in 1896. United States Senator Lindsay
opposed "King William I," as did Clay and former Governor
Buckner. Judge Beckner, a reformer at the constitutional con-
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vention, refused to aid the regular Democrats, citing the
fraudulent "rump" convention that had nominated Goebel.
"Goebelism" used the "most unblushing corruption" to
achieve its aims, he asserted, and every vote cast for its leader
"would encourage our young men to believe that straight
methods do not bring honor in Kentucky.:>:> Bronston spoke at
the Opera House in Lexington and told of the "cold-blooded,
selfish ambition:>:> of Goebel. He described the "humiliating
and despicable methods:>:> used to pass the election law, and
told how his former senate colleague had "proved false to
those instincts which characterize true manhood.:>:> Neither
Hardin nor Stone gave Goebel active support. Even promi-
nent Democrats outside the state joined the attack, among
them former Illinois Governor John Peter Altgeld, the arch-
villain of conservatives because of his pardon of the Hay-
market rioters'. Goebel faced an angry, diverse, and articulate
opposition.
More important, influential newspapers spread the Brown
Democrats:> message. In Louisville Richard Knotfs Evening
Post joined the Dispatch in an editorial effort to defeat "Boss
Bill.:>:> The latter paper became particularly crucial to the
"Brownies,:>:> as the L & N distributed it free across the state.
Appealing chiefly to Democrats, the Louisville Dispatch
strongly opposed the Republicans and the gold standard. It
reprinted the Courier-journafs earlier words of censure for
both free silver and Goebel, and noted the contradictions in
the paper:>s position. Editorials and news stories stressed the
Sanford affair in sensational terms. But the chief target re-
mained Goebel-"a political desperado of the most desperate
character.:>:> His Election Law sought to create an oligarchy,
said the Dispatch, and "murdered:>:> any thoughts of home
rule.
Caustic Willie Breckinridge of the Lexington Morning
Herald denounced Goebel in a biting vein. "The better class
of Democrats:>:> in the South oppose such election laws, said
the aristocratic editor, who noted of Goebel himself: "A gen-
tleman cannot be made out of a vulgarian." The candidate:>s
furious attacks on railroads were but "irrelevant hellaba-
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100" against a straw man. This "demagoguery of the clamor
against corporations" by a "most expert political schemer,
trickster and charlatan" must not be allowed to succeed. The
"infectious, festering disease" of Goebelism cannot continue,
or it would destroy Kentucky. Tell us about the Sanford assas-
sination. Read us the Stone agreement. Explain your gold
stance in 1896, taunted the old ex-Confederate.
It was left to Hallam, another ex-Confederate, to inject one
of the few light moments into a serious campaign devoid of
humor. Even before Goebel had taken the field, Hallam had
given a talk at Bowling Green. From the audience a partisan
Goebel heckler rose and yelled, "Didn't you say in the Louis-
ville convention, not four weeks ago, that if the Democrats of
Kentucky ... nominated a yaller dog for governor, you'd vote
for'im?"
"I did," answered the speaker.
How could he now oppose Goebel, then?
Waiting for absolute quiet, the witty Hallam replied that he
did in fact say he would support the Democratic nominee even
if a "yaller dog."
"But, he added, "lower than that ye shall not drag me!"
Goebel and his partisans did not accept such attacks without
rebuttal, and in some cases they caused the harsh words them-
selves. Papers which supported Goebel, such as the Glasgow
Times, countered by stressing the corruption of these "profes-
sional purificationists" who called themselves "the Honest
Election League." "Boss" Whallen "wouldn't know a political
principle if he met [it] in the road"; Breckinridge, Owens, and
Beckner were without a Democratic bone in their bodies, said
the editor. The Courier-journal printed huge cartoons tying
the L & N to Brown and showing Smith and Belmont dis-
tributing money to defeat Goebel. The newspaper ridiculed
the "holier-than-thou, Louisville and Nashville political
brakemen and moral conductors" led by Basil Duke.
The Democratic nominee did not let his supporters fight
alone. In late August Goebel made his own Bowling Green
speech and called Hallam "a drunkard and debauchee," who
had the face of "a cancerous beefsteak." While calling Duke "a
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professional corruptionist" later, he linked Myers to lottery
money~ Owens to gambling, and Breckinridge to the scandal
that had ended his political career. This attack and others
brought opponents to intensify their campaign and removed
the few restraints on them. Duke portrayed Goebel as "liar, a
slanderer and an assassin"; and others used even harsher
words. As in the past, Goebel still evoked bitter reaction and
excited violent emotions. He had stated the terms of battle
well when he cried out: "1 ask no quarter and I fear no foe.:J:J
On 22 August 1899, a festive and almost victorious spirit
prevailed in a small town in eastern Kentucky. London sat in
the citadel of state Republicanism and there the party chose to
open the campaign. Republicans were confident, yet
worried-eonfident that Goebel was the weakest of the three
possible Democratic candidates and that their opposition was
divided, but worried because Goebel was so different and his
methods were so unpredictable. In a fight between the forces
of good and of the Devil, people should, they reasoned, read-
ily support the morally right one-but if they somehow did
not, or if Goebel used fraud to win, then his weakness, as they
saw it, would become a strength. They would be destroyed. In
the thirty or more years before, no opponent had aroused such
intense Republican hatred as Goebel did.
Taylor opened his campaign before a large, friendly audi-
ence. In a 2lh-hour talk, he stressed his support for the
national administration, defended the state one, and focused
chiefly on Goebel. Since slavery had never flourished in the
mountains, said the nominee, it was fitting to open this strug-
gle to maintain liberty in the shadow of the mountains. Taylor
warned the crowd to organize and demand a fair election:
"This is your only salvation. If it fails you then the deadly coils
of tyranny will tighten about you and crush to death your polit-
icalliberties." A month later, Republicans continued to stress
the same themes, though the desperate character of the oppo-
sition was accented even more. A government "of force and
fraud" was about to be established, if Democrats won. They
would rob the ballot box and end republican government. The
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voter, Taylor cautioned, must act, for if "Goebelism" became
entrenched in the state, all would be lost. "Now is the last
opportunity. "
In their appeals all three groups increased the dangers of
discord after the election. By portraying its cause as unfailingly
correct, and the others' as utterly wrong, each side
strengthened its followers' resolve to resist an unfavorable de-
cision. Goebel suggested that his defeat would result in an
absolutely corrupt government controlled by corporate
wealth; Brown and Taylor stressed that their defeat would
bring a dictator to power and destroy representative govern-
ment. The problem with such appeals was obvious. What did
you do if the opposition did win? Could such an expected evil
be tolerated, even if honorably chosen? And what would hap-
pen if the race was so close that fraud was suspected? Still the
vitriolic oratory and caustic editorials continued as the cam-
paign drew to an end, for the leaders realized that the race
would be very close.
To the Democratic nominee, his campaign seemed to be
faltering. He had not gained a great deal of additional support,
and certainly he had not brought factional enemies back to the
party. It probably would have been a fairly easy Democratic
year, had Goebel not been the nominee; the Republicans had
thought so at least. But this Democrat had many handicaps to
overcome: his immigrant "foreign" background, his non-
aristocratic family, his scorn for established methods, his
"boss" reputation, his shooting of Sanford, his stand on free
silver, his alienation of ex-Confederates, his Election Law, his
conduct at the Music Hall, his approach, his very personality.
In danger of losing support and short on funds, Goebel
turned to the one national candidate who was now most popu-
lar with the Kentucky Democracy. William Jennings Bryan,
still the "boy orator of the Platte," had spurned initial party
efforts to bring him to Kentucky. According to Urey Woodson,
the "Great Commoner" believed Goebel was probably ille-
gally selected, and in a meeting of the two the Kentuckian's
language had supposedly offended Bryan. But the defeated
candidate of 1896 still sought the presidency, and a Demo-
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cratic administration might be able to reverse the 281 votes
that had cost him the state earlier. Ambition helped bring
Bryan to Goebel.
The two began their \vhirlwind railroad campaign in west-
ern Kentucky in mid-October. On the first day Bryan made
ten speeches, reaching an estimated 25,000 voters; he em-
phasized party loyalty. He appealed particularly to the agrari-
ans, asking them to support the Democrats. In other areas he
asked blacks to abandon the party of imperialism for the
Democrats. By the time the train reached Covington an esti-
mated 150,000 had heard the two men speak over a three-day
period. Bryan had repaired a faltering candidacy and, as
Woodson (who accompanied them) remembered, "Goebel's
friends were wild with enthusiasm." A writer in the Kentucky
Gazette proclaimed, "There seems to be little doubt of his
election now."
Such a situation did not help the Republican campaign,
which had had its problems as well. The estimated 65,000
black voters had shown little enthusiasm for Taylor, although
his reluctant support for repeal of the Separate Coach Act
helped some. The endorsement of the Committee of the
General Association of Negro Baptists proved useful, but not
decisive. The Courier-journal's comment that "the Taylor
canvass recalls the remark about the man who was winking at a
pretty girl in the dark. He knew what he was doing but nobody
else did," did not exaggerate that much.
And, perhaps more important, Republicans had not healed
their own factional wounds. Bradley initially refused to cam-
paign for Taylor. Then came the unexpected announcement
that the governor would speak in Louisville-the day after
Bryan left the state. A large crowd gathered, including many
blacks. Bradley appealed to the Negroes, citing his appoint-
ments of four blacks to somewhat minor state positions.
Democrats had enacted railroad segregation in the state, he
told them. Would you vote for them? "I have never been
ashamed of being the friend of the negro, . . ." he declared,
and "I have never been afraid of the bugbear 'social equal-
ity.' " He and the Republicans supported justice for "an unfor-
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tunate race." This attempt to hold Republican voters coincid-
ed with an appeal to Brown Democrats, whose nominee was ill
and virtually unable to campaign. Bradley praised the "bolt-
ers" and their leaders, stressing how the "better men" among
Democrats refused to support Goebel. Then, having said noth-
ing about the Republican nominee, "Billy O. B." ended with,
"And go to the polls and elect Taylor." As the wild cheering
went on, Louisville Republican leader and former partner of
John Marshall Harlan, Augustus E. Willson turned to Bradley
and said, "That's the slickest thing you ever did in your life."
Watterson's paper coyly suggested that Bradley's sudden
reversal was due to Taylor's promise to support his expected
candidacy for the senate. But for whatever reason, Bradley
toured the state for his new friend "Bill" Taylor, and even the
Courier-Journal admitted that the governor's eloquent talks
were "the equal of any Republican speech heard in any Ken-
tucky campaign for a long time." Republicans had successfully
met the challenge posed by Bryan's speeches, and had
strengthened their chances for a final victory.
As the long campaign neared an end, all three parties
turned to the crucial areas. With the east safely Republican by
large margins, and the west Democratic by more uncertain
ones, the central and northern areas held the keys-
particularly Louisville. It was no accident that Bradley had
spoken there first, for in Louisville the "Brownies" had their
strongest support. Republicans wanted to carry the county as
they had four years before. When the influential Irish-
American criticized Goebel for his "insinuations, epithets and
threats against gentlemen" and "treachery and slander of his
friends," Republican hopes increased. Goebel spent a large
part of the last three weeks in the Falls City countering these
appeals. In one speech before a predominately German audi-
ence, he began in his original language. On another occasion
he spoke in a working class neighborhood and pledged full
support for laborers who struck for higher wages. At every
opportunity Goebel defended the Election Law and the Music
Hall, praised the McChord and Chinn bills, damned the "bos-
sism" of the "corrupt" L & N trust, and reviewed his own
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record on reform issues. And when he said, "I didn't know
whether it was safe for me to come to the city of Louisville or
not," laughter followed.
But it was a serious time, and Goebel's merriment masked
real threats. Both sides predicted and expected violence and
fraud. Both viewed the opposition in the most derogatory way
possible. In Louisville, Brown Democrats backed by Whallen
remembered the conduct of the primary in that city only
months before. The Dispatch suggested that citizens band to-
gether to prevent fraud this time, but added, "if there must be
a row let it be started by the Goebelites." A Republican
speaker warned, with figurative noose in hand, that if the
Democrats attempted to steal the election, "We will decorate
the Williamsburg bridge with ornaments never dreamed of by
an architect."
Speaking in the Louisville Music Hall in his last speech be-
fore election day, Blackburn combined threats and com-
promises when he emphasized that "they have thrown down
the gauntlet, we accept the challenge. We will win all or lose
all. . . . I counsel no violence; but we want the people to know
their rights and to maintain them." Louisville's mayor, a
Goebel supporter, proclaimed that with rumors of "riot and
bloodshed" so prevalent, he would take any measures to in-
sure a peaceful vote. On election day he swore in almost 300
private police to patrol the polls. The day before that his Jef-
ferson County election board had dismissed Republican elec-
tion officials from half of the precincts and replaced them with
less partisan ones.
To the opposition all this meant that Goebelites would at-
tempt to repeat the· earlier primary maneuvers in Louisville.
Governor Bradley consulted with Knott, Duke, and the editor
of the Louisville Dispatch, and ordered the militia made ready
should violence break out. On election day each side had
armed men in readiness-Bradley's militia and the mayor's
private police. The press for each group proclaimed "Bayonet
Rule" and accused the other of intimidation as election day
began.
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Surprisingly, the election passed quietly in most Kentucky
cities. There were disruptions and fights, but compared to
most state elections all went very well. In Louisville some of
the militia marched out into the streets' once late in the day,
did virtually nothing, and paraded back. Even the Courier-
Journal admitted that all was unexpectedly calm there.
That evening when Watterson joined Blackburn and Goebel
for dinner at the Seelbach Hotel, William Goebel's political
astuteness was ~evident. Two old enemies sat with the young
intruder they had once hated. Their aid might now make him
governor. But did he have voter support? The three men
dined and awaited the electorate's answer.
7"FORCE WILL BE MET
WITH FORCE"
GOD REIGNS and the Government in Frankfort Still
Lives," proclaimed a Republican headline as the first returns
came in. The Democrat had lost. More cautiously and accu-
rately, the Courier-Journal predicted, "Slow Returns and
Close Finish." The worst had happened: an extremely narrow
margin separated Taylor and Goebel. In a year that should
have been Democratic, that party's nominee had barely tied
the Republican, if that.
The apparent closeness of the vote reflected in part the
Democratic candidate's weakness in the agrarian, Populist,
western part of the state, where Goebel failed to gain ex-
pected majorities. Except for heavily black-populated Chris-
tian County, Goebel's percentage of the Democratic vote
dropped beneath Bryan's 1896 figures in every single county
west of Louisville. The insignificant Populist party's attacks on
the Goebel law apparently reflected western agrarian dislike
for "Boss Bill." This area also had been one of the centers of
Confederate strength.
Another area of expected support-the urban centers-
followed a more mixed pattern. In Ashland, Covington, New-
port, and Louisville along the Ohio, and in Frankfort, Lexing-
ton, and other Bluegrass cities, Goebel increased Bryan's
dismal percentage of 1896. In the west he did not. Of the
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counties that contained the ten largest urban areas of the
commonwealth, Goebel carried seven, but he had needed to
do even better if he wanted a safe margin of victory. Demo-
crats had reason for concern.
Republicans, on the other hand, were sanguine. Taylor had
been able to retain the usual percentage of the mountain vote,
while his "lily white" branch had done very well in western
Kentucky, his home area. But Taylor had not swept the state
either, chiefly because of the urban vote. Although Goebel
had not been as successful in all the cities as he had hoped, he
had increased Democratic majorities in the eastern ones. And
a shift of one percentage of the vote of urban centers meant
many more ballots for the Democrats than a similar shift would
in isolated, underpopulated counties. The close results meant
that each vote gained added significance, that every local
board had a more vital role, and that the State Board of Elec-
tion Commissioners-as Republicans feared-would give the
final decision.
With the outcome in doubt a month before the board met,
the Republicans and the badly defeated Brown Democrats
joined in dire predictions that fraud would overcome their
rightful majority. Three days after the election the Louisville
Dispatch warned that Goebel would not accept the legitimate
results and would risk civil war: "He must be met by bold
measures." The same issue of the Evening Post told of a mass
meeting at the now infamous Music Hall, where editor Knott
had asked citizens to "stop the steal" of the governorship. That
day a protest in Lexington's Opera House attracted Bronston
and Breckinridge. Resolutions were passed in support of Brad-
ley's use of the militia, and the"silver-tongued orator" even
suggested that force should be used to resist turning over the
governor's seat to Goebel. In an editorial a few days later he
wrote of "this unholy and wicked attempt to feloniously steal
the governorship." The opposition expected Goebel's election
board to do its work well.
Meanwhile Democratic papers began telling of Republican
"fraud" in the election itself. In Nelson County, where ballots
bore the name "W. P." Taylor rather than the correct
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"W. S.," the local board threw out these Republican votes.
That decision did not stand, however. Less than a week after
the election, the Courier-Journal printed a story telling how
thin "tissue" ballots had been used in the mountains. This ac-
tion supposedly enabled Republicans to see whether their
employees voted as expected. (Actually both parties had used
these ballots.) In Johnson County, Democrats declared these
ballots illegal and challenged them. That party's supporters in
Louisville asked that the entire city and county vote-carried
by Taylor-be thrown out because of Bradley's use of the
militia.
The Republicans grew less confident about their chances.
Goebel and his lawless followers were marching toward "the
ultimate crime"-stealing the election-said party leaders,
and he had to be stopped. Bradley wrote President McKinley
of the "revolution" in the commonwealth. "I fear," said the
governor, "that I may not be able to crush the spirit of law-
, lessness and preserve the peace." He asked that 1,000 regular
army soldiers be sent to Fort Thomas, and that the state militia
be given blankets, 890 rifles, and 50,000 rounds of ammuni-
tion. Whether this request was met or not, promised Bradley,
"I will not surrender to a lawless mob." McKinley, a political
rival in national affairs, did not send the soldiers.
In the mountains, the fury of an isolated, partisan people
brought forth bitter resolutions. Caleb Powers's Knox County
Republicans pledged their lives "to resist such awful en-
croachment on our most sacred rights." Taylor would be given
his rightful office "by peaceable means if we can, by forcible
ones if we must." In Rockcastle County a similar theme
emerged against this "vicious serpent," this "monster" and
"usurper." Republicans there declared that "before this ring
of looters shall deprive us of the victory we have won in this
contest, we will shoulder our guns and march to the music of
war."
More cautious Republicans and anti-Goebel Democrats
realized the dangers of this explosive atmosphere. Breckin-
ridge in the Morning Herald noted that "thoughtful men are
alarmed at the possibility of bloodshed." Compromise, or at
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least a conference of the principals, was needed. But neither
side could do that. The Republican leadership had splintered
following its brief election unity, as Bradley quarreled with
Taylor, while Caleb Powers now led a more outspoken and
forceful wing that would resist Goebel to the end. Brown
Democrats and Goebel Democrats remained the bitterest of
enemies, and the personality of William Goebel made the op-
position shun any compromise. The outcome would be left to
the election board, then, and it came under the most intense
pressure.
The local county boards had already sent their returns to
Frankfort. And, although newspapers differed on the results,
it seemed certain that the Republicans had a plurality. Repub-
licans pointed out that this came about even though the oppo-
sition controlled the polls, the counting, and the certifying.
Local boards had altered votes, they charged, but still could
not overcome Taylor's large lead over Goebel. Democratic
hopes lay in their appeal that Jefferson County's vote, and
votes of the mountain counties where "tissue" ballots had
been used, should not be counted because of fraud and illegal
force. If the election board refused to allow these ballots, then
Goebel would win.
Amid rumors of how Republicans were turning the state
militia into a partisan army; with stories circulating that Brad-
ley had stated he would refuse to leave office should Goebel be
declared elected; and while the national press ridiculed and
criticized the commonwealth's actions, the board prepared to
meet.
The Courier-Journal pledged to accept their decision: "If
the Republicans are declared the victors, nobody will block
their way to Frankfort." Several Democratic leaders told re-
porters that Goebel would not contest election board deci-
sions. On 2 December, just days before the board met, Wat-
terson, speaking for his party, said that they would submit to
the decision, whatever it was. Democrats expected a favorable
result. Two commissioners-Ellis and Pryor-had given
speeches for Goebel during the campaign, while Poyntz had
been among the candidate's strongest supporters. All owed
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their selection to William Goebel. All had been strong parti-
sans. Not unexpectedly, the Republicans predicted an un-
favorable decision.
A few weeks earlier, when Democratic commissioners in
Johnson County had started to invalidate that county's vote
because of the supposed "illegal" ballots, angry Republicans
gathered as they met. The Democrats, said one Republican
observer, found a town filled with men "standin' around like
they was goin' to a funeral, and indeed, the Commissioners
believed there might be one." They did not change the re-
sults. Desperate Republicans now tried a similar ploy as the
state board met. Certain in their own minds that their rightful
victory would be' stolen unless they acted, the party leaders
gambled. In doing so they made the first move toward their
fatal error.
The board convened, and on 4 December 1899-court
day-hundreds of Republicans gathered in Frankfort. Taylor
had advised party leaders to send men to the city, so that their
presence, he later stated, would "exercise a moral influence on
[the] contest." On Sunday a group of fifty arrived, and the
Democrats promptly labeled them "the advance guard of the
army of intimidationists." The next day the numbers ap-
proached 500, according to one estimate. Watterson's paper
noted that the L & N had brought them without charge. In an
interview later Smith declared that as "a simple matter of bus-
iness" the train had been secured by Republicans for a $1,000
fee.
Guns were prominently displayed by the observers, whom
Republicans weakly defended as citizens only there to demon-
strate for their rights. Leaders apparently believed that in the
atmosphere created the board would feel compelled to issue a
fair decision; Democrats saw it as only another attempt by Re-
publicans to use force to influence a vote. After hearing argu-
ments for three days in these conditions, the commissioners
adjourned and issued their decision on Saturday, 9 December.
Former Justice Pryor of the Court of Appeals joined Ellis in
a two-to-one majority that declared Taylor governor. Goebel
had overlooked only one thing in his scheme to gain power,
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said critics-the possibility that the commissioners might be
honest. The majority of the board-Poyntz dissented-
emphasized that the law gave them no legal power to go be-
hind the official county returns; they thus must be recognized.
The board did unofficially state later that if they had such
powers they would declare the Louisville vote illegal, due to
militia involvement. That meant nothing, however, since their
official actions gave the final count: Taylor, 193,714; Goebel
191,331; Brown, 12,140; and Populist John Blair, 2,936. Cer-
tificates of election were issued, and three days later Kentuc-
ky's second Republican governor was inaugurated.
Despite Republican expectations and previous Democratic
assurances, the contest had not ended, however. The Demo-
cratic State Central, Executive, and Campaign committees
gathered in Frankfort on the fourteenth. Their party had one
last possible appeal. Ironically, the election bill as introduced
originally by Goebel had not contained the provision, later
added in committee, that allowed the legislature to be the final
judge of the governor's and lieutenant governor's races. With
roughly a two-to-one Democratic majority in the newly
formed senate and a 58-42 margin for the party in the house,
such an appeal had its merits.
Led by Blackburn, with most of the new leaders present,
the Democrats decided to contest the" election. A confident
William told his brother, "No matter what happens, if I live, I
shall control the next state convention, and through it the
State organization, which will hold power." If not selected
governor this year, he would be elected senator in 1901. He
did not fear for his political future.
Watterson evaluated the Democratic decision to contest the
election as "A Brave Venture"; Republicans submerged in a
legislative minority did not see the move in such a courageous
light. Other opposition actions did not change that view. The
Goebel Election Law allowed the board to judge all cases in-
volving the other elective offices. Thus while the legislature
heard evidence on the two top offices, the board would be
deciding the minor races. With Ellis and Pryor still sitting, the
results probably would have been the same-a Republican
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victory. But under increasing pressure, with Democrats
angered at their earlier decision, both men resigned.
Taylor named two of his allies as replacements, citing his
constitutional power to fill vacant appointive offices; Democrat
Poyntz chose another man; and the two selected a third. They
cited a provision in the election law giving that power to the
commission, if the legislature was not in session. The two
Poyntz appointees were strong Goebel Democrats; the Taylor
ones were equally favorable to Taylor's cause. Neither side
yielded and the Court of Appeals by a partisan 4-3 vote later
gave their judicial approval to the three Democrats. Having
failed once, the board would not select Republicans next time.
All these efforts had been concluded as the Democratic
caucus met on 1 January 1900, just before the legislature be-
gan. House Democrats reflected their party's differences, as it
took thirteen ballots to select South Trimble, not Goebel's
choice, as their nominee for speaker. Senators voted Goebel
once again as their candidate for president pro tern, even
though they would be involved in deciding whether he was
governor. Goebel nominated Blackburn as the caucus choice
for United States senator, and the move was unanimously
adopted.
But a more dramatic event overshadowed the caucus. A
newly elected state senator, Dr. S. B. Harrel of Logan
County, strode to the front of the gathering and held aloft two
keys. With a good eye for the effect this produced, he charged
that "Boss" Whallen had offered him $4500 to vote for Taylor
when the time came. This money, he told pleased listeners,
was now in a safety-deposit box in a Louisville bank. The keys
would prove his charge of bribery. A grand jury ordered the
box sealed, and upon opening it, they found the sum Harrel
said was there. Since widespread rumors had already told of
bribery attempts by both sides, this seemed clear proof. The
vaultkeeper swore that Whallen and Harrel had rented the
box jOintly. Democrats made full use of the case to pressure
undecided legislators.
Whallen engaged "Wat" Hardin and Hallam to defend him,
and they began by going on the offensive. In a sworn affidavit
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Whallen charged Harrel with taking money under false pre-
tenses. According to the owner of "The Buck," Harrel told
him that he opposed Goebel; but had been given assurances of
$1,000 and promised later appointment as superintendent of a
lunatic asylum if he would support the Democrat. He pro-
posed that for enough money to live "without pecuniary loss,"
he would publically tell all. Whallen then gave Harrel $5,000,
said the affidavit, to allow him "to act according to what he
represented to be the true dictates of his conscience."
A Franklin grand jury indicted Whallen and a cohort, but
when the trial began the defense produced its own answer to
Harrel's caucus dramatics. Whallen introduced a paper signed
by him, Harrel, and a third party, and witnessed by two
others, which contained the agreement Whallen had attested:
for $5,000 the state senator would reveal Goebel's "bribery"
attempt. Harrel denounced this document as a forgery. Sig-
nificantly, neither party pursued its case against the other with
much fervor after that. Later both cases were dropped. The
entire clumsy affair did not turn out as some Democrats back-
ing Harrel had hoped, and his fame faded. Whallen, even if
his version was correct, had only met bribery with bribery;
and his none too lofty standing did not rise further. Neither
man had shown much honor. Overall the trials produced no
conclusive result, but-more important-they gave the
rumors of bribery a firmer base. Those who wanted to believe
the worst about their opposition found supporting evidence in
the Whallen-Harrel affair.
The bribery case, despite its sensational aspects, yielded to
the legislative actions for first place in public attention, how-
ever. The General Assembly convened on 2 January 1900,
quickly voted in Goebel and Trimble as leaders of the two
houses, and then heard Taylor's message. The governor made
virtually a campaign speech against Goebel, warning that the
choice was between a future of glorious progress or one dark-
ened by "civil and commercial oppression."
As soon as the message was read a "Notice of Contest" was
filed for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor.
Goebel charged that illegal ballots had been used in forty
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counties-the list had grown-and asked that "said election in
an of said counties [be] rendered void." A second ground for
contest, said the president pro tem, was the conduct of the
Louisville election. And thousands of ballots in eight other
counties should be voided because, charged Goebel, the L &
N had bought votes and threatened employees if they failed to
follow the railroad's wishes. In two other counties, continued
the Notice of Contest, "duress and open threats" had been
used to force election commissioners to sign fraudulent re-
turns. At the meeting of the State Board of Election Commis-
sioners, "a conspiracy was formed" by the L & N and its agent
John Whallen. Their "desperate armed men" again influenced
the results. All these fraudulent actions should invalidate
thousands of ballots, and William Goebel should be declared
governor as a result.
The next day each house met to select by lot eleven mem-
bers to sit as a committee to hear evidence on the guber-
natorial contest. The senate journal laconically records the
procedure: "The names of the Senators present were written
on separate pieces of paper, rolled and placed in a box by the
clerk. . . who, after the same had been well shaken, drew the
names of three Senators therefrom, separately." None of the
three was a Republican. In the house the same method pro-
duced surprisingly similar results: seven Democrats and one
Republican. The joint committee to decide the governorship
would be nine Democrats, one Republican, and one Populist,
who usually voted Democratic, while the committee on the
lieutenant governor's election was nine-to-two Democratic.
Republicans had expected four or five representatives on each.
The Courier-journal reported that the majority party was
"greatly elated" over the results.
And well they might be, for the odds on such a ratio occur-
ring by chance in the governor's contest are roughly one in
fifty (Powers erroneously calculated the odds as much higher).
Republicans charged fraud, but they were mystified about
how it had been done. Only Democrats had examined the box
and had seen the slips, and Republicans were certain that
chance had not dictated the unfavorable ratio. Perhaps they
95
were wrong. But another answer comes from a Democrat who
wrote a history of his party some years later. According to his
version, he had been told "by the official who claims he ma-
nipulated the drawing in the House, exactly how he ac-
complished what he seemed then and seems yet to think was a
justified fraud." Unfortunately he does not reveal the method
used. Republicans at the time presented a theory that the
Democratic clerk rolled Republican names in a tighter roll
than Democratic ones. As a result, when the box was shaken,
these names filtered to the bottom, allowing the clerk to draw
out the Democratic names remaining on top. Another
suggested that no matter what slip was drawn, the speaker
simply called out a Democrat's name. Other possibilities were
advanced. Nothing could be proven. Perhaps it had only been
chance.
Before the committees met other business took place. On 10
January Blackburn easily defeated Bradley for United States
senator in the joint session. "Old Jo's" alliance with Goebel
had brought him the desired prize. Bryan returned and gave a
talk praising the new senator.
Then on 15 January, the contest committee began to hear
evidence on the governor's race. While several prominent
lawyers represented the Democrats, they were overshadowed
by the Republican counsel, which included independent Wil-
lie Breckinridge and Republican W. o. Bradley. Meeting for
most of the time in the ballroom of the Capitol Hotel, the
contest committee quickly rejected several of Taylor's key
contentions. Republicans charged star-chamber methods, as
Democrats produced their witnesses. Each could make a good
case for the other's fraud. Neither Republican nor Democrat
had conducted a "pure" election.
Committee hearings went on. The relative calm of their de-
liberations contrasted with the increasing tensions outside. A
violent era had existed in Kentucky for decades. "Regulators"
and Ku Kluxers after the war, an assassination of a Court of
Appeals justice in 1879, such affairs as the Hatfield-McCoy
feud of Pike County, the French-Eversole feud in Perry
County, the White-Baker feud in Clay County, and the
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Logan-Tolliver feud in Rowan County, made the era's bloody
reputation a deserved one. Violence was not confined to the
mountains either, for the state's overall murder rate by 1890
stood second highest in the nation. To Americans the image of
the Kentuckian was increasingly that of a bloody, lawless
mountaineer or of a white-frocked, hot-tempered gentleman
planter with pistol in hand. Actions in Frankfort the last two
weeks of January confirmed such impressions.
Violence first exploded on 16 January at the Capitol Hotel in
an incident unrelated to the Goebel contest. Two bitter per-
sonal enemies, ex-Congressman David G. Colson and young
Lieutenant Ethelbert Scott, quarreled and drew their
weapons in the hotel lobby. Both fired at the same time. Scott
pulled a bystander in front of him for protection. Colson
emptied both of his pistols, while Scott did the same with one.
The bystander was killed. Scott was hit four times, and as he
fell trying to escape, Colson shot him three more times.
Eighteen shots had been fired in less than two minutes and
three men, including Scott, had been killed. Four more had
been wounded. Colson, also wounded, was arrested. No con-
viction followed. This event should have warned observers of
the dangerous temper that existed in the city. Guns were pre-
valent and, as the conclusion of the long and bitter political
contest neared, solving disputes relied more on force than on
law.
Actions by Democratic and Republican partisans had con-
tinued to divide the two antagonistic camps. As had happened
in the past, the senate stripped Republican Lieutenant Gov-
ernor John Marshall of his powers. That left Goebel in control
of one of the two houses that would decide his fate. Republi-
cans expected an unfavorable decision by the contest commit-
tee, but the final vote would be in the entire General Assem-
bly. They hoped enough Democrats would join them to defeat
Goebel. That pOSSibility made each vote more crucial, and
both parties contested any close races. Up to twenty seats
were thus uncertain, with the possibility that half might go to
Democrats. Men's memories harkened to the 112 ballots in
the recent senatorial race. Would that again occur?
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As a rule, though, Republicans expected Goebel to control
his party and their legislative votes. Many felt as Breckinridge
did. He told his daughter of the "sham trial where I know the
decision has been made for weeks and we are only 'playing' a
trial." The Republican Louisville Commercial proclaimed, as
the contest committee neared the end of its deliberations,
"Goebel Garrote Tightened." Some desperate Republicans
sought to influence the decision in the same way as they had
others. Earlier in Johnson County partisans had demonstrated
for their cause, and the results favored them. When the elec-
tion commission had met in December a similar tactic, to Re-
publican eyes, had yielded a similar result. Once again some
of the party leaders resorted to this avowedly dangerous
stratagem. Taylor and Secretary of State Powers agreed to call
Republicans to Frankfort on 25 January.
Courier-Journal headlines told the Democratic reaction to
the move: "ARMED MOB OF MOUNTAINEERS Invade Frankfort
to Bully the Legislature." "Threats of Assassination," cried out
the Kentucky Gazette. Over 1,000 Iuen, the majority from
eastern Kentucky, had entered the city almost overnight.
Most stacked their rifles in the commissioner of agriculture's
office, but they retained handguns. The administration
supplied the "army" with ham, bread, and coffee. Democratic
advocates armed now, if they had not already, and prepared
for an outbreak of violence. Poorly housed, sometimes resort-
ing to drink to relieve boredom, the determined men from the
mountains milled in the town, as if awaiting orders. On the
evening of the day they arrived most of the men left.
Anti-Goebel spokesmen tried to defend the administration's
actions by stressing that these law-abiding citizens had only
sought to protest the "crime" Goebel sought to perpetrate.
The Lexington Morning Herald praised the "order and com-
mendable self-restraint" of the protesters. Some Republican
newspapers cautiously supported the move. But the overall
reaction, even among Republicans, was negative. As Taylor's
counsel before the contest committee, W. C. P. Breckin-
ridge, despite his paper's public stand, stood firmly against the
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bringing of Hirresponsible armed men" to Frankfort. He had
advised, Hin unmeasured terms," that they be. withdrawn.
Other leaders gave Taylor the same advice. The return of all
but 300 of the men lessened criticism, but did not stop it.
The danger of a bloody outbreak continued. Powers re-
marked on the 29th, HI would a thousand times rather we
would fight and be free than to submit and be slaves." His
spirit typified others who refused to yield to the evils of Hthe
Kenton King." Large groups of armed men from both parties
stood ready for the expected outbreak. The contest committee
would make its recommendation shortly. In early February
the election commission would begin its deliberations on the
minor state offices. By .. the end of that month the Goebel
Democrats, now hated more than ever by Republicans, might
well control the state.
Could either side peacefully accept an unfavorable decision
after such a long fight? A writer in Harper's Weekly predicted
Hthat there will be razors in the air, and that Reason will retire
to the cellar and Discretion will hide under the bed." Less
figuratively, Breckinridge's Morning Herald warned that if
the legislature followed their Hunconstitutional" course, then
Hviolence and bloodshed" might result. HForce," it predicted,
Hwill be met with force."
8"LOYAL TO THE GREAT
COMMON PEOPLE"
ON THE COLD Tuesday morning of 30 January 1900-
despite the many rumored threats to his safety circulating
around Frankfort-Goebel did not alter his routine. Coming
from his room in the Capitol Hotel, he joined his allies and
virtual bodyguards Eph Lillard, warden of the penitentiary,
and Jack P. "Dirk Knife" Chinn. The three started for the
Capitol building a few blocks away.
As they entered the Capitol grounds the men mentioned
how unexpectedly clear the area was, and they wondered
aloud if any more "mountaineers" would be arriving. Lillard
then moved ahead to make certain that the Capitol interior
was safe, for trouble, if it came, was expected to occur there.
Chinn, a rather heavyset man, lagged behind Goebel by a few
feet. Just as Lillard reached the Capitol at about 11:15, he
heard the report of a rifle. He quickly turned around.
Goebel had been shot. More mumed shots were heard.
Chinn rushed up, exclaiming, "Goebel, they have killed you."
As Goebel sought to rise, Chinn told him to lie down, or "they
will shoot you again."
"That's right," he weakly answered.
The momentary quiet was broken as excited legislators hur-
ried out, and a hastily organized group of bystanders began to
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carry the wounded man back to the hotel, about five minutes
away.
Cries of "Goebel has been shot" quickly spread through the
town. The streets filled with onlookers, some carrying rifles
and pistols. Angry Democrats talked of revenge and the dan-
ger of a mob seemed very real. Then in a surprisingly-and to
Democrats, suspiciously-quick action, the militia formed
around the state building from where the shots came. Within
twenty minutes after the shooting, Republicans were pro-
tected from a vengeful crowd.
In the hotel, a doctor examined the wounded man. The
crush of observers threatened to disrupt his work, so some
were ordered out, and windows were broken to let air in.
Goebel lay "white as a sheet," almost bloodless, his pulse
weak, his skin cold, his body in shock. The bullet had entered
three inches to the right and a half inch above the nipple,
shattered a rib, sent bone splinters into one lung, pierced the
right lung, and exited through the back near the vertebrae. In
an attempt to repair the "quite profuse" bleeding, the physi-
cian dressed the wound, began a saline solution, and gave
Goebel some opiates. Other doctors quickly offered assist-
ance. Most did not expect Goebel to live through the night.
But Goebel thought otherwise, and Arthur wired Justus in the
West, "William shot from third floor of state house. Says him-
self he will recover."
Taylor and four other men, including Breckinridge, had
been together in the governor's office in the building from
where the shot was fired. Amid the confusion and excitement,
Taylor rushed out of the office, revolver in hand for protec-
tion. Then, on hearing the news of the event, the governor
sadly declared, "It is the act of another Guiteau [President
Garfield's assassin]. It is terrible." After quickly conferring
with Bradley and Breckinridge, he ordered out the militia-
and became a virtual prisoner for the immediate future. Re-
publicans prepared to defend the building should it come
under Democratic attack.
The contest committees met that afternoon. Taylor's attor-
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neys asked that further deliberations be suspended, or at least
postponed until quieter times. After being refused this re-
quest, the Republican counsel did not participate in later ac-
tions. That evening, by 10-1 and 9-2 partisan votes, the joint
committee announced that they would recommend that
Goebel be made governor and Beckham lieutenant governor.
Faced with the certainty of legislative endorsement of that
stand-the shooting of Goebel had unified uncertain Demo-
crats-Taylor acted.
The committee made their announcement at 8:00 P.M. An
hour later, the Republican governor issued a proclamation that
adjourned the General Assembly to meet again in London,
Kentucky in a week. He based his authority to act in this man-
ner on a clause in the constitution which said the legislature
must meet in Frankfort, "except in case of war, insurrection
and pestilence." Insurrection, according to Taylor, had oc-
curred. Constitutionally, the governor's action was of ques-
tionable legality. But if he hoped to keep his office, delay
might be the only recourse. A week could yield needed time,
and meeting in London gave a favorable environment for
Republican legislators.
And besides, Taylor was afraid. Almost certainly he ex-
pected a retaliatory attempt on his own life and the lives of his
family. Taylor ordered thirty troops to guard his wife and chil-
dren in the Executive Mansion. He remained on the Capitol
grounds, surrounded by about 500 soldiers. The Louisville
Legion and the 2d Regiment had arrived quickly following the
news of the shooting and had brought with them several Gat-
ling guns, which now faced outward toward the rest of Frank-
fort. In his quarters a secluded, isolated, besieged Taylor
looked out on a hostile town. Below him poorly clothed troops
shivered in the falling snow, awaiting the morning.
At ten o'clock the next day members of the legislature came
to the Capitol, to test Taylor's proclamation. Republican Ad-
jutant General D. R. Collier, vehemently anti-Goebel, read
the order from the building's famous double spiral staircase
and told legislators that they could enter only to remove per-
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sonal effects. Speaker Trimble called on Democrats to meet at
the Frankfort Opera House. Collier firmly reminded them that
any such assembly would violate the proclamation and thus be
illegal. Several legislators followed Trimble. Soldiers' bayonets
refused them entrance at the Opera House. They moved to-
ward the courthouse as troops raced to the destination first.
By the time the solons reached there, a line of soldiers met
them. A crowd began to talk of storming the building, but the
legislators quietly withdrew. Republican members meanwhile
heard the proclamation and began to leave for London.
Determined Democrats denied that any state of insurrec-
tion existed. The only danger came from Republicans, they
insisted. To adopt the committee report required a joint ses-
sion, yet no public building large enough could be obtained
because of the soldiers. But Goebel must be declared gover-
nor and Taylor must be ousted.
Later in the afternoon word came privately to each Demo-
cratic member to meet in the Capitol Hotel that evening. The
instructions asked them to assemble separately, not in groups,
and then to come one by one to a second floor room. A legis-
lator present at the time later recalled how "the lights at the
meeting were dimmed and the proceedings carried on in low
tone of voice." A quorum of nineteen senate Democrats and
fifty-three from the house was announced as present, though
those attending were not certain of the numbers. The group
then heard the joint committee report, adopted it unani-
mously, and declared William Goebel the rightful governor. It
had been less than thirty-six hours since he was shot.
Sometime before nine o'clock that same evening of 31
January 1900, Chief Justice James H. Hazelrigg of the Court
of Appeals swore in Goebel as governor. Although rumors still
are heard that he gave the oath to a dead man, the presence of
several witnesses and the later testimony of many prominent
people indicate that Goebel was still very much alive. He
signed, probably with the guiding hand of others aiding him, a
proclamation designed by Democrats to counter Taylor's.
Goebel ordered the troops removed and the legislature reas-
sembled.
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Now began the long and involved question of who was le-
gally governor. Was Taylor's proclamation constitutional? Was
the crisis an insurrection? If so, did that void the Democratic
legislative actions? Republicans kept possession of the state
buildings and refused to acknowledge Democratic actions,
while their opposition issued orders as if they controlled the
executive office. Neither side's partisans accepted the actions
of the other. Anti-Goebel leaders now faced a difficult deci-
sion. They had counselled throughout that the law should be
followed, that decisions should be respected, as in the election
board's 2-1 vote. And although the Democratic action might
not be fair, it was apparently legal. Even Taylor admitted this,
in part, when he commented that the proceedings to oust him
were conducted with respect to "the formalities of the law.
But it is the mere formality that is respected." Democrat
Breckinridge in the Morning Herald soon wrote of the con-
troversyas the "battle of truth against sham forms of law," but
he recognized his side's slipping legal position. Other Repub-
licans and anti-Goebel Democrats seemed uncertain of their
course, and several believed Taylor's proclamation was uncon-
stitutional. Yet they would not yield and allow Goebel to be-
come their governor.
What a Lexington paper called the possible "horrors of civil
and fraternal war" threatened. A random shot might have pro-
voked bloodshed and another "Brothers' War." Taylor would
not leave his quarters and guards escorted his family to visit
him, a virtual prisoner. In Frankfort over 1,000 troops had
assembled, and equal numbers of armed Democrats stood
ready. Rockcastle ·County Republi.cans pledged to ·send their
"full quota to the front," and followers in other counties vowed
to march upon the capital if they were needed to enforce the
governor's orders. Various Republican newspapers questioned
the legislative proceedings that resulted in Goebel's
swearing-in, which they suggested was grounds 'enough for
disobedience.
To meet this latter objection, Democrats met on Friday and
more carefully reenacted the earlier proceedings. All was still
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done with lights dimmed and voices low. Then Goebel took
the oath ofoffice again, with local Circuit Judge James E. Can-
trill administering it. Beckham took the oath for lieutenant
governor and issued an order removing Adjutant General Col-
lier, who followed only Republican commands. Collier ig-
nored the order, and Democratic choice John Breckinridge
Castleman set up his own militia in town, subject only to the
Democrats. Two governments and two armies now existed.
And in the Capitol Hotel the man indirectly responsible for
this situation lay dying. William Goebel's condition fluctuated,
but physicians promised little hope. Uremic poisoning set in,
blood filled his lungs, pneumonia developed. Conscious most
of the time, Goebel kept asking for water, but he could get
little relief. Doctors gave more injections to halt pain. In times
of relative painlessness, Goebel conferred with lieutenants, a
politician to the end. He gave advice on possible courses of
action. But he had little strength and such occurrences came
less often. By 2 February his temperature had risen and his
pulse had almost doubled. A newspaper reported that he had
been kept alive through the night only by "artificial stimu-
lants."
Arthur had arrived soon after the assassination attempt,
gone into his brother's room and kissed him; he seldom left
William alone after that. Goebel's sister came also. Justus was
rushing eastward on a train from Arizona while his brother
continued to fight death.
On 3 February William Goebel's struggle ended. At ten
o'clock that morning he became worse. Doctors injected mor-
phine and other drugs and administered oxygen, but they
could not halt a rising fever. Hiccoughs and nausea increased
in strength. Although only semiconscious, Goebel told a
minister, "I do not hold myself in open violation to the word
of God." In early afternoon, he asked a physician if he would
die. The doctor told him he had but a few hours left. At 5:45
Goebel requested a drink of water, and then soon lapsed into
unconsciousness. Twenty-five minutes later, doctors left him
with his brother and sister. Alone with two of the few people
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who knew him well, William Goebel died at about 6:44 P.M.
His brother Justusl's arrival at the station within the hour came
too late. At age forty-four, his ambition to be governor realized
for only three days, William Goebel had survived an assassinl's
bullet for only a little over 100 hours.
His last words-as reported by Democrats-insured that his
memory would live on: "Tell my friends to be brave, fearless
and loyal to the great common people.l'l'
9THE SEARCH FOR
THE ASSASSIN
THE LEGEND had begun. Irvin Cobb recalled later that
journalists immediately scoffed at Goebel's deathbed oratory.
Suspicious because William Goebel had given little evidence
of such eloquence in life, he and other reporters had inquired
and found that these were not the words uttered. According to
Cobb's version, Goebel had craved a favorite dish and, after
eating it, had told a physician before becoming unconscious,
"Doc, that was a damned bad oyster." Goebel may have told
his friends to be "loyal to the great common people," but more
likely he did not. Initial accounts did not contain this state-
ment. What had probably occurred was that this speech was
but the first of many later moves by Democrats to insure that
Goebel would become a popular martyr. A man disliked by so
many would be transformed into an honored hero who nobly
fought for the comman man and for the good of his party,
against an evil monopoly and a militaristic opposition. The
Kentucky senate adopted a resolution which said, "As the
Christ's life was sacrificed to class hatred conspiring with im-
perial power, so the life of William Goebel paid forfeit to a
conspiracy of monopolistic power."
Goebel's death removed the Single barrier to reasonable
discussion between the two sides. The shock of the assassina-
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tion and the threat of civil war brought leaders to work for
some kind of settlement. After being appointed by Beckham,
Adjutant General Castleman conferred with his opposite
number and longtime friend, General Collier. Both belonged
to the Masonic order and agreed to honor the "brotherhood
and fraternity" of the Masonic code. They pledged not to op-
pose each other by arms. As he left, Castleman said, "Thank
God for this, for now the law and not the rifle shall determine
the right." And so it would. On 5 February the Democratic
majority met in Louisville, thus removing from Frankfort
another potential catalyst of trouble. In London the Republi-
can minority failed to get a quorum, as the two legislatures
continued to act as if each did not exist. Yet the distance
separating the antagonists allowed others to attempt com-
promise.
On the Sunday following Goebers death the Democratic
hierarchy conferred at Louisville's Seelbach Hotel. Beckham,
Trimble, Ollie James, Urey Woodson, Henry Watterson, and
other leaders talked until early morning. The day news of this
meeting appeared, the Republican Louisville Commercial
editorially called on Taylor to allow the legislature to meet in
Frankfort. It also stressed a Republican theme for the next
months: resubmit to the people in November the question of
who is governor.
In a growing spirit of peace, a Republican called on Senator
Blackburn to try to arrange a conference of leaders of both
parties. Finally at 3:00 A.M. they decided to meet together. On
6 February 1900 the men talked for several hours and then
signed an agreement. Democrats received acknowledgement
that Goebel had been legally selected governor and that Beck-
ham now was the rightful heir to the office. Republicans
vowed to remove the militia from Frankfort. In return Demo-
crats promised to grant immunity to Republican officials, to
postpone legislative actions for a week, to stop contested elec-
tions for senator and representative in the General ...Assembly,
and to provide a new "absolutely fair and nonpartisan" election
law. Lieutenant Governor Marshall and "Gus" Willson were
among seven prominent Republicans, and Beckham,
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Blackburn, McCreary, Woodson, and Lillard were among
nine Democrats, who signed the proposal.
Peace could at last come to Kentucky even before Goebel's
burial-if Taylor would sign the agreement. The governor's
options were decreasing. After a cabinet meeting, President
McKinley had refused to send requested troops to the state
and had so informed Republicans. Not a man of strong charac-
ter, Taylor vacillated. A visitor thought he "displayed extreme
distress of mind." Taylor believed he had been elected, and
he wanted to hold what he thought was his rightful office. Yet
he feared that if he did not resign he might be killed.
According to one description, Taylor "walked the floor, his
bony arms flailing the air, the skirts of his dismal coat flapping
like black distress flags, his famous underslung jaw adroop
until it seemed ready to . . . fall off, and his haggard eyes
streaming." Political advisor Breckinridge wrote his daughter
about the man he defended: "Taylor," he said, "is an irreso-
lute, unstable and indecisive man-incapable of either making
up his mind or keeping it made up. . . . He is patriotic, well
meaning and perhaps with physical courage; but wholly unfit
for leadership in times like these. He advises with every body,
sends for every body; seems to agree with the last advice. . . .
I am sorry for him." Breckinridge judged his man well, and
apparently he or Basil Duke gave the last advice. Both re-
jected yielding to Goebel Democrats, and Taylor followed that
course when he refused to sign the peace proposal. "No Com-
promise With Dishonor," the Louisville Commercial taunted
Watterson. The controversy continued for several more
months.
But clearly something had to be done. Harper's Weekly
called the time in the commonwealth, "the greatest political
crisis in any State. . . since the days of 1877." The prospect of
bloodshed, said the writer, "is not remote." About the only
humor in a grim situation came from Mr. Dooley (F. P.
Dunne), who had Taylor saying that martial law was "made
undher Ine own personal supervision. . . . So th' nex' ye hear
th' sojers ar-re chasin' th' coorts out iv th' State, th'Legislature
is meetin' in Duluth, Pinsacola, an' Bangor, Maine, an' a com-
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ity iv citizens, consistin' iv some iv th' best gun-fighters iv th'
State, ar-re meetin' to decide how th' controversay can be de-
cided without loss iv blood or jobs." He ended with the obser-
vation that "they's something wr-rong in Kentucky, Hinnissy.
We were too slow. Th' inimy got th' first cheat."
The object of Dooley's ridicule, Taylor on 10 February re-
moved all but some 200 militia from the capital, as proof of his
good faith, and on the nineteenth the legislature reconvened
in Frankfort. But in their farcical actions in the chambers they
proved worthy of Mr. Dooley's ridicule. Republican Lieuten-
ant Governor Marshall's orders were followed only by his
party, and Democrats obeyed only their acting officers. Sepa-'
rate prayers, separate journals, separate votes all went on at
the same time, with neither side admitting the other's legiti-
macy. Then on the twenty-first, Taylor, Marshall, and other
Republicans finally agreed to let the judiciary decide the issue.
Beckham signed the proposal, which said that both parties
"will submit to and abide by all orders and judgements of the
courts."
The various legal actions were consolidated and went before
Louisville Circuit Court Judge Emmet Field. He heard
Taylor's attorneys, including Bradley, assert that the illegal
"rump" General Assembly had acted in a quasi-judicial man-
ner and had disfranchised thousands of voters by their actions.
Democrats simply said that such legislative actions historically
were not subject to judicial review. Judge Field supported the
Democratic contention, by implication saying that insurrec-
tion had not occurred. Legislative actions "must be taken as
absolute"; the court had no authority to go behind the legisla-
tive record. Republicans quickly appealed. On 6 April 1900
the Court of Appeals supported the lower court in a nonparti-
san decision. That left Republicans dependent on the United
States Supreme Court.
Taylor remarked: "I am not a criminal, neither shall 1 be a
fugitive from justice. Whenever indicted, if such an outrage
should be committed, I will appear for trial." But as the day
came for the announcement of the final judicial decision, he
suddenly went to Louisville. There a reporter found him walk-
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ing back and forth in his familiar long black coat, string tie, and
black hat. "I will stay here and fight. I will not run away," he
repeated as he paced. The news came quickly on 21 May 1900
that only Kentuckian John M. Harlan supported him; all the
other justices saw no federal issues involved and returned the
case. Fearing arrest, the now former governor fled across the
river to Indiana. Taylor never returned, despite extradition
efforts. He practiced law in Indianapolis until his death
twenty-eight years later. The Republicans had lost the gover-
norship.
Taylor wired his adjutant general to "surrender your office
to your successor" and to dismiss the militia. Beckham soon
took over the state offices. The State Board of Election Com-
missioners, sitting as a contest board, had earlier ruled Demo-
crats the victors in the minor offices. Throwing out the Jeffer-
son County vote and that of four mountain counties, they gave
the Democrats a majority. The Court of Appeals by a partisan
4-3 vote affirmed that decision. (Eventually Republicans won
one position.) By 22 May 1900 the matter had been settled. No
more militia marched, no dual government contested for
power, and all was relatively quiet.
Although some Republicans expectedly raged over the out-
come, the party as a whole took the decision peacefully. They
perhaps felt some guilt over the assassination, certainly recog-
nized their minority status in both legislative and judicial
branches, and, most importantly, firmly believed that the
November election would put Republicans back in power.
Calm acceptance of the outcome could be better received if
they could regain the offices in only six months. The question
of who was governor was settled-for the time.
But the question of who had killed Goebel was not. That
matter troubled contemporaries for many years and has
plagued those who have studied the events ever since. The
day of the shooting a heavily armed man named Holland
Whittaker, from Taylor's Butler County, was seized and
charged with the assassination. It was the first arrest. Soon a
large number of lawyers, detectives, and other investigators
began to become involved as the search for Goebel's killer
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widened. The legislature appropriated $100,000 for the
effort-which Republicans charged was used to bribe wit-
nesses. The opposition vehemently denied the accusation.
Politics had quickly found its way into the investigation and
would remain. Before it ended, twenty persons were accused
as principals or accessories to the assassination and sixteen of
these were indicted. Three became prosecution witnesses on
promises of immunity from prosecution, and of the remaining
thirteen, only five went before ajury. Three convictions finally
resulted.
Preliminary evidence gathered by investigations made it un-
likely that the first man arrested-Whittaker-had fired the
shot. Besides that, Democrats suspected-and perhaps
hoped-that Republicans higher in administration circles
were involved. On 9 March a clerk in the auditor's office was
arrested, and warrants were issued for a former Republican
secretary of state, a state police captain, Secretary of State
Caleb Powers, and Powers's brother John. One of the four fled
to Indiana, another to South America. Disguised in army uni-
forms, Powers and the fourth man boarded a train in an at-
tempt to escape. At Lexington they were discovered and ar-
rested. In their possession officers found a document signed
by Taylor pardoning Powers for any "alleged complicity" in
the murder of William Goebel. Democrats refused to honor
the pardon, since they accepted only Beckham's authority.
More arrests, of lesser figures, soon followed.
On 2 April 1900 Judge James E. Cantrill convened the
Franklin County grand jury. "The Judge with 'flowing' whis-
kers" had been a former Democratic legislator and lieutenant
governor, and had aided the Goebel cause since the election.
He was not a nonpartisan observer, as his rulings would re-
veal. In the jury selection fate certainly seemed to favor
Goebel Democrats, for ten of the twelve chosen jurors sup-
ported that party. Nine votes were needed for indictment, and
in the end the prosecution got ten. Republicans began a
charge they would continue throughout many trials-that the
jury was "packed." The grand jury i~dicted ten men, including
the three who would eventually be found guilty-Henry E.
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Youtsey of the auditor's office, James B. Howard from eastern
Kentucky, and Secretary of State Powers. Later indictments
named William S. Taylor, among others, but he had left the
state by that time.
Chief interest thus focused on Caleb Powers, the highest
Republican official on trial. On 9 July 1900 his case began in
Scott County after a stern and determined Judge Cantrill
granted a change of venue. Still, Democrats controlled the
sheriff's office, which selected and summoned prospective
jurors. Former Governor Brown led a Republican-funded de-
fense; but after exhausting challenges, he had to accept a jury
of at least eleven Goebel Democrats.
While Commonwealth's Attorney Robert B. Franklin titu-
larly led the prosecution, Justus and Arthur Goebel engaged
attorney Thomas C. Campbell. A well-known lawyer from
Cincinnati and N ew York, he received, according to Woodson,
about $150,000 for services and expenses. Campbell-with
few restraints by Judge Cantrill-evoked in lurid terms the
Democratic version of events through the testimony of over
sixty witnesses. The commonwealth sought to show that Pow-
ers brought the Hmountain army" to Frankfort to intimidate
the legislature and, failing that, to kill Goebel; that the secre-
tary of state tried to entice others to do the deed earlier; that
he made plans through Youtsey to accomplish the assassina-
tion and left his office key with him; and that the killer shot
from a window in Powers's office.
Conflicts quickly developed. Witnesses on the scene that
January day had given different accounts as to where the shot
had come from, although now they generally proclaimed that
Powers's office had in fact been the site. A bullet found in a
nearby tree ten days after the shooting was thought to be the
one that had killed Goebel, and a surveyor employed by the
prosecution used it.to trace an angle back to Powers's office as
well. Taylor's private secretary testified as to Youtsey's ac-
tions. He had seen the man some days earlier, looking out a
window, with a rifle in his hand. HIf trouble comes, I am going
to be prepared," Youtsey had said.
The prosecution explained Powers's absence from Frankfort
116
the day of the assassination as a planned move to provide a
convenient alibi. (He had received word of the shooting on
board a train just outside Louisville.) A witness told of an ear-
lier plan to give a key to a proposed assassin. That, said the
state, explained why the door to Powers's office was locked
when men tried to enter it after the assassination. Three for-
mer aides to Powers gave the most sensational accounts.
Freed from prosecution in return for their testimony, they
told details of conversations in which Powers had told them to
bring armed men to Frankfort to kill Democratic legislators
and Goebel, to start riots, and to call out the militia to keep
Republicans in office. Powers had masterminded the plot,
they said.
The defense demonstrated fairly conclusively that one wit-
ness had perjured himself and that another's testimony was of
questionable validity. The commonwealth's most damaging
evidence had come from Powers's close associate Wharton
Golden. Brown noted Golden's earlier indictments for boot-
legging and carrying concealed weapons. He finally got
Golden to admit reluctantly that Campbell and Arthur Goebel
has harassed him and told him he would go to the penitentiary
for life if he did not testify for the prosecution.
Powers took the stand himself, admitted to some rash
statements, but denied the most incriminating ones attributed
to him. He acknowledged bringing the 1,000 or so men to
Frankfort, but cited different motives. The former secretary of
state said he had both keys to his office in his possession, and
explained that aduplicate must have been used. Powers vig-
orously asserted that he had never threatened to kill Goebel or
been involved in a conspiracy to do so. He had fled because he
believed partisan men would not give him a fair trial.
Other witnesses noted that shots had come from the third
floor, not Powers's lower-level office, that the bullet found in
the tree could not have been the one that hit Goebel, that
Youtsey had acted suspiciously but quite separate from Pow-
ers. After prosecution rebuttal, the court made its charge to
the jury. Cantrill's instructions were consistent with his parti-
sanship. Twenty-four hours of lawyers' arguments sent the
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case to the jury, after thirty-six court days. Less than an hour
later the jurors filed back into the courtroom and it was an-
nounced that-as expected-they had found Powers guilty.
He was sentenced to life imprisonment. While his lawyers ap-
pealed, Powers went back to jail.
On 7 September 1900, Jim Howard's case began in
Frankfort. Thirty-three years old, married and with three
children, the quiet Clay County Republican had been engaged
in the bitter White-Baker feud that had ended in several
deaths. He had come to the capital, he said, seeking a pardon
from Taylor. Democrats charged that he had been the actual
assassin. Jury selection under Judge Cantrill continued the
earlier patterns, as at least eleven Democrats heard the case.
Several witnesses testified as to Howard's presence on the
grounds of the Capitol, and five men swore that they had
heard him boast that he had done the deed. Attorney Camp-
bell brought in and dwelt on Howard's earlier indictments for
murder in the Clay County feud-noting parallels. Howard
also testified in his own defense, saying the he was in a hotel ~t
the time of the shooting and denying the statements attrib-
uted to him. His defense attorney called three men who
weakly supported his alibi. After the same biased instructions
by Cantrill and sensational closing arguments by both sides,
the jury began its deliberations. In a half hour they returned a
verdict of guilty and called for the death penalty. An appeal
followed.
A third trial opened in Scott County before Judge Cantrill
on 8 October 1900. Goebel Democrat jurors again were
selected to hear the case. The defendant was Henry E. Yout-
sey. A religious man from a respected family, the stenographer
from Newport was also rash, undisciplined, and very unstable.
To Democratic eyes he had been the intermediary between
Powers and Howard. A vengeful Arthur Goebel took the
stand. In appearance resembling his oldest brother, both
eloquent and forceful, he dramatically told how the defendant
had admitted guilt to him. Youtsey sprang up and shouted,
"That's a lie. I hope God will kill me if I ever said a word to
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that man or he to me." The judge ordered him to sit down. He
refused to do so. "There is no blood on my hands, not a parti-
cle. I want everybody to see it. I am innocent." As deputies
tried to restrain him, Youtsey fell to the floor. He sobbed and
shouted, seemed to faint, and could not be revived. The next
day doctors told the court that Youtsey was "temporarily de-
ranged, " and during the rest of the trial the defendant lay as if
lifeless on a cot brought daily into the courtroom.
After the delay Arthur Goebel testified that Youtsey had
admitted to him that he had consulted then governor Taylor
about the matter of William Goebel. Taylor told him to carry
out his plans. He then met Howard outside Powers's locked
office, gave him the key and some special cartridges (to pene-
trate the bullet proof vest they thought Goebel wore), and
left. Other evidence introduced confirmed Youtsey's purchase
of some specially made bullets. Defense attorneys could not
call on their client, who remained unconscious, and Howard's
statement that he had never met Youtsey had little force. In
less than an hour, the jury found Youtsey guilty. Within a few
days Youtsey recovered completely. (He later acknowl-
edged that he had faked the coma "because it seemedto be the
best thing I could do.") He did not appeal the verdict and
began serving his life sentence. The Democrats had their as-
sassins; the Republicans now had their own martyrs.
When the two appeals-Howard's and Powers's-reached
the Court of Appeals, a change had occurred in the composi-
tion of the court. Republican Edward C. O'Rear had won elec-
tion to what had been a Democratic .seat. The men faced
judges who were 4-3 Republican. Not surprisingly, the appel-
late court, by that partisan vote, reversed both cases and sent
them back for new trials. The majority cited Cantrill's "preju-
diced" rulings regarding admission of evidence, his charge to
the jury, and use of Howard's past record in the Clay County
murders. And so began the long process of trials that con-
tinued for seven more years. Howard went through two more
trials, Powers three. With the exception of Powers's last trial,
"packed" juries remained the rule-of 368 jurors summoned
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in one, only 8 were Republican, from counties over 40 percent
Republican. In another, Powers saw 173 of the 176 men sum-
moned as Goebel Democrats.
Testimony in earlier trials had been reprinted in newspapers
across the state and finding an unbiased jury was almost an im-
possibility. Samuel Hopkins Adams's view of the atmosphere
in Kentucky expressed the temper surrounding each trial:
"How deeply the bitterness of the Goebel killing has entered
into the life of Kentucky no outsider can fully realize. The
animosities engendered by it have brought about literally
scores of fatal quarrels. Business partnerships have been dis-
solved; churches have been disrupted; lifelong friendships
have been withered; families have been split; there is no local-
ity so remote, no circle so closely knit, as to escape the evil
influence. At the Capital of the state people dare not talk
freely about it."
Howard's second trial began in January 1902 with argu-
ments and judicial instructions almost identical to the first.
The only change in the outcome was that his guilty conviction
brought with it life imprisonment rather than the death pen-
alty. He appealed, and the court again reversed the results by
a partisan vote. Democrats refused to allow to go free men
they saw as murderers and conspirators. Howard's third trial
began in April 1903. Only this time a new prosecution witness
testified. Henry Youtsey had been in the penitentiary for two
years now, and reporters described his wild, furtive eyes, and
his prison pallor. Some reports circulated that he had been
tortured; more likely he appeared on promises of leniency.
Whatever the cause, Youtsey was a firm friend of the prosecu-
tion.
Youtsey linked Taylor to the "conspiracy" by saying that the
ex-governor had discussed the planned assassination with
Howard and himself. According to Youtsey, Taylor and Pow-
ers ·planned it, he served as their aide, and Howard fired the
shot. The defense cross-examined Youtsey effectively, indi-
cated some obvious errors, introduced Taylor's deposition that
he had never talked to Howard or suggested assassination, and
allowed Powers and Howard to take the stand and deny Yout-
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sey's version. But the results revealed the futility of defense:
Howard was found guilty. The usual appeal followed. But an
election had once again changed the complexion of the court.
Now 5-2 Democratic, the Kentucky Court of Appeals on 22
April 1904 affirmed Howard's conviction by that partisan mar-
gin. A year and a half later, the United States Supreme Court
refused to review that decision. In 1906 Howard joined Yout-
sey and began serving a life sentense.
Powers had faced similar experiences. His second trial had
begun in October 1901 with two of his prominent accusers
now absent. Both witnesses had repudiated their previous tes-
timony, citing bribery and intimidation. Republicans im-
mediately seized on this as proof of their accusation of a polit-
ical witch hunt, while Democrats said the opposition simply
had bribed these men to change their stories. Nevertheless,
the trial went much as the first one, with Cantrill's same parti-
san tactics. And at the end the jury returned the same verdict
and punishment as before. Power's appeal was successful.
The third trial might prove crucial. Powers faced this con-
frontation with the knowledge of Youtsey's damaging tes-
timony. He knew the prosecution sought the death sentence.
He perhaps guessed that reversal by an unfriendly Court of
Appeals was unlikely. A guilty verdict this time might mean
his life. Powers prepared thoroughly and engaged the services
of new counsel, including Lexington attorney Samuel M. Wil-
son. His lawyers asked Cantrill to disqualify himself, in accord
with what the appellate court had ruled in its last reversal.
Cantrill refused. Finally, after Powers's lawyers obtained a
court mandate ordering his disqualification, an angry judge
obeyed rather than face contempt charges. The new judge had
also supported Goebel, but his overall rulings were less partial
than Cantrill's.
In August 1903-over three years since his first trial-Caleb
Powers faced the prosecution again. The same evidence was
given, aided this time by Youtsey's more detailed testimony.
In much better health now-the defense attempted to show a
cause and effect relationship brought about by his
testimony-Youtsey again implicated Taylor, Powers, and
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Howard. All three men, in person or by deposition, refuted
his story. After thirty-eight days of hearing evidence, the re-
spective counsels made their appeals. Then Powers rose.
Trained in the law, speaking only with the briefest notes, he
made an able and emotional talk that lasted seven hours.
Widely reprinted later, it covers over eighty pages of fine
print. Whether a conspirator or not, Powers was a very capa-
ble and intelligent man. Mter reading over his address one
student of the trials wrote that Powers's speech was "so com-
pletely objective that at times it was difficult to realize he was
talking of and for himself and not for someone else."
Powers analyzed the evidence, stressed the weaknesses of
the prosecution's case, emphasized the partisanship involved,
and argued his defense. All agree on the cowardliness of assas-
sination, he said, all agree that "the killing of Goebel was the
worst possible thing that could have befallen the Republican
party," all agree that the murderer should be punished. "We
differ as to who is responsible for his death." Point by point he
went over the testimony, carefully stressing strong points,
skillfully omitting weak ones. He ended with a melodramatic
portrayal of his mother at home awaiting a verdict. "With a
frail and trembling hand she moves back the white hair from
her sorrow-ridden brow," went a sample sentence. And then
he asked the jury "to liberate the suffering innocent and send
an outraged boy back to the country he loves."
The masterful, if at times overdramatic, speech left the
majority of the courtroom in tears. Even jurors cried, accord-
ing to some accounts, but emotion did not sway their votes.
The verdict was guilty. As Campbell had asked, they rendered
a punishment of death. If the appellate court ruled against
Powers in his appeal, he would be hanged. But in a rare non-
partisan move during these very partisan trials, two Demo-
crats joined two Republicans and reversed the lower court.
They cited errors in Campbell's passionate closing argument
for the death penalty and the partisan jury selection as bases
for their decision.
Still no relief came to Caleb Powers. His clever, effective,
and excellent autobiography My Own Story earned him some
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wealth and much sympathy when it appeared in 1905. But in
late November 1907 his fourth trial began. Prosecutor Camp-
bell had died and thus would harass him no more. On the
other hand, Judge Cantrill had been elected to the Court of
Appeals, where his influence would do the Republicans' cause
no good. Nevertheless, with Campbell dead and Cantrill not
involved at the lower court level, a more general spirit of
justice prevailed. The fact that a Republican had just been
elected governor may have helped.
Whatever the cause, jury selection went well for Powers,
with eight Republicans and four Democrats being chosen. The
defense introduced witnesses who tended to discredit Yout-
sey's testimony. Their statements suggested that Youtsey him-
self had fired the shot. One man swore that he had taken a
Marlin rifle from Powers's office the day of the assassination
and he produced what he said was the weapon used to kill
Goebel. Youtsey had sold the rifle to a man not implicated in
the affair, but the former owner knew its whereabouts that
January day in 1900. Now almost eight years later, on 2
January 1908, Powers's case went to a jury once again. After
two days' deliberation the jurors deadlocked and both sides
consented to dismiss them. Reporters announced that the
vote had been 10-2 for acquittal.
Both Howard and Powers petitioned the Republican gover-
nor for a pardon. On 13 June 1908, "Gus" Willson stated his
belief that both men were innocent, and that Youtsey, now a
thoroughly discredited Republican, had killed Goebel. No
conspiracy existed, said the governor. Less than a year later,
Willson issued pardons to six other men, including former
Governor Taylor. "The American Dreyfus," as Powers was
being called, had, like Howard, been imprisoned for over
eight years when freed. Democrats regained the governorship
in 1911, and five years later Youtsey was paroled. Democratic
Governor James D. Black-from Powers's Knox County-
granted the last of the three convicted men a full pardon in
1919. After two decades the controversy over who had killed
Goebel was almost over.
Youtsey lived for a time as a forlorn and rejected man, di-
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vorced by his wife and with few friends. He eventually remar-
ried and served as county clerk. Howard went into seclusion in
Clay County, refused to see most visitors, and said almost
nothing further about his role in the affair. He did happen to
be in Georgetown the day of old enemy Judge Cantrill's fu-
neral. Someone asked him if he wanted to attend. "No," he
answered, "but I am willing for it to be known that his funeral
has my hearty endorsement." Up to his death, Howard pro-
claimed his innocence.
Powers received a vindication of sorts. As he liked to say, he
served as many years in Congress as he had in jail. Republi-
cans, certain of his persecution by Democrats, selected him
over the party's incumbent in the 1910 primary and swept him
to victory in the fall. Three times Powers won reelection to the
House, although his congressional record was not outstanding.
Powers died in 1932, aged sixty-four, a private man who, to
the last, never diverged from his defense of years earlier.
Who, then, assassinated William Goebel? No simple answer
can be given. If the court testimony is accepted uncritically a
solid scheme of plots, planned assassinations, and wholesale
murders can be outlined. It is easy to paint a believable pic-
ture of a conspiracy involving Powers, Youtsey, Howard, and
others-easy but not quite fair. The testimony is too unreli-
able, the partisanship too strong. Perjured evidence was
known at the time, and other sworn statements may be equally
faulty. As a writer for Harper's Weekly wrote in 1900, "One
side charges too much; the other side denies too much."
Many have examined the case and found their own villains.
A relative was certain that his cousin Youtsey was the assassin;
Powers's attorney Wilson agreed; Urey Woodson, author of a
book on Goebel, firmly believed Howard guilty. Others had
their own culprits. Of the known possibilities Howard, who
had killed before, seems a good choice-with Youtsey as an
accomplice. Youtsey, too, had the temperament of an assas-
sin. And it is conceivable that somewhere lived an unknown
man, alone in the knowledge that he had killed a governor.
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It may be begging the question, but the evidence is simply
too contradictory and the people involved were too partisan to
allow any definitive answer. Until new information is uncov-
ered, the answer to the question, "Who killed William
Goebel?" is simply, "We do not know." Nor may we ever.
10
"HE IS GOEBEL,
THAT IS ALL"
ATHOUGH GOEBEL was the only American governor who
died in office as a result of an assassination-among the
roughly 1300 who have served-he was not the victim of a
unique act. Before him in 1893, the Kentucky-born mayor of
Chicago had been shot. In 1901 President McKinley was
killed, and eleven years later Theodore Roosevelt was
wounded by a would-be assassin. In Tennessee former United
States Senator and recently defeated gubernatorial nominee
Edward Ward Carmack died of wounds suffered in a 1908
shooting. In Kentucky itself the violent spirit of the "dark and
bloody groundn had resulted earlier in the death of a Court of
Appeals justice and in various other murders.
But if Goebel's assassination occurred in a framework of vio-
lence it was different in other ways. Studies have indicated
that many attacks on political leaders were directed more at
the office held or sought than at the person. In Goebel's case it
seems fairly certain that the man himself provoked the action.
Goebel fits well the category of "high riskn politicians-men
who excessively drive themselves to advance their careers,
while Willingly exposing themselves to dangerous situations.
Goebel's own behavior aroused intense hatred and bitter
reaction. Convinced that uncorrected evils existed, Goebel in-
creasingly pictured himself as the target of organized political
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plots, as the lone figure fighting a sinister opposition: his
course became more correct, his opponents' less defensible.
Goebel almost had to have this view in order to drive himself
to the lengths required for victory. Ambition united with a
reform obsession, and the two became inseparable. Com-
promise could not be accepted in Goebel's political morality
play.
T. Harry Williams's appraisal of Huey Long-a different
type of leader-applies also to Goebel: "He wanted to do
good, but to accomplish that he had to have power. So he took
power, and finally the means and the end became so entwined
in his mind that he could not distinguish between them, could
not tell whether he wanted power as a method or for its own
sake." Thus Goebel moved in ways that made him appear
more dangerous to the established order than any previous
state politician. His actions strengthened his opponents' view
of him as an utterly ruthless man who would use any means-
legal or not-to win office. They felt his tactics dictated their
responses. When Goebel appeared near his goal, a minority
angered by events provided the "Lost Cause" environment
from which the assassin probably emerged. Viewed as a cor-
rupt political boss, Goebel could be seen by an enemy as a
menace that must be removed.
Goebel's ambition had forced him to the course of machine
politician, and he initiated the events that turned him into
"Boss Bill, the Kenton King." He recognized that to achieve
his desires would require less traditional methods-a danger-
ous gambit in a conservative state. In an attempt to overthrow
the established party machinery he built his own machine in a
ruthless manner. Not to do this meant less opportunity for
final victory. And so he irreversibly committed his career to
controversy-and eventually to violence.
In retrospect, William Goebel appears as a prototype of the
twentieth-century urban political boss with a reform orienta-
tion. To contemporaries in Kentucky this appearance was a
contradiction they could not understand: Goebel had either to
be a boss or a reformer; he could not be both. Within a few
decades of his death, however, Goebel's actions did not seem
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so unusual. His railroad bills and election law varied little from
the prevailing southern pattern. Men like HBiny" Klair of
Lexington, Mickey Brennan of Louisville, and Maurice Galvin
of Covington continued his political type in Kentucky. HBoss"
Ed Crump of Memphis operated in a similar fashion. Other
urban machines, such as New Orleans' "Old Regulars," rose to
power as the South became less rural-oriented. By the early
twentieth century various Hmachines" operated in almost
every southern state. Nor were leaders of the Progressive
movement immune to machine influences. Woodrow Wilson
used New Jersey bosses in his career, for example. But in
Goebel's era, in Kentucky's environment, his association with
boss rule turned many articulate reformers against him and
made his task more difficult.
This was the contradiction: while Goebel voiced the reform
refrain, his actions spoke against reform. Other leaders of the
time-HGolden Rule" Jones of Toledo and Kentucky-born
Tom Johnson of Cleveland, for example-also attacked or-
ganized wealth and corporations. But they directed their ef-
forts against political machines as well. Goebel's stands paral-
leled and anticipated many of the programs of Robert M.
LaFollette-equalization of corporate property, regulation of
railroad rates, and strong commissions. But when LaFollette
found opponents blocking his every step, he countered by
taking his programs to the people, and his resonant voice and
speaking ability allowed him to articulate his thoughts. Wilson
did the same in New Jersey. In both cases the masses reacted
favorably. Goebel had to influence through his governmental
actions, and if his way was blocked, his personality and oratory
did not easily allow him to appeal successfully to the people.
Convincing himself that he sought noble goals, Goebel rec-
ognized that the political world counted only votes, not inten-
tions. And in his effort to control Kentucky he went to exces-
sive lengths, disrupted his party, and almost caused civil war
in the state. Goebel died trying to gain power, in some ways a
victim of himself: a man sacrificed to ambition without limit
and politics without compromise.
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Assassinations have changed public attitudes and influenced
subsequent political history. In Goebel's case the question
arose qUickly: would his death end reform in the state? Some
historians have suggested that the assassination did in fact
crush the progressive spirit, and that as a result Kentucky
never experienced the reforms of the Progressive Era. In one
sense this view is correct. For the assassination warne.d
would-be reformers of the dangers of attempting too much, of
challenging the established order too forcefully.
Overall, however, the murder of William Goebel did not
abort reform. Constructive change did come to the common-
wealth. The fact that it came slowly and with less force than
elsewhere owes more to the state's relative poverty, rurality,
and continued legacy of violence than to one man's assassina-
tion. Actually many specific changes advocated by Goebel
came about quite quickly and the Progressive movement did
find a willing-if belated-home in Kentucky.
Reform began in the Democratic rump assembly that ruled
following the assassination. Though without Republican par-
ticipation, this General Assembly was recognized as legal by
the courts. It quickly enacted the McChord bill without a dis-
senting vote, giving the Railroad Commission power "to make
and fix a just and reasonable rate." Another act-to go into
effect at once because "armed hordes of men have been trans-
ported to Frankfort"-made illegal such free transportation
"for the purpose of intimidating any office or officers· in this
Commonwealth." A third act struck out at corporations' in-
volvement in elections by forbidding such organizations ·to
furnish "any money, privilege, favor or other thing of value to
any political or quasi political organization." From the grave
William Goebel had won his victories over the railroads.
Goebel's youthful successor has been uniformly repre-
hended for his inability to continue this reform spirit. J. C. W.
Beckham allowed his attention and efforts to focus on a bloody
mountain feud and on lawless Night Rider activity in the Black
Patch War. In both cases ·he appeared to side with violence.
His legislature passed a law segregating Berea College, which
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created a brief furor. And by the end of his term, the governor
came under attack for "selling out" to the L & N. Yet despite
these less than distinguished actions, Beckham did continue-
sporadically-the reform spirit suggested by Goebel. His ad-
ministration· extended the school term, set up an effective
compulsory education law, began two teachers' colleges, suc-
cessfully amended the Food and Drug Act, raised the age of
consent, passed a child labor law, and began construction of a
much needed new capitol.
In fact, it is at least possible that Goebel would not have
greatly improved upon Beckham's record had he lived. His
dozen years in the senate had not resulted in many specific
legislative acts, that bore his stamp. The Goebel Election Law
had been far from legitimate reform, for instance. Beckham
got it repealed before the special 1900 election (which he
barely won). And while Goebel had kept before the people
some important questions, he had shown only limited interest
in others, such as educational reform. Goebel never had the
opportunity to show .whether he would foster major reform
once in control of government or .simply reach for more
power, as enemies charged. But his death stimulated a brief
Hurry of reform legislation that helped accomplish his pro-
gram. The assassination did not snuff out the growing Harne of
progressivism.
The sparks ·kindled during Beckham's seven years in office
burst into a relative inferno of reform when the Democrats
regained the gubernatorial office in 1911 after Willson's term.
It was under the administration of cautious, conservative ex-
Confederate "Bothsides" McCreary· that progressivism came
to Kentucky in full force. ·He had used his remarkable political
ability to regain ·the governor's chair, and he followed-
typically-voters ready for constructive change. As a result
McCreary ended his four years with a generally good record of
reform.
Leaders opposed to Goebel at the Music Hall years before
now won the prize fot which they had contested in 1899. Pro-
gressivism continued its advance under Governor·A. o. Stan-
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ley. Reform thus came to Kentucky slowly but ironically under
the old order that Goebel had so disliked, or under the leader-
ship of those who had opposed him before his nomination,
while supporting their party after it. Many of the very forces
Goebel had viewed as reactionary became in fact the vanguard
of the Progressive movement. They had triumphed over
Goebel.
And throughout these years William Goebel was not re-
membered chiefly as a reformer, or even as a political boss,
but rather only as the assassinated martyr. Democratic orators
cried out against "the party that murdered Goebel," and "piti-
ful politicians . . . ghoul-like . . . [would] metaphorically dig
up his remains to excite the populace and accomplish their
pitiful little ends." The ghost of the man who had rejected
such appeals in the nineteenth century now became the
"bloody shirt" issue of the twentieth. Thus William Goebel,
who-correctly or not-eould have been remembered as a
symbol of reform, became instead only a campaign tactic. This
perhaps was the real tragedy of Goebel.
But Goebel was more than a campaign tactic. To his con-
temporaries, exactly what he was depended on your political
faith. To historians, he remains something of a paradox even
now. Perhaps Arthur Goebel analyzed his brother best in a
December 1900 letter. "It is almost a year since William
died," he concluded, "and he lives in the minds of the people
as much as ever. Why is it? He is Goebel, that is all."
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Bibliographical Note
AN EXTENSIVE collection of Goebel letters has not yet been
made public, if they exist. The best available source is the ,
Goebel Family Letters, on microfilm in Special Collections,
Margaret I. King Library, University of Kentucky. Seldom
used before, these are a rich source of information. Acknowl-
edgement is made to Dr. Bennett Wall of Tulane University
for his role in gathering these and other manuscripts.
For Goebel's early life and background see the small Wil-
liam Goebel Papers at the University of Kentucky, his father's
Compiled Service Record at the National Archives, and Ken-
ton County Tax Lists in the Kentucky Historical Society. Ken-
ton County Will Book 8 has Goebel's will. The John White
Stevenson Collection, at the University of Kentucky, gives in-
sights into Goebel's mentor.
In the politics of the 1890s much more is available from the
side that opposed Goebel. Covington rivals speak out in the
Hallam Family Papers and the Mackoy Family Papers while
the Preston-Johnston Family Papers, the W. J. Stone Papers,
the Cassius Marcellus Clay Collection, and the Lindsay Family
Papers offer much material. Valuable information on railroads
can be discovered in the Craig Shelby Papers. All these major
collections are at the University of Kentucky. At the Manu-
script Division, Library of Congress, the valuable, but un-
Wieldy collection of the Breckinridge Family Papers shows
W. C. P. Breckinridge's changing politics. The Henry Watter-
son Papers are disappointing.
Republicans speak more softly, for less material on them is
available. The Kentucky Historical Society houses the unpro-
cessed papers of the governors of this period. The papers of
both W. O. Bradley and W. S. Taylor proved helpful. Only a
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few items are in the William Sylvestor Taylor Papers, on
microfilm at the University of Kentucky, while the William
McKinley Papers at the Library of Congress, good for 1899,
are surprisingly silent on events of 1900. See also the .Reuben
N. Miller Papers at the University of Kentucky, and William
O'Connell Bradley's Scrapbooks which chiefly contain news-
paper clippings.
The Filson Club in Louisville has many items that focus
primarily on the election of 1899 and its aftermath. The Arthur
Younger Ford Papers, the James W. Ainslie Letters, and the
Dee Armstrong and William G. Harding Papers all provide
items of use. Richard W.Knott's biased "History of Goebel-
ism," in the Temple Bodley Collection, is valuable.
Information on the trials themselves can be found in the
Goebel Papers at the Kentucky Historical Society, or in the
Caleb Powers Trial Papers in the Wilson Manuscript Collec-
tion at the University of Kentucky. Scrapbooks of various use
include the Annie G. Crutcher, J. C. W. Beckham, and
W. W. Stevenson scrapbooks at the Kentucky Historical Soci-
ety, and the "Clippings on the Assassination of William
Goebel," Lillard H. Carter Scrapbook, and Bruce Ferguson
Scrapbook, at the University of Kentucky.
Most earlier accounts concerning Goebel have relied chiefly
on the Democratic Courier-Journal, the Lexington Morning
Herald, and the Republican Lexington Daily Leader. These
are all valuable and have been used here as well. But three
other major dailies give a different viewpoint and are in some
ways even more instructive. The Louisville Commercial spoke
for Republicans, the Louisville Evening Post for indepen-
dents, and the Louisville Dispatch for Brown Democrats in
1899. To use only these, however, risks ignoring the smaller
but still influential papers. Included among the more than
twenty examined, were the Hickman Courier, the Hazel
Green Herald, the Nelson County Record, the Glasgow
Times, the London Mountain Echo, the Paducah Sun, and the
Louisville Kentucky Irish-American. Information on Goebel's
elections and environment in Covington comes from the
Newport Kentucky State Journal and the Cincinnati En-
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quirer. One of the most useful out-of-state newspapers was
the New York Times.
Goebel's senate career can be followed in the Kentucky
Senate Journals, 1887-1900, and other events can be traced in
the House Journals of the same period. The final results are
printed in Kentucky Acts of the General Assembly. The mas-
sive, four-volume Official Report of the Proceedings and De-
bates in the Convention . .. to adopt, amend or change the
Constitution of the State of Kentucky traces in detail Goebel's
public role. Kentucky Reports, vol. 108, has the state court
ruling on the contested election.
Surprisingly few studies of Goebel have been printed. The
most exhaustive has not. William S. Lester's manuscript,
"The Goebel Affair" relies on standard sources, is anti-Goebel
and anti-Powers, and is over 600 pages long. It suffers from an
uncritical use of the trial testimony. Perhaps the best book-
length study is also the oldest one: R. E. Hughes, F. W.
Schaefer, and E. L. Williams, That Kentucky Campaign; or
the Law, the Ballot and the People in the Goebel-Taylor Con-
test (Cincinnati, 1900). Considering the authors' closeness to
events, it is surprisingly accurate.
The same cannot be said of Urey Woodson's First New
Dealer (Louisville, 1939), which is poorly organized as well.
Its value comes from Woodson's nearness to Goebel. A more
biased Republican view is E. B. Tackett's A Review of the
Goebel Tragedy (Lexington, c. 1916).
Perhaps the first scholarly examination of Goebel came from
Thomas D. Clark. In the first edition of his History of Ken-
tucky (New York, 1937) and then in his "The People, William
Goebel, and the Kentucky Railroad," Journal of Southern
History 5 (1939), he gave an interpretation of Goebel that
became standard. Both Professor Clark in his "William
Goebel-Southern Demagogue," University of Kentucky Re-
search Club 7 (1941) and Joseph G. Green in "William
Goebel: Demagogue or Democrat?" Southern Speech Jour-
nal 27 (1961) examined their subject as a stump speaker
and both found a demagogue. Brief sketches of Goebel's life
are in G. Glenn Clift's Governors of Kentucky, 1792-1942
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(Cynthiana, Ky., 1942) and Robert S. Cotterill, "William
Goebel," Dictionary of American Biography (24 vols., New
York, 1927-).
My information on the trials came in large part from Francis
X. Busch, They Escaped the Hangman (Indianapolis and New
York, 1953). See also A. F. Johnson, Famous Kentucky
Tragedies and Trials (Louisville, 1916).
There are many good regional studies available. Two impor-
tant ones are C. Vann Woodward's Origins of the New South,
1877-1913 (Baton Rouge, 1951) and a textbook account par-
ticularly strong on the postwar South-Francis B. Simkins'
and Charles P. Roland's A History of the South (4th rev. ed.,
New York, 1972).
Among the state studies, Clark's History, already noted,
and his Kentucky: Land of Contrast (New York, 1968) look at
events in the commonwealth in this period. Election statistics
for presidential races are analyzed well in Jasper B. Shannon
and Ruth McQuown, Presidential Politics in Kentucky,
1824-1948 (Lexington, 1950). A provoking analysis of earlier
politics is Thomas L. Connelly's ~~Neo-Confederatism or
Power Vacuum: Post War Kentucky Politics Reappraised,"
Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 64 (1966). See
also George Leo Willis, Sr., Kentucky Democracy (3 vols.,
Louisville, 1935), vol. 1; and a recent study by Hambleton
Tapp and James C. Klotter, Kentucky: Decades of Discord,
1865-1900 (Frankfort, 1977).
Studies of men important in Goebel's career include Arndt
M. Stickles, Simon Bolivar Buckner: Borderland Knight
(Chapel Hill, 1940); James A. Barnes, John G. Carlisle: Fi-
nancial Statesman (New York, 1931); Joseph F. Wall, Henry
Watterson: Reconstructed Rebel (New York, 1956); and Mary
K. Bonsteel Tachau, "The Making of a Railroad President:
Milton Hannibal Smith and the L & N," Filson Club History
Quarterly 43 (1969).
Recollections of those on the scene during this period vary
in usefulness. Some of the best are Caleb Powers, My Own
Story (Indianapolis, 1905); the unreliable Irvin S. Cobb, Exit
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Laughing (Indianapolis and New York, 1941) and SticTifuls
(New York, 1923); John B. Castleman, Active Service (Louis-
ville, 1917); and Isaac F. Marcosson, Adventures in Inter-
viewing (New York, 1919). Three older histories are virtual
recollections: Samuel M. Wilson's History of Kentucky
(Chicago, 1928), vol. 2, gives Powers's chief lawyer's view.
Both E. Polk Johnson, A History ofKentucky and Kentuckians
(3 vols., Chicago and New York, 1921) and Z. F. Smith, History
of Kentucky (rev. ed., Louisville, 1901) should be examined.
Background .biographical information is in The Illustrated
Centennial Record of the State of Kentucky-(Louisville, 1892);
Biographical Cyclopaedia of the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky (Chicago, 1896); and H. Levin, editor, Lawyers and
Lawmakers ofKentucky (Chicago, [1897]). .
Many studies help to better understand Goebel, including
William D. Miller, Mr. Crump of Memphis (Baton Rouge,
1964) and T. Harry Williams, Huey Long (New York, 1969).
Useful examinations of political murder are Lauren Paine, The
Assassin's World (New York, 1975); William J. Crolty, editor,
Assassins and the Political Order (New York, 1971); and Hugh
Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, editors, The History of
Violence in America (New York and Washington, 1969).
Among the unpublished works is an excellent 1935 senior
thesis from Princeton University-Edward F. Prichard, Jr.,
"Popular. Political Movements in Kentucky, 1875-1900."
Focusing more on Goebel is Nicholas C. Burckel, "Progres-
sive Governors in the Border States . . . 1900-1918" (Ph. D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971). Most of
Burckel's chapter on Goebel was published in the Filson Club
History Quarterly 48 (1974) as "William Goebel and the
Campaign for Railroad Regulation in Kentucky." See also
John D. Minton, "The Political Prosecution and Trials of
Caleb Powers" (Master's thesis, University of Kentucky,
1947). James C. Klotter, "The Breckinridges of Kentucky:
Two Centuries of Leadership" (Ph. D. dissertation, University
of Kentucky, 1975) examines the career of W. C. P. Breckin-
ridge.
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